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ABSTRACT 
FAMILY RESEMBLANCE: A STUDY OF LINGUISTIC CONFORMITY 
WITHIN FAMILY SYSTEMS 
DECEMBER 1991 
REBECCA LEE GARNE'IT, B.Mus., UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI 
M. A. , UNIVERSITY OF M'ASSACHUSETI'S 
AT BOSTON 
Directed by: Professor John R. Murray 
This thesis reports the results of an empirical study designed to test 
two hypotheses from the early psychiatric work of C.G. Jung: first, 
the existence of a "family disposition" toward the word association 
test (WAT), and second, the theory that there is interference between 
the "thinking" and the "feeling" functions in an individual's cognitive 
processing. The experiment involved 52 normal subjects from 15 
families, ranging in age from 12 to 65. Subjects were tested using an 
association instrument adapted from the WAT developed by Jung (Jung, 
1973). Response commonality was examined along several dimensions: 
identical verbal response, identical category response, -and identical 
reaction type. Subjects were found t o have 20% verbal commonality and 
34-38% categorial connnonality within family units. Comparison of 
relatives' responses to those of non-related individuals, using a 
Spearman rank order correlation test on classified responses, yielded 
an average correlation figure of .29 for related and .25 for unrelated 
pairs of individuals; this difference seemed too small to support the 
hypothesis, but no formal test of significance was performed. Sample 
size proved too small to test the significance of response pattern 
redundancy within families. In the second part of the experiment, 38 
subjects completed the deductive logic section of the Ross Test of 
Higher Cognitive Processes, and their error rate was compared with 
their rate of predicative responses on the WAT. A Pearson Product 
Moment Correlation was .57, indicating a moderately strong correlation 
between preference for predication, a characteristic of the "feeling" 
function, and difficulty with deductive logic, a process of the 
"thinking" function. A theoretical chapter traces the evolution of 
Jung's cognitive theories from his early word association experiments 
(Jung, 1973) to the development of his functional system of psycho-
logical typology (Jung, 1971). 37 tables, 12 figures. 
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To the memory of 
Sabina Spielrein, M.D. 
dia gynaikon 
Although the word is shared, 
people live as though thinking were a private possession. 
--Heraclitus 
INTRODUCTION 
OF ASSOCIATIVE, PREDICATIVE, AND DEDUCTIVE LOGIC 
In 1883, Sir Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin and one of 
the founders of modern word association theory, published the first 
edition of a book containing family portraits created through a 
technique he had invented, composite photography. By superimposing the 
image of one individual on that of another, he was able to create the 
portrait of a "family face," an image in which the similarities of form 
and structure among individuals were reinforced through repetition, and 
the differences distinguishing each individual from the others smoothed 
away. The resultant likeness, though representing no one in particular, 
did represent the "family resemblance," the prototypical face in which 
all the individual members had a share. 1 
A generation later, Dr. C.G. Jung uncovered a curious phenomenon 
while giving the word association test to a group of normal subjects at 
the psychiatric clinic of the University of Zurich. Aroclng the first 
thirty-eight people he tested were eight women who were connected by 
family ties, two groups of rnothers with two daughters, and a mother-
daughter pair. In each of these three groups, there was a remarkable 
similarity among reactions to the stimulus words of the test, not only 
in terms of the actual response words uttered, but in terms of the type 
of response, the reaction style, adopted by each of the women. It was 
as though each family group shared a specific attitude, a manner of 
approaching the words of the test, and the concepts they represented, 
that showed an underlying unity of thought and of orientation toward the 
world. 
Was it mere coincidence? Clearly, Jung didn't think so, and he was 
quick to organize an experiment on family associations which was carried 
out by one of his students at the Burgholzli Clinic, Dr. Errrna Furst. 
The results, published by Dr. Furst in 1907 and subsequently reported by 
Jung in his 1909 lectures at Clark University, seemed to point to the 
existence of a family reaction-type, a distinct style of associative 
thinking pervading the responses of family members.2 Individual 
patterns of relationship between stimulus and response, when graphed and 
superimposed on one another, yielded the same sort of prototypical form 
as Galton had produced with his composite photographic images. 
A passionate interest in image and symbol formation diverted Jung's 
attention from any further exploration of the linguistic phenomenon he 
and Furst had observed in families, and the focus of analytical 
psychology, as he was to define it over the next decade, turned to the 
deep autonomous processes which all individuals share--the functions of 
the collective unconscious. Association theory itself followed much the 
same path, shifting its emphasis from t he introspective exploration of 
individuals' thoughts and reminiscences, which had characterized the 
work of Galton, Wundt, and the Zurich researchers, to the generalized, 
mass approach of Kent and Rosanoff, Woodrow and Lowell, Thorndike, 
Palerm:), Russell and Jenkins, in experiments designed to yield the most 
coltlOC)n, nost average, most typical associations across vast populations 
of adults and schoolchildren, responses that can be statistically 
predicted on the basis of frequency tables, word pairs that seem so 
natural in their occurrence as to be somehow embedded in the language of 
everyday usage. 
2 
In both of these approaches--the Jungian and the statistical--what 
has dropped out of the equation is the intermediating system between the 
individual and the collective. It is through the family that the 
collective structure of meaning in society--its language--is introduced 
to each of us; it is by means of family interaction that category, 
opinion, bias, prejudice, and inhibition slip in and permeate the logic 
of everyday discourse, molding our attitudes to conformity with those of 
the group with which we live. And it is out of the matrix of that 
interaction that we emerge into the collective as full participants in 
its linguistic order, holding in conman many of its meanings, but 
bearing with us as well the unseen tokens of a private understanding 
shared only with those who taught us the use of words. 
Cognitive psychology and systems theory have recently turned their 
attention to the role of the family in language acquisition and 
conceptual development, and the influence of family corrmunication style 
in the etiology of functional thought disorders, including the syndrome 
diagnosed as schizophrenia. Jung himself had undertaken his original 
association experiment in order to establish a normative baseline 
against which the reactions of psychotic speech could be compared. As a 
working psychiatrist on the staff of one of the most progressive mental 
hospitals of its day, his primary concern was to be able to shed some 
light on the hopelessly obscure utterances of his inpatients. But what 
emerged from his results had powerful implications for the development 
of a theory of cognition embracing both pathological and "normal" 
thought processes, a theory that leads, by way of the linguistic 
patterns in a household, from simple associative reaction to the full 
panoply of attributes and characteristics comprising personality. 
3 
In a conception that long antedates the current view of "multiple 
intelligences," or "multiple frames of reference," Jung described the 
qualities of a number of different cognitive styles which he had 
observed in tests of verbal association, each of which represented a 
different way of perceiving, processing, and relating to the data of 
material reality. When set on a continuum, these styles could be seen 
to progress systematically from the logical to the pathological; when 
compared among themselves, they showed antithetical and complementary 
features that allowed them to be organized in terms of opposing 
cognitive functions--thinking and feeling, sensation and intuition, as 
they came to be called in his 1921 monograph, Psychological Types. 
4 
Ever since Freud proposed the exi stence of two modes of cognition, 
primary and secondary process t hinking, t he dichotomy between syncretic 
and analytical thought, bet ween the associative and the rational, has 
come to be taken for granted, and yet l i ttle attention has been paid to 
the conditions by which "thi nki ng" comes t o be differentiated as the 
prefered mode of cognition in advanced societies. An implicit 
assumption that rational thought is a universal phenomenon pervades the 
educational system. Piaget suggests that logic is the culminating stage 
of a child's natural cognit ive development; some psycholinguistic and 
cognitive theorists would go even f urther, and locate the discriminative 
function of thought in some sort of i nborn structure of the mind, 
coexistent with innate "hardwiring" for language and information 
processing. 
If it were possible to rely on innate disposition-- natural 
function, hardware, the universal architecture of cognition--to reach 
its predestined potential in the process of rational thought, there 
5 
would be little market for the courses in "critical thinking" that have 
become :[X)pular on the contemporary American educational scene. But the 
fact is that for many individuals, the ability to think critically is a 
painful, artificial, hard-won acquisition in the struggle against 
natural dis:[X)sition and the forces of the environment; it is achieved at 
tremendous personal risk in a battle waged with received wisdom, public 
opinion, family mores, religious authority, peer pressure and the line 
of least resistance. For some, the fight may hardly be worth the 
trouble, if it means the loss of comfort, the relinquishment of safe 
conformity, alienation from friends and family. Rational thinking is 
work, and there is very little to make it attractive, too little to 
offset the danger it entails. 
Arrong the leading factors inhibiting the development of critical 
thought is dis:[X)sitional bias, which figures in the discussion of such 
theorists of thinking as Jonathan Baron. It is an argument, again, 
foreshadowed in the work of Jung, who in 1921 proposed the idea that a 
cognitive habit based on the feeling function could not acconmodate the 
operation of the thinking function. The two processes were mutually 
opposed, in his conception; yet both were "rational" processes, and both 
operated systematically to reach conclusions--thinking by a rigorous, 
linear, sequential discrimination amohg facts, and feeling by means of 
evaluative judgment, the sole criterion of which was to accept or reject 
any given pro:[X)sition. 
The process of evaluative judgment, the hallmark of the feeling 
function, was first observed by Jung in the associative behavior of 
subjects who tended to respond to stimulus-words with predicates, rather 
than with synonyms, superordinates, contrasts, or other linguistic 
6 
forms. The predicative relationship, in itself, carries qualification; 
it is that which describes, which indicates the surface characteristics 
of a substance, and the way in which an action is performed. Predicates 
value, and evaluate, their arguments; they form the basic syntagmatic 
unit of thought, the simplest statements of fact, and, according to at 
least one cognitive theorist, Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky, provide 
the essential structure of the purely egocentric, "inner" speech of 
silent thought.3 
A person whose associative thought runs in predicative channels is 
likely to construe the world in relationships based on value, on 
objective comparison and qualification, or on subjective judgment and 
opinion. Such a habit of thought might be less amenable to instruction 
in the rigors of critical reasoning than, for example, a style which 
grasps the substantive, hierarchical relationships among things, a style 
which reflects the orderly syntax of Western ontology and the logic 
implicit in the structure of Inda-European grammar. This latter 
approach turns on analysis, discrimination, dissection, separation, the 
creation of an array of substances through division and subdivision 
which are then to be assembled i n categorical conceptualizations; such 
is the essence of rational thought. The other, the predicative style, 
analyses as well, but into one of two categories: this specific thing, 
which by predication becomes that much more specific, and everything 
else. Thinking builds structure through abstraction; predication 
concretizes the single instance; thinking ascends to the irrmaterial 
realm of concepts, predication remains with the object in all its 
grounded sensory manifestations; thinking classifies, predication 
labels--and may impose, along with the label, a set of attitudes and 
values that work underground, as it were, to subvert the move toward 
dispassionate, rational discourse. 
By some coincidence--or was it?--the majority of those identified 
as "predicate reaction types" by Jung in his first experiment were the 
members of his family groups, women of his educated sample. Furst, who 
reported her test results from nine Zurich families of the uneducated 
class, found the predicate reaction-type pervasive among adult members 
of both sexes in eight of them. These findings would seem to suggest 
that predication, as a reaction style, transcends the categories of 
gender, age and education, and when present at all in a family unit, 
tends to dominate the responses of its members. 
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It was to examine that suggestion that the present study was 
undertaken. Do family members resemble each other in tenns of their 
associative reaction style? Is predication a dominant force in the 
linguistic patterns of those family groups where it occurs? Is there a 
demonstrable level of conformity, or congruity, in linguistic patterns 
produced by family members in response to a given set of words? That 
much could be determined from a replication of the original word 
association experiment among family groups. But what about the deeper 
implications of the nature of predicative thought itself? Is there any 
evidence to suggest that a cognitive process which manifests itself in 
predication--the basic unit of "feeling" cognition--would have 
difficulty when asked to switch to the "thinking" skill required in 
formal logic? To answer that question, a comparison was made between 
individuals' reaction styles and their answers on a standardized test of 
deductive reasoning. 
Like Jung and his coauthor Franz Riklin, and like Errma Furst, I was 
primarily concerned in this research to establish an initial set of 
norms against which more dysfunctional responses might be compared. My 
involvement with the subject of family associations, an outgrowth of 
three semesters' work with the material of Jung's article "The 
Associations of Normal subjects," takes its real impetus from a deep 
personal concern for the kind of dynamics that can lead to pathological 
conformity among family members, conformity of language, of behavior, 
and of thought.4 My ultimate interest, like Jung's, is therapeutic, 
not intellectual; I intend to take this work further, into the realm 
where the processes of identification, unconscious role-play, and 
empathic enmeshment operate beneath the level of language to annihilate 
the individual personality. In such a nightmarish system, an over-close 
conformity in verbal response might be the sign of deeper contamination 
of one being by another, indeed perhaps the only sign, a silent cry for 
help from a troubled soul whose hope of detection lies in the family 
resemblance, the linguistic camouflage by which his entrapment is meant 
to be concealed. 
This work is dedicated to the meroc>ry of Soviet psychiatrist Sabina 
Spielrein, whose devotion to word association research began in her 
teens, when she was asked by earl Jung to assist him in his experiments 
at the hospital where he was treating her for schizophrenia. Later a 
member of Freud's Vienna circle, a collaborator of Saussure's student 
Charles Bally, and the analyst of Jean Piaget, this extraordinary woman 
returned to the Soviet Union in 1923, bringing Jungian and Freudian 
ideas into an intellectual milieu that included Vygotsky and a very 
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young Alexander Luria.5 Her spirit and inspiration have been an 
ever-present force in the conception and development of this project. 
There are many among the living who have given me encouragement in 
this work as well, and they have my most heartfelt thanks. Among those 
whose help was of special significance is Ann Bikales, of the C.G. Jung 
Institute of Boston, who at the moment when I strayed across the 
threshold of analytical psychology set me the task of completing a 
master's degree; I hope that what I have done over the last two years 
fulfills the adventure in the spirit of her mandate. Thanks also are 
due to Jacqueline Schectman, LICSW, IAAP, whose year-long program in 
Child Therapy Studies at the Boston Jung Institute served as my 
practicum in the Graduate Program in Critical and Creative Thinking at 
the University of Massachusetts at Boston, and set the stage upon which 
I was destined to meet my mentor in a moment of despair when I believed 
I was the only one in all the world who really cared al::,out Jung's early 
word association work. 
My friends and former colleagues, who served as subjects of my 
experiment and were so caught by the excitement of word association--the 
same extraordinary excitement which fired the staff of the Burgholzli 
Hospital for nearly a decade and made it one of the most desirable sites 
for aspiring young psychiatrists from all over the world--that they 
wanted to go out and test the families of their own friends and 
acquaintances, you too have my thanks. You know who you are; I hope you 
understand that to thank you all by name would compromise the privacy in 
which I promised to hold your participation. This work is yours as 
well. 
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C H A P T E R I 
THE STRUCI'URE OF ASSOCIATIVE COONITION 
C.G. Jung made his reputation in the international psychiatric 
comnunity at the age of thirty-one with the publication of his 
experimental research into the psychology and psychopathology of word 
association. His observation of the processes of cognition focused on 
patterns of associative response, the relationship between stimulus and 
response that revealed conceptual and episodic information stored in 
his subjects' meroc>ries. These patterns, or complexes of associations, 
gave him insight not only into the past of those with whom he worked, 
but also into the underlying system of their thought, the structural 
organization of meaning and of mind. 
Jung's work on the systemic dimension of associative cognition 
went beyond an interest in individual process, however. At the same 
time as he developed his theory of complexes, he was also engaged in an 
exploration of external systems, and the effect of dynamic interaction 
on the verbal behavior of group members. The associations of family 
members, studied under his supervision at the BUrgholzli Clinic, led 
him to an appreciation of the decisive role of the family in shaping an 
individual's preferred information-processing style. Furthermore, the 
reaction patterns he observed among members of families provided 
important evidence for the development of his theory of the collective 
unconscious, a theory in which the structural dimension of language 
plays a critical, but little recognized, part.I 
The present chapter, and the one which follows, are intended 
to provide a brief overview of a structuralist approach to the 
processes of verbal association, and to language as a structure for 
both associative and conceptual thought. It is in context of this 
theoretical framework that Jung's ideas can be brought within the 
paradigm of modern cognitive science. 
Association: Structure and Process 
The ability of the human mind to make spontaneous meaning-based 
associations between words has been recognized at least since the time 
of Plato and Aristotle, but does not seem to have been studied 
empirically until Galton, Wundt and Ebbinghaus began their 
investigations in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.2 
The basic elements of a coherent structuralist approach to association 
came not from the experimental laboratory, however, but from the world 
of clinical psychotherapy, in the cognitive model advanced by Sigmund 
Freud in his revolutionary study of thought, The Interpretation of 
Dreams. 
In the final chapter of this work , Freud detailed his conception 
of the mind as a vast network of interconnected associat ive pathways, 
responding to the displacement of energy set off by the stinrulus of a 
subliminal "directing idea." A quantity of excitation, which he called 
"cathectic energy," flows like an electrical charge through the network 
of associations, activating those selected by the directing idea. If 
the energy reaches sufficient intensity, the thought can spark across 
the threshold of consciousness; on the other hand, if it fails to 
"attract the attention of consciousness," the thought "diffuses its 
energy through all the association paths emanating from it, and throws 
the entire chain of thoughts into a state of excitation, which 
continues for a while, and then subsides" (Freud, 1950, p. 446). 
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Under certain conditions, Freud suggests, the energy of a thought 
may be sufficient 
to pass from one idea to another, so that individual ideas 
are formed which are endowed with great intensity. Through 
the repeated occurrence of this process, the intensity of 
an entire train of thought may ultimately be concentrated 
in a single conceptual unit (1950, p. 447).3 
The nodal connections of the associative network are formed not 
only around ideas, but also around the data of sensory perception, 
discrete impressions which become permanently bound to one another in 
memory through the operation of the classical laws of association, 
simultaneity, contiguity, or similarity. In an earlier work, one of 
the case histories included in Studies on Hysteria (1895), Freud had 
described these associative concentrations as "complexes of ideas," and 
had suggested that they exert their effect on an individual's thought 
and behavior through the "compulsion to associate" (Breuer and Freud, 
1955, p. 69 n. 1). 
Freud's concept of a densely networked associative system, 
responding to and diffusing the energy of thought, was studied in the 
mid-twentieth century by a number of clinical and experimental 
psychologists, among them David Rapaport, who cast the idea into a 
self-consciously structuralist form. According to his colleague Fred 
Schwartz, Rapaport called the connections described by Freud 
"'associative relationship structures,' by which he meant that just as 
words may be conceptualized as structures, so the relationships between 
words may be conceptualized as structures, i.e. quasi-permanent 
organizations of experience" (Schwartz and Rouse, 1961, p. 1). The 
subliminal influence of Freud's "purposive idea" on the constellation 
of thoughts through which it passes on its way to consciousness was 
12 
renamed "associative priming," or "preactivation," and its effect on 
free association and on paired associate recall was derronstrated in a 
variety of empirical tests carried out by Rapaport, Gill, Schafer, 
Rouse and Schwartz (Schwartz and Rouse, 1961). 
These studies identified two distinct phases in the response 
process, an "analytic" phase, during which the stimulus word activates 
a variety of associations related by sound, contiguity, meaning, 
conceptual similarity, or "secondary" or indirect, association," a 
connection made outside the central associative network with another 
network interlinked by one or more overlapping meanings; and a 
"synthetic" phase, marked by the selection of one association and its 
referral to consciousness. Recovery of the associate word in the 
synthetic phase was found to be affected by the subject's verbal 
fluency and motivation, as well as such strategic factors as his sense 
of what is appropriate or acceptable in the social context, and his 
desire to minimize personal discomfort in the process of recall. 
Many of these experiments used t he stimulus-response pairs 
established in the Kent-Rosanoff experiment of 1910, which had 
established a set of normative response f requencies in a sample of 
1,000 normal American adults. Howard Pollio (1966) linked the 
phenomenon of associative frequency to the idea of a hierarchical 
organization anong words, with a rank ordering provided by the relative 
probability of a word's appearance as a response to a given stimulus. 
Those words which occur most frequently in the language were shown to 
form larger hierarchies than low-frequency words, due to the greater 
variety of context in which they are found in colloquial expression. 
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Affective considerations--the pleasantness or unpleasantness of a 
word's connotation--were also found to affect hierarchy size. 
A closer examination of associative hierarchies undertaken by 
James Deese (1962) revealed that the hierarchy of a single word is 
organized around smaller units which he- called "clusters," stable 
groups of words which tend to evoke each other as associates. The 
associative "meaning" of any stimulus word is to be found in the 
distribution of responses to it, and the content of the entire 
constellation of clusters surrounding a stimulus defines the dimensions 
of the "associative concept" it entails. Mapping the semantic 
interrelationships within and between clusters gives an indication of 
the terrain of what Pollio (1966) calls "semantic space," an overall 
"verbal-cognitive structure" within which the associative process 
operates. 
Deese's work (1962, 1965) demonstrated that clustering is not 
merely a consequence of the frequency of words within the language, or 
of semantic and conceptual relationships established by cormon consent. 
An individual's attitudes and values are also a powerful factor in the 
organization of verbal clusters, and Deese suggests that a simple test 
of word association can function as an effective and reliable tool for 
the exposure of this personal dimension of cognitive processing. 
Psycholinguistic theory of the 1960's contributed to the 
structural approach a yet more rigorous analysis of the relations which 
underlie associative connections. The manifest phenomenon of the word 
became secondary; the operant unit of thought in this model is the 
proposition, a structure which encodes in non-verbal form the quality 
of a relationship between items, actions, or concepts. The information 
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propositional form; likewise, the retrieval of information from a 
proposition, or propositional node, requires a process of 
reconstitution, according to the operation of a set of transformational 
rules, in order to return the thought to verbal form. 
Classical information-processing theory as described by Howard 
(1983) and Stillings (1987) conceives of memory as a powerful network 
comprised of a myriad of such propositional nodes, the basic units of 
the "architecture of cognition." The informational essence of each 
proposition is a predicate, an abstraction of the relationship 
obtaining between the elements, or arguments, connected within the 
node. Networks of propositions are created as predicates pertaining to 
a single argument link it with others in an outwardly expanding system 
of interrelationship. The complexity and richness of the networks that 
form over time can be revealed in the patterns of response evoked on a 
test of verbal association. 
Like the Freudian model at the beginning of the century, a number 
of cognitive theories developed since in the late 1960's by Quillian, 
Anderson, and others (Howard, 1983) describe associative thought in 
terms of a process of spreading activation, or diffusion of attentive 
energy, along the pathways of a propositional network, making 
connections between a bit of input information, the stinn.ilus, and the 
finite number of possible responses to it. Because the links in a 
propositional chain become strengthened through repeated activation, 
the argument with the strongest link to the stinn.ilus word is most 
likely to channel the activation, and receive a sufficiently high 
"charge" to send it into consciousness as the selected response.4 
The entire process of activation and retrieval can, in fact, function 
as an indicator of "associative relevancy" (Anderson, 1983). 
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The information encoded within a proposition is arranged in a 
hierarchical fashion, allowing for the establishment of stable 
categories into which the components of declarative knowledge can be 
classified. Arguments are conceived as subsets, or subordinates, of 
the class of elements represented by the predicate, according to the 
information prcx:essing theory developed by John Anderson (1976, 1983) 
under the name "Adaptive Control of Thought," or ACT. Relation-
argument structures function not only to represent verbal knowledge, or 
information presented in verbal form; an event or episode is also 
subject to the same sort of analysis as is an item of declarative or 
semantic information. Any incident or activity can be dissolved into 
predicates in such a way as to preserve information about the 
relationships among actors and objects, as well as information as to 
time, place, condition, quality, and attitude.5 
Predication, then, proves adequate for the abstraction and 
representation of complex semantic, conceptual, and episodic 
information. The networking of predicates creates a unified field 
containing the totality of an individual's knowledge about the world, 
and, through the process of spreading activation, serves to make that 
knowledge accessible to consciousness at the stimulus of a single word. 
The Family and the Development of Categories and Attitudes 
Theorists of language have long recognized that interaction with 
adults is essential for normal linguistic development in children. The 
language a child hears from his parents not only determines the verbal 
patterns in which he makes his own attempts at expression, but also 
serves to transmit a set of values, affects and attitudes appropriate 
to the parents' scx:ial class and educational level (Deese, 1970). 
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Studies of vocabulary acquisition in children have traced the 
development of successive classification systems, which are transformed 
and restructured under the impact of increasing experience and 
additional information. The words that name things are first 
encountered in a specific context, and they function as designations of 
a field of connotative associations, with links to particular concrete 
objects rather than to other words (Pollio, 1966). The act of naming 
is itself an act of association, with two distinct dimensions: 
connections are made between the sound of the word and the physical 
entity to which it refers, and also between the entity and the 
environment in which it is encountered. A child's internal categories 
are built around these syncretic units of information, which must be 
broken down and reformulated as the child begins to separate what is 
constant in a word's meaning from what is subject to change. 
Roger Brown (1958a, 1958b) found that the naming practices of 
adults are designed to anticipate the functional structure of the 
child's perspective. Words which are thought to have utility in the 
child's world are chosen as the names given to the child to learn; 
often, these terms convey some intermediate degree of specificity, 
being neither the most concrete term possible for the item named, nor 
the term for an inclusive conceptual category. Children evidently do 
form abstract classes with the items of their experience, but they tend 
to refer to their abstractions with the only words they have to use, 
those terms which an adult would find applicable to some individual 
member of the intended class.6 
As the utility of this limited system of nomenclature is outgrown, 
the child is introduced to the appropriate terms for the inclusive 
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concept, or the more finely-discriminated example, and gradually gains 
proficiency in going up and down the hierarchy of subordinations and 
superordinations which these terms represent. Jeremy Anglin (1977) has 
seen this readjustment of nomenclature as an integral step in the 
child's conceptual development. 
Anglin remarks that the acquisition of a name for a thing comes 
comparatively late in a child's experience. Prior to the attachment of 
the arbitrary verbal label to the object, the child has developed, from 
personal observation, an operant "concept" of the object, a concept 
which carries such practical bits of information as how the object 
behaves, what it does, what purpose it serves, and how one ought to 
behave with respect to it. These irrminently concrete relationships and 
attributes are subsumed directly into the child's definition of the 
word, once it has been introduced by an adult, and collectively serve 
the child as the "meaning" of that word. What a child "means" by a 
word thus may be a very different matter from the significance the 
adult attribut es to it, although the same word may be used by both to 
make an identical objective reference. 
Children's definitions, then, tend to be expressed in terms of 
non-essential attributes, descriptive or behavioral qualifications and 
value judgments, all of which are formal predications with strong links 
to sensory experience or to parental instruction. The categories which 
collect these predications cut horizontally across the vertical 
structure of ontological classes, the categorical hierarchy of being 
into which individuals are sorted as the child's understanding of the 
world shifts from an associative to a conceptual base. An item with 
one established place in a conceptual hierarchy can, at the same time, 
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enjoy membership in a vast number of predicative categories, by virtue 
of attributes it shares in cornnon with other, conceptually unrelated, 
items. 
Frank Keil's work in the development of children's ontological 
knowledge (1979) indicates that predicates come to be used in a much 
more restricted manner as the child's conceptual organization begins to 
reflect the categorical differentiations of adult ontology. Meaning, 
in the lexical sense, becomes detached from context and begins to 
involve the logical distinctions between things which are more 
characteristic of an adult perspective.7 Likewise, Anglin (1977) 
also considers the ability to abstract predicative attributes as 
crucial to the process of concept attainment. 
Abstraction is, in essence, the discovery of some corrmon quality 
pervading a number of differentiated items. Brown (1958b) suggests 
that this ability, which characterizes adult cognition, is 
qualitatively different from the generalizing approach taken by the 
child, who applies an attribute perceived in a single item to objects 
which have not previously been differentiated. Generalization, then, 
occurs as a result of two distinct and in some respects antithetical 
processes, conceptual abstraction, and failure to discriminate. To the 
extent that words tend to function in the child's language as category 
terms, any predicative attributions the child hears made by adults are 
susceptible of inappropriate generalization, and may lead, especially 
if they are introduced in emotionally-loaded contexts, to the 
development of prejudicial attitudes which are as difficult to adjust 
as are inmature conceptual formulations. 
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Like Brown, Anglin (1977) also suggests that attitudes and values 
can be transmitted within the family as a part of the language 
acquisition process. The selection of terms, and the context in which 
they are taught, implies a set of beliefs about appropriate action, 
affect and orientation that go far beyond the strictly lexical, or 
conceptual, meaning of the given words. What Anglin calls "behavioral 
equivalence" is one of the earliest categories established by parents 
for their children, grouping together objects toward which the child 
should behave in a similar manner. The injunctions contained in these 
early naming practices invest the child's linguistic habits with 
parental attitudes, a process which presumably extends through his 
later development of abstract concepts and a semantic structure which 
is increasingly independent of concrete experience. 
Predicate, Paradigm, and Associative Development 
The theorists of children's language acquisition have generally 
worked with instruments other than the word association test, and in 
studies where association tests were administered, the purpose has been 
to examine the comparative developmental level of the child's 
linguistic structure, and not the relationship of the child's language 
to that of his parents. The developmental approach does, however, 
point out some systematic features which distinguish children's 
associations from those of mature adults; in particular, the role of 
the predicative response assumes significance as an indicator of 
linguistic maturation. 
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The earliest verbal language of children consists of words 
embedded in syntactical context. Individual words attain the 
significance of sentences, or perhaps more accurately, commands, and 
conversely, entire phrases are apprehended as single indivisible words. 
Until the unitary structure of these verbal packages has been broken 
down, any one word from the phrase will evoke the rest of it in a word 
association exercise (Entwisle, 1966). 
A sentence-constructing operation predominates in a child's 
associative process, until such time as he has attained an 
understanding of formal grammatical relations. A child's response will 
"complete" the stimulus word, by attaching a verb to a given noun, or a 
noun to an adjective. From the standpoint of associative 
relationships, both responses qualify as predications, but Doris 
Entwisle, who studied the associations of more than a thousand American 
schoolchildren in the early 1960's, preferred to call them "syntagrnatic 
responses." 
Once the child has developed a coherent sense of the granmatical 
organization of language, associative responses begin to be drawn from 
the same form class as the stimulus word, nouns being given in response 
to nouns, and adjectives to other adj ectives. This shift to 
"paradigmatic responses" is completed by the age ten or twelve, and is 
then maintained until at college age, there is, among some individuals, 
a return to the earlier pattern of syntagmatic association.8 such a 
systematic modification in the associative pattern, from predicative to 
paradigmatic responses, can be seen as a reflection of the child's 
appreciation of the functional structure of language, derived from 
formalized instruction in the acquisition of literacy. 
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Nouns predominate in the vocabulary of young children, although as 
Brown (1958b) suggests, this fact does not necessarily mean that 
children think rrore concretely than do adults, but simply that the 
terminology they are given to use by adults is rrore concrete than that 
the adult might prefer. There is at least one qualitative difference 
between the nouns produced by children and adults, however: adult 
associations tend to create categorical hierarchies of sulx>rdinate, 
coordinate and superordinate terms, while children's nominal responses 
tend to express contiguity or coexistence; children produce far fewer 
coordinating responses than do adults, and almost no abstract 
conceptual terms. 
The rrost cormnon paradigmatic responses of children tend to be made 
in the form of antonyms or contrasts. Antonyms have been found in 
responses of children as young as four years old, far younger than the 
age at which the paradigmatic shift begins, and the tendency to respond 
with opposites increases until the age of fourth grade. Entwisle 
(1966) found girls more likely to respond with opposites than boys, and 
attributed this phenomenon to a heightened reactivity on the part of 
girls toward what they perceived as the "pressure" of the testing 
situation. For both genders, response cormnonality, the production of a 
word with a high level of statistical frequency in the language, 
increased with age, a measure both of increasing familiarity with 
lexical rneanings of words and a higher degree of socialization. 
The acoustical properties of a stimulus word seem to dominate the 
associations of very young children, an indication that the semantic 
content of the word is not yet adequately comprehended. On the other 
hand, sound-based responses virtually disappear from the associations 
of rrore linguistically mature subjects. 
22 
Entwisle found an orderly pattern of development in children's 
associations, shaped by the factors of function and context within 
which words are encountered and exchanged. As the child's linguistic 
ability matures, a stimulus word characteristically elicits first a 
noun, then a syntactic reaction of some kind, next a paradigmatic 
response, and finally a secondary, or "late syntactic" response, 
representative of the elaborate and flexible predication which 
distinguishes an adult's verbal expression. 
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Socioeconomic factors were found to play a significant role in the 
development of a child's associative system. In Entwisle's study, 
children of high socioeconomic status exhibited more response 
corrmonality, at an earlier age, than children of IOC>re depressed family 
backgrounds. Regular exposure to adult verbal interaction, associated 
with higher-status families, accelerated a child's acquisition of 
mature vocabulary and syntactic fluency; conversely, isolation and lack 
of opportunity for meaningful interaction with adults was seen as a 
factor inhibiting a child's development of linguistic skill. 
Deese (1970) went further in his analysis of the cultural 
influences on language acquisition patterns. Citing the research of 
Bernstein (1961) in Great Britain, he suggests that for members of the 
higher social class, language functions as an instrument for 
description and for analysis; formal speech, for individuals of this 
class, is highly structured, and the activity of speech tends to be 
treated as an intellectual game, offering opportunities for advanced 
semantic and conceptual formulations. Among the lower classes, 
however, language serves only the purposes of description, and as a 
consequence, it is more difficult to propose analytic arguments within 
the limitations of its style. Furthenrore, D:!ese suggests that 
different attitudes toward the expression of affect among members of 
differing social classes may also have an impact on the patterns of 
linguistic development i n children, and on the related process of their 
cognitive development as well. 
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The studies mentioned in this chapter have focused on aspects of 
language and information processing which are assumed to be universal 
in scope, part of the structure of the cognitive system coimOn to all 
individuals. The chapter which follows will treat the work of a number 
of theorists, contemporaries of Freud and Jung, for whom language 
itself was the supraordinate structure, operating with its own set of 
constraints on the development of individual thought and expression. 
C H A P T E R I I 
LANGUAGE AS THE STRUCTURE OF PERSPECTIVE 
The current cognitivist focus on the relational structures of 
thought is a perspective that was shared by a number of researchers in 
the structure and psychology of language whose work began in the first 
decades of the twentieth century. Of these pioneers in the science of 
language and cognition, two, Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky and Alexander 
Romanovich Luria, are well known and highly respected within cognitive 
and developmental circles. Two others, Ferdinand de Saussure and 
Benjamin Lee Wharf, are perhaps better known in the fields of 
semiotics, linguistics, and anthropology, yet their ideas contribute 
substantially to an understanding of the external context within which 
the psychological process of associative thought takes place. 
All four of these students of cognitive processes shared a belief 
in the influence of language on thought, and t he primacy of its social 
or collective dimension in shaping an individual's expression and his 
world-view. But to Saussure, in parti cular, can be credited the 
original insights into language as a system that gave rise to the 
structuralist method of analysis, and an i ntellectual revolution to 
which cognitive science is one among many heirs. 
The first portion of this chapter will offer a sumnary of some of 
the thoughts of these four men on language in its relation to 
associative cognition. Part two will discuss the mediating role of the 
family, as described by systems theorists Gregory Bateson and R.D. 
Laing, in creating the individual's linguistic practices, and 
transmitting collective values and attitudes. 
Language and Associative Cognition 
In 1907, the year after the publication of C.G. Jung's first 
volume of Diagnostic Association Studies, his compatriot, Ferdinand de 
Saussure, professor of linguistics at the university of Geneva, began a 
course of lectures which revolutionized the academic approach to 
language. Rejecting the historical and comparative traditions of 
linguistics, with their focus on the evolutionary development of words 
in isolation from each other, Saussure offered instead a vision of 
language as an integrated system of relations existing complete at any 
moment in time, and represented by conceptually-invested sound 
patterns, which he called "signs." In his view, the study of relations 
by means of signs might well transcend the boundaries of linguistic 
science, and apply to any realm of human existence which was structured 
in terms of formal interactions; out of this perspective emerged the 
science of semiology, and the analytic movement known as structuralism. 
Language as a system of relations. The sign is itself the expression 
of a relationship between sound and concept. In Saussure's conception, 
it is an arbitrary union; there is no natural or inevitable connection 
between a word and the object it signifies. Nor is the word a mere 
name, set within a formalized nomenclature. The essential function of 
a word is not the indication of a specific object, but rather the set 
of relations in which that object is located, its existential and 
determinate context. 
Language, for Saussure, is the comprehensive structure which gives 
order to the expression of these relative relationships. Language is 
both a repository of linguistic signs, meaningful sound patterns which 
are the synthetic creations of social convention, and a system of 
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classification, arising from the mind's innate capacity for association 
and coordination. The dynamic interplay between the individual and the 
societal dimensions is what gives rise to language as a structural 
system. 
In a passage which predates by more than half a century one of the 
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tenets of cognitive linguistic theory, Saussure remarks: 
A language, as a collective phenomenon, takes the form of 
a totality of imprints in everyone's brain, rather like a 
dictionary of which each individual has an identical copy. 
Thus it is something which is in each individual, but is 
none the less common to all (Saussure, 1972, p. 19). 
This lexicon of structural relations gives formal coherence to the 
individual's associative process. Because it is a social construct, it 
differs in its particulars from one linguistic corrmunity to another, 
but what does not vary is the structure itself, and the operation of a 
systematic cognitive process based ultimately on the perception of 
difference. 
"The mechanism of a language," Saussure says, "turns entirely on 
identities and differences" (1972, p. 107), on an analysis of the 
psychological contrasts between sounds. There are no concrete, 
independent, positive entities in language, but only contrasts, sets of 
values defined in relation to one another. Word and concept, signal 
and signification, are completely context-dependent. The content of a 
word, or of the concept to which it refers, "is determined in the final 
analysis not by what it contains, but what exists outside it" (1972, 
p. 114). Meaning exists by virtue of the relations between signs, and 
the contrast between each sign and all others which are contained in 
the same system. "In the language itself," Saussure says, "there are 
only differences" (1972, p. 118). 
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This system of oppositions and contrasts inevitably constrains the 
conmunication of thought into certain channels. "Any difference in 
ideas distinguished by the mind will seek expression in different 
linguistic signals," Saussure suggests; "whereas two ideas the mind no 
longer differentiates will tend to find expression in the same signal" 
(1972, p. 119). Language is formally organized in such a way as to 
permit a systematic and regular process of comparison and substitution 
among its constitutent signals, and the function of discrimination 
underlies and facilitates the process of corranunication between 
individuals. outside the bounds of social discourse, however, it is 
not difference, but identity, which dominates an individual's 
linguistic organization. The perception of identity, or of similarity 
among the elements of language, allows for the creation of complexes of 
associations, the structures in which language is stored in memory. 
Language as a social instrument, as a means of conmunication, is 
linear, sequential, constructive, "syntagrnatic." As a network of 
associative complexes, on the other hand, it is simultaneous, 
unlimited, "paradigmatic." In syntagrnatic configurations, Saussure 
says, "any unit acquires its value simply in opposition to what 
precedes, or what follows, or ooth" (1972, p. 121) ; but within 
associative clusters, each element takes its place on the basis of the 
coit10C>nality it shares with other units in the rrmernonic group. The 
inclusion of a set of relations in an associative series may be based 
on similarity at the conceptual level, or it may reflect similarities 
of form or of sound between two linguistic elements. "Any word," 
Saussure remarks, "can evoke in the mind whatever is capable of being 
associated with it in some way or other" (1972, p. 124); likewise, any 
word can stand at the center of its own complex of associations, 
surrounded by an indefinite number of other words, linked with it in an 
indeterminate order.I 
Thus, Saussure says, 
the whole set of phonetic and conceptual differences which 
constitute a language are .•. the product of two kinds of 
comparison, associative and syntagrnatic. Groups of both kinds 
are in large measure established by the language. This set of 
of habitual relations is what constitutes linguistic structure 
and determines how the language functions (1972, p. 126). 
Syntagma and association are mutually interdependent. The relations 
which are defined in the linear context of discourse become codified in 
paradigmatic complexes; and when the purposes of communication call for 
the construction of a syntagrn, the associative groups provide a choice 
of terms. As this dynamic process unfolds, the concept, or its sign, 
evokes not just one form but a whole latent system, through 
which the oppositions involved in the constitution of that 
sign are made available ... In this process, which involves 
eliminating mentally everything which does not lead to the 
desired differentiation at the point required, associative 
groupings and syntagrnatic types are both involved (1972, p. 129). 
Both syntagrnatic and associative processes ultimately depend on 
the same cognitive function, the perception of t he relations obtaining 
between the units of each order, and a classification system based on 
the discrimination among those relations, their respective values. The 
use each individual makes of these relative values Saussure called 
"speech;" the system itself, the codification of values assigned 
collectively by society, was called the "linguistic structure." 
Habitual speech practice by individuals over time supplies the content 
of the code, but once the system has been fixed, it imposes its 
conventional forms and structures on the expression of each individual 
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who shares the language. Although it may appear, Saussure says, that 
there is considerable choice in the selection of a word in relation to 
the concept it represents, "the signal is imposed rather than freely 
chosen ..• What can be chosen is already determined in advance" (1972, 
p. 71). 
Furthermore, in Saussure's theory, language is a closed system. 
Definition and explanation take place within its confines, referring 
the unknown element to terms already known; "to explain a word is to 
relate it to other words: for there are no necessary relations between 
sound and meaning" (1972, p. 188). Words become enriched through 
contact with other words, but attain their precise values only by 
contrast with similar terms. "No word has a value that can be 
identified independently of what else there is in its vicinity," 
Saussure says. "There are languages, for example, in which it is 
impossible to say the equivalent of 'to sit in the sun'" (1972, p. 
114). 
But even within that inflexible system of evaluative relations, 
the shared tradition of a given linguistic community, a deeply radical 
relativism is still possible. In speaking of the shift in perspective 
which had allowed him to break with the whole of linguistic science 
before him, Saussure rernarks that a given field may be seen to present 
quite different things, depending on the viewpoint 
adopted ... The object is not given in advance of the 
viewpoint: far from it. Rather, one might say that 
it is the viewpoint adopted which creates the object 
(1972, p. 8) . 
The conceptual reframing of linguistics accomplished by Saussure 
at the beginning of the century has been described by psychologist Paul 
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Kugler (1982) as a "paradigm shift" comparable to the change in focus 
from substance to structures in contemporary physics. But it remained 
for another linguistic scholar, Benjamin Lee Whorf, to work out the 
implications of Saussure's ideas on the delimiting function of the 
structures of language. 
Linguistic Structure and the Boundaries of Cognition 
Saussure's conception of language as a system of patterned 
relationships is the launching-point for the radical and still highly 
controversial reformulation of linguistic theory proposed in the 1930's 
by American language scholar Benjamin Lee Whorf. In a statement which 
embodied Saussure's philosophy, Whorf asserted his position in his 
essay, "A Linguistic Consideration of Thinking in Primitive 
Corrmunities:" "Sense or meaning does not result from words or 
morphemes, but from patterned relations between words and morphemes 
Any scientific grammar is necessarily a deep analysis into relations" 
(Wharf, 1956, p. 67-68). out of his study of relational systems, Whorf 
developed, in concert with his mentor Edward Sapir, the hypothesis of 
"linguistic relativity," and the belief that an understanding of 
linguistic structure is fundamental to any comprehensive theory of 
human cognition. 
Wharf's painstaking research into the patterns of expression in 
aboriginal languages of the Western hemisphere convinced him that the 
familiar occidental categories of reality--space, time, and matter, 
form and substance, being and becoming--which are assumed by Westerners 
to be universal in nature are, in fact, artificial constructs rooted in 
Inda-European language, reflective of the structures of that language, 
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and, far from universally accepted, are held only in the corrmunities 
that hold that linguistic system in coITl!lOn. Other, non-Western 
societies have developed radically different views of the universe, no 
less valid than the one to which our language predisposes us, and 
equally reflective of the relational system encoded in their particular 
linguistic tradition. 
The philosophical abstractions and psychological realities of any 
culture, Wharf believed, are implicit in the syntax of that culture's 
language, which not only serves to organize expression, but actually 
imposes its own order on human perception and thought. Perspective is 
nothing IlDre or less than a derivative of language, a consequence of 
the linguistic classification of the data of sensory experience; and 
thinking itself, the formulation of ideas, is inextricably linked to 
the system of relationships which is codified in the structure of a 
particular language. 
The process of cognition, according to this theory, is a search 
for meaning within the limits of external constraints, a search 
confined to the relational patterns fixed within a given language 
system. Words convey no meaning in isolation; the content, the 
reference of an individual word, is insufficient in itself to carry 
meaning. Rather, it is the "rapport" between words, the "factors of 
linkage between words and IlDrphernes, which make the categories and 
patterns in which linguistic meaning dwells" (1956, p. 66). The 
process of thought, what Whorf calls "silent thinking," is no less 
dependent on this matrix of patterned connections than is the overt 
speech by which the formulations of individual thought can be expressed 
to others. It is rapport, systematic relationship, which coordinates 
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words into the semantic units with which thinking operates, and by this 
means serves to constitute what Whorf considers to be the real essence 
of thought. 
The form that an individual's thought can take, Whorf says, is 
controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is 
unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate 
systematizations of his own language ... every language is a 
vast pattern-system, different from others, in which are 
culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the 
personality not only connnunicates, but also analyses nature, 
notices or neglects types of relationship and phenomena, 
channels his reasoning, and builds the house of his 
consciousness (1956, p. 252). 
Rational thinking, as we know it, is in Wharf's view a purely 
ethnocentric phenomenon, the outcome of a relation between formal 
expression and linguistic patterning discovered in classical Greece and 
India. The propositional logic of predication and deduction which 
resulted from this ancient insight is not a universally shared 
cognitive process, but rather a specialized type of syntax, an 
operation within grammatical structur es latent in the language, what 
Whorf calls "the background linguistic system" (1956, p. 212). 
But even less formal modes of t hinking, the apparently 
unstructured associative connect ion of concepts and ideas, are no less 
influenced by the patterns available to the thinker, patterns of which 
he is entirely unaware. Just as the formal relationship of logical 
propositions forces to certain inevitable conclusions, so the 
underlying structural system of a language leads to the formulation of 
ideas which may be taken as universally valid and necessary by the 
participants in the linguistic order, but which may be completely 
invalid in another. Strict objectivity, in this model, is impossible: 
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perspective is never absent from the equation of thought. And like 
Saussure, Whorf believed that the individual "is constrained to certain 
modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free" (1956, 
p. 213). 
The automatic and involuntary patterns of language, in Wharf's 
view, are a result of collective consensus within a society, and serve 
as the means by which a coherent world-view is represented. "Fashions 
of speaking" crystallize in idiomatic form a society's habitual modes 
of analysing and classifying the data of experience; these patterns, 
in turn, contain and transmit the system of thought which has 
developed within the confines of linguistic structure. 
Furthermore, language patterns, Whorf believed, not only channel 
thought into specific forms, but also enforce "resistances to widely 
divergent points of view" (1956, p. 247). Concepts from one system 
which cannot be easily formulated in other language systems will meet 
with intellectual rejection. This language-based relativity operates 
for Wharf not only at the structural level, between language systems, 
but also within language systems, between groups and individuals who 
share the same overall structure but operate with different habits of 
speaking. In some of his work, Wharf found that language patterns may 
conduce to specific behavioral patterns, as well as habits of thinking, 
both in the collective context of society as a whole, and perhaps more 
importantly, within the sphere of individual action. 
"An accepted pattern of using words," Whorf wrote in an essay on 
"The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language," "is often 
prior to certain lines of thinking and forms of behavior" (1956, p. 
134). Automatized connections between concepts and the phenomena out 
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of which they are constructed seem to condition or influence an 
individual's reactions. Often, Wharf says, the "cue to a certain line 
of behavior is ... given by the analogies of the linguistic formula in 
which the situation is spoken of" (1956, p. 137); in other words, the 
terms which are used by people to speak about things are connected with 
interpretations of situations in which those objects appear, and, in 
Whorf's view, carry implications as to the standard of behavior to be 
adopted with respect to the things so named. Linguistic patterns thus 
materialize in the form of behavioral patterns. Inappropriate 
terminology used with respect to a hazardous situation, for example, 
can lead to careless behavior which may cause an accident; pejoritive 
or prejudicial labels applied to individuals may become self-fulfilling 
prophecies. "OUr behavior," Whorf asserted, "can be seen to be 
coordinated in many ways to the linguistically conditioned microcosm 
... people act about situations in ways which are like the ways they 
talk about them" (1956, p. 148). 
Language, then, is for Wharf the means by which we create our own 
versions of reality, and in turn, react to our creations, both as 
individuals and as members of a collective linguistic union. · So 
interconnected are the phenomena of language, thought and behavior that 
some cognitive and behavioral disorders can be directly traced to the 
linguistic patterns in which an individual's thought has become 
entrapped.2 But even those whose thinking is not apparently abnormal 
still operate within the bounds of systematic patterning, and have a 
great deal to gain through an expansion of their awareness of the 
underlying structure of relation by which language influences thought. 
Although apparently a strict determinist, Wharf, like Saussure, allowed 
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for the possibility of perspectival change: something as simple as a 
change in the habits of our language, he suggests, "can transform our 
appreciation of the Cosmos" (1956, p. 263). 
The principle of linguistic relativity, as embodied in the work of 
Wharf's mentor, Edward Sapir, in combination with the methodological 
approach of Saussure's structural analysis of language, entered into 
the intellectual framework of cognitive science through the work of 
Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky, for whom language is preeminently the 
instrument for the organization of thought and action.3 Vygotsky's 
developmental work on the stages in which associative cognition is 
transformed into abstract or conceptual thinking, although the subject 
of an ongoing intellectual critique, provides one framework for the 
understanding of qualitative differences between the processes of 
predicative and deductive thought. 
The Logic of Complex and Concept 
For Vygotsky, language is ultimately social. As a system of 
semantic elements, language provides the means through which private 
experience can be generalized, made sufficiently abstract, to be 
communicated to and comprehended by others. Its communicative and 
expressive function operates long before it assumes its role as 
organizer of internal thought. The process of language learning takes 
place in a social context, and thought itself develops out of the 
externally directed habits of childhood speech. 
The earliest language of the child, Vygotsky says, is 
essentially social. At first it is global and multi-
functional; later its functions become differentiated. 
At a certain age the social speech of the child is 
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quite sharply divided into egocentric speech and 
conmunicative speech •.• Egocentric speech emerges 
when the child transfers social, collaborative forms 
of behavior to the sphere of inner-personal psychic 
functions (1986, p. 35). 
Egocentric speech, Vygotsky found, plays an important transitional 
role in the development of thought from overt social expression to 
inner cognitive process. Far from indicating a detachment from real 
activity, as Piaget and other students of psychoanalytic theory had 
previously asserted, egocentric speech is actually an integral 
component of social behavior. This kind of speech, Vygotsky observed, 
"becomes gradually intellectualized and starts serving as a mediator in 
purposive activity and in planning complex actions" (1986, p. 39). 
At an early stage of development, Vygotsky says, the child uses 
words as though they were properties of the things they designate; "for 
a long period of time the child is unaware of the symbolic role of 
language and uses words as simple attributes of things" (1986, p. 93). 
As it develops in the direction of internalization, the child's 
verbalization retains this essentially predicative quality, and his 
thought becomes structured in complexes of associations which coalesce 
around connections made between objects by way of their perceived 
attributes. 
Vygotsky distinguishes five separate stages in the development of 
thought, from the level of vague and purely subjective association to 
that of true concept fonnation, according to his definition. The 
cognitive process at work in all these stages he calls "thinking in 
complexes." In a complex, he says, "individual objects are united in 
the child's mind not only by his subjective impressions by also by 
bonds actually existing between these objects" (1986, p. 112). The 
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process of thinking in complexes is both objective and coherent, but 
differs qualitatively from conceptual thought in that the bonds uniting 
elements in a complex are "concrete and factual, rather than abstract 
and logical" (1986, p. 113).4 It is as if, Vygotsky suggests, the 
child organizes the discrete elements and objects of the universe into 
"family groups," the individual members of which belong together in 
point of actual fact, and not by virtue of logical classification. 
The earliest complexes to constellate in a child's thinking are, 
in Vygotsky's term, the "associative type." Associative complexes are 
based on any kind of objective connection perceived arrong objects at 
hand, not simply shared qualities, but the accidental attributes of 
contiguity or spatial coexistence as well. At this stage of cognitive 
development, a word "ceases to be the 'proper name' of an individual 
object; it becomes the family name of a group of objects related to one 
another in many kinds of ways" (1986, p. 114). 
This level is superseded by one in which associative complexes are 
formed on the principle of contrast, arrong objects which differ and 
complement one another. This sort of arrangement is the "collection 
complex ... a grouping of objects on the bas is of their participation 
in the same practical operation--of their functional cooperation" 
(1986, p. 115). It reflects the child's practical experience with 
objects in the world, a learned awareness of the fact that unlike 
objects are often taken together to form a complementary set of things. 
These basic complexes, the associative and the collective, differ 
from the succeeding types, called the "chain complex" and the "diffuse 
complex," in that in the latter, there is no evident principle of 
consistency in the manner of complex formation. The chain complex, in 
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particular, Vygotsky says, "has no nucleus" (1986, p. 117); no single 
trait can be abstracted from all its members, but each element is 
connected to others through differing attributes or qualities. Two 
items may have nothing in common with each other, but join in the 
structure of a chain by sharing one trait in corrmon with some 
intermediating third element. Diffuse complexes are even less 
apparently coherent, but are internally organized around some sort of 
indefinite inner generalization, personal and idiosyncratic to a high 
degree. 
The most highly-evolved type of complex thinking is called by 
Vygotsky "the pseudoconcept" (1986, p. 119) by virtue of its apparent 
similarity to the mature cognitive process of concept formation. At 
this level, complex and concept are functionally equivalent, but 
represent distinctly different mental operations. The resemblance 
between them is en.hanced by a superficial similarity in the language 
used to express them. 
The material in which the child forms his thoughts, his words, are 
taken from the language of adults, as Vygotsky points out. 
complexes corresponding to word meanings are not 
spontaneously developed by the child: The lines along 
which a complex develops are predetermined by the meaning 
a given word already has in the ianguage of adults ... 
The linguistic milieu, with its stable, permanent word 
rneanings, charts the way that the child's generalizations 
will take. But, constrained as it is, the child's thinking 
proceeds along this preordained path in the manner 
characteristic of the child's own stage of intellectual 
development (1986, p. 120). 
The adult, through verbal interaction with the child, can demonstrate 
the process of conceptual thinking, Vygotsky says, but 
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carmot pass on to the child his mode of thinking. He 
merely supplies the ready-made meanings of the words, 
around which the child builds complexes. such complexes 
are nothing but pseudoconcepts. They are similar to 
concepts in their appearance, but differ substantially 
in their essence (1986, p. 120). 
Vygotsky believed that conceptual thinking would not develop 
spontaneously out of the associative processes underlying the formation 
of complexes. As an earlier researcher, Narziss Ach, had demonstrated, 
the mere existence of associations, "however numerous and strong, 
between verbal symbols and objects is not in itself sufficient for 
concept formation" (1986, p. 99). Although a pseudoconcept may contain 
all the necessary elements from which a concept might be fashioned, 
what is required is a mental operation which transcends the concrete 
and perceptual links which unite the disparate members of a complex. 
Conceptualization is thus conceived as the product of abstraction. 
The essential function of a complex, Vygotsky says, is 
to establish bonds and relations. Complex thinking begins 
the unification of scattered impressions; by organ1z1ng 
discrete elements of experience into groups, it creates a 
basis for later generalizations. 
But the advanced concept presupposes more than unifica-
tion. To form such a concept it is also necessary to abstract, 
to single out elements, and to view the abstracted elements 
apart from the totality of the concrete experience in which 
they are embedded. In genuine concept formation, it is equally 
important to unite and to separate: Synthesis and analysis 
presuppose each other as inhalation presupposes exhalation 
(1986, p. 135-136). 
The inherent difference between complex and conceptual thinking 
in the Vygotskyan schema can be traced to the differing functions of 
the word in each operation. At the stage which precedes the awareness 
of abstract relations, Vygotsky says, the structure of meaning is 
essentially predicative. When confronted with the task of defining a 
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word, the child (or adult in the preconceptual stage of cognitive 
development) is incapable of a semantic or lexical analysis, and 
instead offers lists of qualitative or functional attributes. Once an 
individual has made the transition from generalization to abstraction, 
and has developed the ability to analyse and coordinate concepts within 
a coherent and hierarchical system of thought, the shift may be 
reflected only in his social speech. His inner speech, the transform 
of early egocentric verbalization, still retains its original structure 
as predication. 
Inner speech is alrrost entirely predicative, Vygotsky suggests, 
because "the situation, the subject of thought, is always known to the 
thinker" (1986, p. 182). Written speech and oral corrmunication 
generally requires the full specification of subject and object in 
order to be intelligible, but there are, Vygotsky says, two cases in 
which predication can be encounterea in external speech: as the answer 
to a question, or when the subject of the sentence is understood by all 
concerned. 
The kind of condensation or abbreviation of thought represented by 
predicative speech becomes possible as a means of communication when 
"the thoughts of two people coincide" (1986, p. 236). As Lev Tolstoy 
had found in his developmental research, communication by abbreviated 
speech is the rule, rather than the exception, among people who live in 
close psychological contact. Thus, Vygotsky suggests, the predications 
of inner speech become externalized arrong individuals who participate 
in a shared frame of reference, with nru.tual agreement as to perception 
and perspective. 
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For Vygotsky, as for Saussure and Wharf, specifically verbal 
thought must be distinguished from other, non-verbal forms of thinking, 
and is subject to the inner rules of language. "Verbal thought," he 
asserts, "is not an innate, natural form of behavior, but is determined 
by a historical-cultural process and has specific properties and laws 
that cannot be found in the natural forms of thought and speech" (1986, 
p. 94); that is, in the purely associative and predicative m:)des of 
thought characteristic of elementary consciousness. Abstractions are 
impossible without words, Vygotsky says; and although current critiques 
of his work center around the adequacy of his definition of "concept," 
his position is one which identifies conceptual thought with verbal 
processes. 
Associative and conceptual thinking thus remain for Vygotsky two 
distinct, although interconnected, processes, the one based on 
generalized perceptions, the other on the abstraction of relations, and 
the systematic creation of structure. Thought is that process of 
connection by which such structured relations are established and 
developed through the mediating influence of words. '"111ought," 
Vygotsky says, "is not merely expressed in words; it comes into 
existence through them" (1986, p. 218). 
Associative and categorical Relations 
Vygotsky's younger colleague and friend, cognitive psychologist 
Alexander Rornanovich Luria, further elaborated his ideas on the mutual 
interdependence of thought and language, and the qualitative difference 
between association and concept formation. In Luria's conception, 
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association is in itself already a form of abstraction, a transcendence 
of purely sensory perception which is a necessary precondition for the 
construction of abstract concepts. But beyond the conceptual stage of 
cognitive development, which is characterized by an awareness of what 
Luria calls "categorical" relations, is rational thought itself, the 
processes of logic, the ability to draw conclusions on the basis of 
premises. For Luria, associative and rational cognition are the two 
methods by which human intellegence can broaden and deepen its field 
beyond the imrrediate experience of sensory perception, and both modes 
of thought process the data of perception through the medium of 
language. 
The essence of language, Luria says, is that which "enables us to 
abstract, codify, and generalize signs and objects" (1982, p. 28). 
Language designates things or actions, properties or relations, and 
hence conveys and processes objective information." The active 
selection of a word does not simply indicate the object named; it 
"analyzes it and introduces it into a certain system of associations 
and relationships" (1982, p. 29). This, in fact, is the function of 
words: "words organize things into systems. That is to say, words 
codify our experience" (1982, p. 31), and allow for communication of 
that experience with others. 
The relations and properties signified by a word, over and above 
its objective or nominal reference, compose what Luria, along with 
other contemporary psycholinguistic researchers, calls its "semantic 
field," a complex of connotations, derived from personal experience, 
which surrounds every word and structures its connections with other 
words. It is this semantic field which is activated through the 
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process of association, providing a choice among rich and meaningful 
alternatives for the purposes of expression. On the other hand, 
however, each word also has its "categorical" significance, its place 
in a structured hierarchy of abstracted properties, with its formal 
relations restricted to other elements sharing the same category. The 
latter mode of organization, the result of an analytical operation, 
contributes the objective "meaning" of any given word; the synt hetic 
process, working within the semantic rna.terial of individual experience, 
creates what Luria calls the "sense" of the word. 
Like Vygotsky, Luria found that "meaning" is subject to change; 
the objective reference of a word may remain constant, but its place in 
the conceptual hierarchy, the comprehension of its categorical 
relations, is repeatedly redefined in the course of cognitive 
maturation. conceptual development has profound consequences, as both 
Soviet researchers found: "as word meaning changes," Luria asserted, 
"psychological processes also change" (1982, p. 50) .5 
The serna.ntic field, or associative complex, is in its most basic 
form a network of predications--actions, attributes and affects which 
are linked to the experience of concrete situations. At later stages 
of development, Luria suggests, "the structure of word meaning takes on 
an entirely different character. 
The word enters into a system of hierarchically connected 
and mutually subordinated categories. It acquires, as 
linguists say, a paradigrna.tic character. The word's meaning 
is situated in a hierarchical system of abstract oppositions 
.•. At the stage of concrete concepts, the key role is 
played by situational, object-actuated bonds; whereas at the 
stage of abstract concepts, the key role is played by the 
verbal and logical hierarchically constructed bonds (1982, 
p. 52-53). 
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With this change, the experiential and affective dimensions of the 
word, its associative connotations, are left behind, and its expressive 
potential comes to conform to the objective meaning shared in society. 
The psychological shift in the analysis of relations is from concrete 
to abstract, from predication to paradigm, from description and 
differentiation to coordination and classification according to a 
strict system of verbal-logical definitions. 
In a perspective that they shared with Whorf and Saussure, and in 
the intellectual tradition of dialectical materialism, both Vygotsky 
and Luria saw this structural shift in the way language is used as 
related to socioeconomic factors, as historically and culturally 
determined, rather than as the result of natural cognitive development. 
Luria's engaging memoir, The Making of Mind (1979), describes a series 
of experiments he conducted in Soviet Central Asia to explore the 
processes of linguistic coding, classification and abstraction, and 
logical problem-solving among members of a non-literate society, 
subsisting in relatively primitive conditions of life. 
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His results in this endeavor led him to the conclusion that people 
of such traditional backgrounds "classify objects according to their 
inclusion in a concrete situation" (1982, p. 62). Their own forms of 
conceptualization, as evidenced in Luria's Cartesian tests, proved to 
be very different from those of urban, formally educated individuals, 
and in their radical inclusivity were not entirely unlike Vygotsky's 
"complexes." In terms of abstract reasoning, Luria's aboriginal 
subjects were completely unfamiliar with the kind of abstraction 
characteristic of those who have been educated in the methods of formal 
logical thinking. The unwillingness of his subjects to move beyond the 
inmediate sensory dimension of personal experience, their focus on the 
practical interrelationships between things, made categorial 
discrimination difficult and deouctive reasoning a virtual 
impossibility for them. Within the context of their daily lives, the 
abstract universals and part iculars of syllogistic logic bore no 
intelligible relationship to each other, and led to no necessary or 
inevitable conclusion. 
From this experience, Luria identified rational thinking as a 
process deriving from fonnal education, but not so much from 
instruction in reasoning as such, as from the systematic approach to 
words which is involved in the teaching of literacy. The preconditions 
for rational thought, he believed, must include a fundamental change in 
the functional role of language. Words must become separated from 
their "syrnpractical" and "synsemantic" contexts and cease to express 
associative relations before t hey can become tools for the orderly 
classification and analysis of objective reality. It is only when this 
cognitive shift has taken place, under the influence of education, that 
fonnal rrethods of thinking become possible. Logic is a consequence of 
language, but of language viewed as the structure of categorical 
relations. It can emerge, Luria says, "only during those stages of 
cultural development when activity realized through the help of 
language becomes an independent process" (1982, p. 203), divorced from 
the concrete and perceptual process of associative cognition. 
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For Luria, as for Vygotsky, the context in which this 
transfonnation was most likely to occur was the structured environment 
of socialized education. But many habits of thought which are acquired 
and reinforced through family interaction may prove impervious to the 
structuring processes of a systematic conceptual perspective. The 
remainder of this chapter will be devoted to the ideas of two 
metacognitive theorists, anthropologist Gregory Bateson and 
psychiatrist R.D. Laing, on the influence of family cormrunication 
patterns on the thought of the individual. 
Cognitive Functioning and Language Patterns in the Family 
Gregory Bateson has been cited by psychologist Howard Gardner as 
one of the leading participants in the group that created cybernetic 
theory, the irrmediate intellectual precursor of the "cognitive 
revolution" (Gardner, 1985). His work on information processing in 
social systems, including cross-cultural research on families in 
developed and traditional societies, presents an analysis of language 
and its relation learning which has far-reachi ng implications for the 
mental functioning and behavior of those involved in the corrmunication 
patterns of the group. 
For Bateson, all learning takes place within a specific context, a 
"frame" by which information al::lout t he message to be learned, a 
metaco:rmnunication, is presented to the learner. The presence of dual 
or multiple levels of information is rarely noticed, but contributes to 
learning by providing a background against which the overt message is 
to be understood, along with a set of rules and instructions for the 
appropriate interpretation of the message. The frame functions include 
the message in an particular category of information, and to exclude 
all other, irrelevant information. 
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"People will respond rrost energetically," Bateson suggests, "when 48 
the context is structured to appeal to their habitual patterns of 
reaction" (1972, p. 104). These patterns are themselves developed and 
habituated in the earliest of social settings, the family. Values, 
attitudes, and ideals are implicit in the metalinguistic frame in which 
language is learned, in the way a word is used, the affective tone it 
carries, the system of relationships into which it is introduced, the 
interaction which it facilitates. All these dimensions are elements of 
the code which imparts meaning to the word in the systemic context in 
which it is meant to function, transforming it from arbitrary sign to 
corrmunicative signal. 
Meaning, in Bateson's conception, is a "synonym of pattern, 
redundancy, information, and 'restraint' 11 (1972, p. 130). Language is 
a system for the generation of pattern, and the act of corrmunication 
is, in its essence, "the creation of redundancy, meaning, pattern, 
predictability, information, and/or the reduction of the random by 
'restraint' 11 (1972, p. 131-132) . Pattern introduces the appearance of 
order into the chaos of perceptual data, and allows for the 
discrimination of differences on the basis of which structures of 
meaning can be developed, predictions made, and information transferred 
among individuals. 
In much the same way that Saussure conceived of language as a 
system of differences, Bateson, in one of several essays on the "double 
bind" theory of cormnunication, defines information as "a difference 
which makes a difference" (1972, p. 272). Difference, in this view, 
results from a modulation of conmunication, an adjustment or 
qualification made in relation to other elements within the frame, or 
in relation to the frame itself, the context. Data is selected to 
become "information" on the basis of the perceiver's relative !X)int of 
view; thus difference may not be a criterion of the selection process, 
but rather a result of it. 
Individuals within systems function together in such a way as to 
reduce the negative impact of difference, Bateson says, through "a 
sharing of premises regarding the meaning and appropriateness of 
messages and other acts in the context of the relationship" (1972, p. 
233). In other words, they evolve common meanings and a collective 
approach to the processing of information. 
In any group, so long as the information contained in both the 
message and the frame is logically consistent, cognitive operations can 
function in a normal manner. However, as Bateson found, when there is 
chronic incongruence or contradiction between the two levels of 
communication, information processing can be seriously impaired. Mixed 
messages of the kind which result in paradox, what Bateson called the 
"double bind comnnmication," can cause the recipient to begin to doubt 
the validity of his own perceptions, to distrust the information 
contained in any context, and to react inappropriately to messages with 
consistent contexts. These behavior patterns, and the linguistic 
patterns which accompany them, were found by Bateson to be habitual in 
families in which one or more members suffer from functional thought 
disorders, including schizophrenia. 
The influence of family co:mmunication patterns stems from the fact 
that individuals rarely examine the abstractions which underlie their 
cognitive habits and their modes of linguistic interaction with one 
another. Yet premises and assumptions which have become automatic and 
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can therefore remain unspoken contribute substantially to the context 
in which verbal messages are formulated and interpreted. Unless they 
are critically examined, these patterns are reinforced and perpetuated 
without alteration. But any transferable change in understanding, what 
Bateson calls "second order learning," or learning to learn, requires 
just such a critical examination, a recognition of patterns as they 
signify both meaning and relationship. 
A family system characterized by resistance to this metacognitive 
level of analysis will, by its very nature, impede the process of 
second order learning. As Bateson points out, it is the function of 
any system to be "self-corrective against disturbance" (1972, p. 435), 
a function which is accomplished by a reactive reframing of disturbing 
information. By this means, homeostasis is maintained, the status quo 
is preserved, development is prevented, and t he necessity for change 
restricted to an absolute minimum. 
out of its habitual communication patterns, a family system 
develops internal organization and a stable relational structure which 
seems logical within its own context. Li kewise, the patterns of 
thought arising from within a corrmunication system become so 
standardized as to appear rational to the participants in the system. 
It is only when these patterns are placed in another context that 
difficulties may become apparent, difficulties which manifest 
themselves through the evidence of language and of reasoning. 
Bateson's theories developed directly out of his experience with 
dysfunctional families, as did those of R.D. Laing, a psychoanalyst and 
psychiatrist at the Tavistock and Langham Clinics in London. But both 
approaches emphasize the role of conmunication in regulating cognitive 
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operations, and the sets of relations which define the structure of the 
system, in ways that are applicable to the unimpaired family as well. 
For Laing, the "family" is "an introjected set of relations" 
(1972, p. 6), patterns of reaction and interaction arrong individual 
participants in the system which become internalized over time and are 
subsequently reenacted in other contexts outside the original system. 
"When such an internal template of space-time relations-in-sequence is 
externalized," Laing says, "it appears to function both as a schema 
governing ways external events are hoped, feared, seen to happen, and, 
by inducing action and reaction, as self-fulfilling fantasy and 
prophecy" (1972, p. 11). The total set of interactions, according to 
Laing, has an unrecognized dramatic structure involving multiple 
generations, and the description of the set in any given moment depends 
entirely on the perspective of the participant, the character and role 
he has assumed in the context of the family "story." 
Like Bateson, Laing believes that communication patterns can 
induce patterns of behavior and of thought . One of the most powerful 
mechanisms of induction, in his view, is the language of predication. 
The attribution by parents of qualities, especially negative qualities, 
to their children, or the pronouncement of evaluative judgments, can 
carry such force as to shape the child's entire perspective. Parental 
definitions of the child's behavior, whether objectively true or not, 
can become true over time as the child internalizes both the predicate 
and the context, the circumstances, in which it was delivered. 
Furthermore, in the context of a mixed message, Laing suggests that it 
is the predicative portion of the communication which takes precedence 
over any other, discrepant information (1972, p. 79-80). 
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Induction, for Laing, is a process of "mapping" one individual's 
set of expectations and values onto another in such a way as to cause 
the other to embody those attributions and behave accordingly (1972, p. 
117). Unlike the process of education, which might serve the same 
apparent end, induction undermines the child's development; it is 
linked with unexamined attitudes and habitual patterns of interaction, 
and occurs because of unspoken prohibitions against examining the 
structure and context of those patterns. 
Some families operate, Laing says, as a "transpersonal system of 
collusion" (1972, p. 99) in which members agree to maintain the 
stability of the system by ignoring the existence of its operating 
procedures, its "rules and metarules." SUch rules, Laing says, "govern 
all aspects of experience, 
what we are to experience, and what not to experience, 
the operations we must and must not carry out, in order 
to arrive at a permitted picture of ourselves and others 
in the world ... If what we are instructed to achieve 
cannot be achieved by the how we are instructed to achieve 
it, we are in difficulty. (1972, p. 107). 
A major factor in this difficulty, perhaps the determining one, is to 
be found in the linguistic patterns in the family household, and in 
particular, the psychological force of predicative speech. 
The theorists mentioned in this chapter, with the exception of 
Saussure, worked out their intellectual systems with explicit reference 
to the psychoanalytic doctrines of Freud and his followers, including 
C.G. Jung. In the chapter which follows, the development of Jung's 
ideas on cognition will be traced from his early empirical work in word 
association, to his theoretical fornru.lation of a functional approach to 
cognitive processing. 
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C H A P T E R I I I 
C.G. JUNG'S EARLY THEORY OF COGNITION 
The professional career of Carl Gustav Jung--and the historical 
course of twentieth-century psychology--took a decisive turn in the 
moment when he discovered that his painstaking experimental work at 
Zurich's famed Burgholzli Clinic gave empirical support to the radical, 
shocking, and academically unacceptable theories of Sigmund Freud. The 
structural model of mind which had been outlined by the Viennese 
neurologist in his monumental 1900 publication, The Interpretation of 
Dreams, explained in one comprehensive representation a whole system of 
cognitive functions and processes known only too well to the young 
swiss psychiatrist from the fragmentary evidence of his patients' word 
associations. Despite the hazard to his own reputation as a scientist, 
Jung chose to cast his empirical data on the side of Freud's 
speculations, and in 1906 took the first step toward establishing a 
relationship with Freud that would forever alter the world's 
understanding of human cognition. 
In the seven years of their professional collaboration and 
personal friendship, Jung offered Freud what he could not have achieved 
on his own: not simply the validation of his theories, but access to 
medical and intellectual circles outside Vienna as well. The 
Burgholzli Clinic drew interns and researchers from all parts of 
Europe, from Russia and from America, and in its experimental research 
facilities, a generation of psychiatrists learned Freud's 
psychoanalytic theory through the practice of the word association 
experiment. As part of that theory, they studied the structure of the 
psyche detailed in the final chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams, a 
complex information-processing system that has been seen by some recent 
theorists (Peterfreund, 1971; Erdelyi, 1985) as a forerunner of the 
computer-based "multi-store" model of modern cognitive psychology. 
But Freud's mechanical metaphor for the mind--the "compound 
instrument," as he termed it--with its two modes of operation, primary 
and secondary process thinking, was in some respects too static and too 
homogeneous a model for Jung to adopt as his own. While keeping 
Freud's idea of two essential thought processes, which he called 
"directed" and "non-directed" thinking, Jung eventually rejected the 
structural approach to cognition for one which conceived of the mind in 
terms of the fluid interplay of four dynamic functions, centered around 
a nucleus of associated ideas which holds the essence of each 
individual's personal self-consciousness. Where Freud had posited a 
single, comprehensive, unified apparatus of human thought, a structure 
and function corrmon to everyone, Jung sought to explain the diversity 
of human individuality with a theory of psychological types, describing 
his own approach to the mind in terms which sound strikingly similar to 
those of cognitive psychology's "levels of processing" model.I 
The present chapter will present a brief summary of the early 
cognitive theory of C.G. Jung as it emerged from the data of his 
association experiments. The first section will discuss the 
reaction-types described by Jung and his colleague, Franz Riklin, in 
their 1904 article, "The Associations of Normal subjects." The second 
section will follow the theory of reaction-types in its subsequent 
development toward the concept of four cognitive functions, and in 
particular the opposing pair of rational functions, thinking and 
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feeling. The final section will be devoted to Jung's discussion of 
types and functions as they develop in context of the family. 
Linguistic Orientation and Reaction- Types 
Jung and Riklin began their experimental program with the idea 
that an individual's responses on a word association test might fall 
into patterns that could be identified and described as distinctive 
reaction-types. The criterion upon which such a differentiation might 
be made was the preference the individual showed for specific kinds of 
associative responses, particular semantic or logical relationships 
which the respondent chose to set forth in his reactions to the 
stimulus-words. 
In order to test their hypothesis, Jung and Riklin gathered more 
than 12,000 associations from thirty-eight normal adults, men and women 
of varying ages, educational levels and linguistic abilities. SU.bjects 
were tested in conditions of undisturbed attention and in the presence 
of a variety of distractions, including auditory and motor tasks, 
visualizations, and conditions of physical and emotional fatigue. Each 
subject's responses were then classified according to a four-part 
system, adapted by the Burgholzli researchers from an earlier schema 
developed by Gustav Aschaffenburg and Emil Kraepelin for use in their 
empirical investigations of association. The system discriminates 
among some thirty-seven types of associative response to a given 
stimulus word, and is structured in such a way as to permit an analysis 
of the relative strength of the logical or linguistic connection 
inhering in the relationship between stimulus and response. 
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At the top of the hierarchy are the so-called "internal 
associations," those relationships which reflect objective conceptual 
bonds between words. Associations which fall into this sector are 
those in which stimulus and response are united by reference to some 
coordinating corrmon concept, or those which orient each other through 
subordination or superordination. Definitions and declarations of 
cause are located in this initial group, as are all forms of 
predication, including the syntactic (the subject-verb or verb-object 
relationship) and the attributive (adjectival predication of quality, 
quantity, attitude, or relation, and disposition as to place, time, 
means and purpose). These meaning-based or meaning-extending 
associations are assumed to be the product of reflective thought, the 
result of an analysis which has penetrated to the depth at which, in 
the language of levels of processing theory, the conceptual material of 
stimulus and response has been encoded in all its relational, 
referential, thematic and functional complexity (Perfetti, 1979). 
More superficial, and less complex, are the responses which fall 
into the second category of "external associations." These are the 
responses conditioned by the operation of the classical laws of 
association, the laws of contiguity, frequency and similarity, as well 
as the automated responses of synonym and antonym, and the form 
changes, word completions, and compound constructions that show that 
the subject has made no effort to address the semantic content--the 
meaning--of the stimulus word. This is the realm of slogans, 
interjections, proverbs, quotations and empty phrases, of "speech 
formulas" (Lakoff, 1982), of verbal interaction which can occur without 
the expenditure of attention, without an attempt at comprehension, 
without regard for concept, idea, or meaning. 
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M:)re marginal still are the responses of the third major category, 
that of "sound reactions." These are verbal productions which have 
lost their claim to be called associations in the true referential 
sense of the word; they are responses at the most superficial level of 
cognitive analysis, reactions to the acoustic, phonemic and 
phonological dimensions of the stimulus-word. The most debased 
responses of all are classified in the final, residual category. Here 
are grouped the repetitions of the stimulus word and the failures to 
respond, as well as those indirect associations which are made in 
response not to the stimulus-word, but rather to sane other, 
unarticulated inner concept, the sense of which may be a complete 
mystery even to the respondent. 
Given this scale on which to position the verbal-logical 
relationships fonned by their subjects' responses, Jung and Riklin 
noticed that their data did, in fact, organize itself around a number 
of distinct reaction patterns, or types, which could be identified in 
part from an analysis of the relational category preferred by the 
subject for the majority of his responses. Some individuals, the 
experimenters found, had a predominant tendency to answer the stimulus 
with a word indicative of some conmon concept, a clear, coherent, 
objective association which bore witness to an organized and logical 
approach to the lexical and semantic information of the stimulus word. 
Others, no less clear and objective, responded to the purely linguistic 
dimensions of the stimulus, its gramnatical mutability, its involvement 
in the popular phrases of everyday speech, its tendency to merge with 
other words into compounds in which each element loses its intrinsic 
meaning. 
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In these two types of reaction, nothing in particular was revealed 
about the subjective state of the respondent, his emotional response or 
his personal orientation to the stimulus concept. A certain am::>unt of 
factual data might emerge from the response words themselves; members 
of certain professions, for example, might give themselves away with 
words that had become habitual through the corrmon language of their 
careers. But in contrast to these individuals, who shared what Jung 
and Riklin called an "objective attitude," were respondents who 
indulged in open self-disclosure with their associations, respondents 
whose orientation was identified by Jung and Riklin as an "egocentric 
attitude." Aloong these respondents, two major types emerged, those 
whose responses clustered in associative complexes which hinted at 
specific personal experiences of a more or less emotional nature, and 
those who reacted with the evaluative pronouncements of predication. 
These four basic reaction-types2 represented four distinct 
approaches to the information carried in the stimulus-word, and, by 
extension, Jung believed, to the reality represented by the stimulus, a 
reality which would appear in a radically different guise to a 
objective-semantic reaction type than to a complex or a predicate type. 
An individual's interpretation of, and reaction to, the external 
stimuli of his environment could perhaps be understood through an 
analysis of these response preference patterns, which were themselves 
evidence of the background and education he had experienced, the kind 
of language he had heard, and affects expressed or concealed by means 
of that language. 
Far from mere linguistic phenomena, then, these associative 
reaction-styles were signals of a set of attitudes about the nature of 
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reality, and were accompanied by characteristics commonly held to be 
components of persona:..Hy. The degree of a subject's self-control, the 
intensity of his emotional engagement, the quality of attention he was 
able to maintain, his tendency to place the sound of a word into an 
intellectualized conceptual hierarchy or into the vivid imagery of 
predication, his preference for paradigm or syntagrn, for analytic or 
synthetic formulations, for similarity or for difference, were all 
evidence of underlying cognitive processes which varied among 
individuals even as their reaction-styles, their choice of associate 
responses, varied from one to another.3 
The calm neutrality of the two objective ty:pes, for example, was 
evident in their conceptual approach to the word, their abstraction, 
the absence both of affect and of personal involvement with the matter 
of the stirnulus-word.4 Among the egocentric ty:pes, a great number of 
predicates in an individual's response pattern was found to accompany a 
solid subjective stance, a high degree of concentration, a freedom of 
emotional expression, and a remarkable trait not shared by members of 
other reaction-ty:pes, the ability to generate internal imagery as a 
non-verbal associative response to the stimulus-word. A high 
proportion of superficial reactions among an individual's responses, 
finally, the sort of words that have become embedded and automatized in 
the language of corrnnon discourse, was found to occur in conjunction 
with a high degree of distractibility and the tendency to self-
revealing reminiscence, which might either be given free expression, or 
else, if too painful, suppressed. 
The program of research into normal associations at the Burgholzli 
Clinic was designed to provide a baseline against which the utterances 
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of mentally ill individuals could be compared. Rather than finding any 
clear-cut differentiation between the associations of nonral and 
disturbed individuals, however, Jung and his colleague found only a 
difference of degree. The verbal patterns of their subjects proceeded 
on a continuum from the tight and structurally stable conceptual bonds 
of coordinate, subordinate and superordinate relationships, through 
varying intensities of predication, to the more superficial and 
automatic reactions of synonym, antonym and casual phrase, to 
apparently incoherent responses and failures stermning from some private 
inner experience which the subject either refused to reveal or was 
actually unable to explain to the experimenters. At this end of the 
spectrum, Jung and Riklin observed , the responses of perfectly average 
individuals began to coincide with the kind of linguistic behavior that 
might be observed in clinical cases of hysteria, manic disorders, or 
more pathological kinds of cognitive dysfunction. 
In pathological states, the same t wo orientations or attitudes 
which distinguished the responses of normal individuals could be also 
be seen, differentiated again i n terms of relative degree: the 
outwardly-directed organizing tendency of t he objective type, and the 
inwardly-focused evaluative tendency of the egocentric type. These two 
attitudes were the first of the cognitive phenomena to be drawn by Jung 
from the material of his word association experiments to serve as the 
foundation for his emerging theory of psychological types. 
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Toward a Functional Typology of Cognition 
Much of the verbal behavior Jung and his colleague observed in 
their word association research was not, in fact, the evidence of 
deep-lying psychological processes or of complex, conceptually-based 
thought. Rather, the responses they collected might better be 
described as "linguistic reactions," which the researchers held to 
"represent the psychological connection only in a remote and imperfect 
way" (1973, p. 10). Language itself, and not the intention of the 
respondent, provided the motive force for many of the reactions. The 
individual's inner association "cannot become the object of another's 
consciousness without being transformed into the familiar syrnlx>lism of 
language," according to Jung and his colleague (1973, p. 11) . This 
transformation will be shaped by the individual's fluency in the 
language, but also by the frequency that certain associative pairs and 
common phrases have established for themselves in the patterns of 
ordinary social discourse. 
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The linguistic roots of cognitive processing. The primacy of language-
based associations asserted itself most strongly when a subject's 
attention was artificially diminished. Jung and his coauthor explained 
the phenomena they observed in the distraction portion of their 
their experiment in dynamic terms: 
..• one could say that the "associative energy" (Ranschburg) 
was to such an extent diverted to another area that only a 
portion of it is still available for the reaction. Thus a 
correspondingly poor or easy (that is, strongly canalized) 
association is given, because the stinrulation of ready and 
accustomed cerebral mechanisms requires a smaller amount of 
energy than the canalization of relatively new and unaccustomed 
connections (1973, p. 43). 
When distracted, fatigued, or emotionally disturbed, then, a 
subject responds with the easiest reactions to produce, those which 
have become mechanical through practice, habit, or repetition. such 
habitual connections between words would naturally include not simply 
those formulas an individual has rehearsed on his own, but also those 
high-frequency verbal patterns, "stereotyped word-connections" (1973, 
p. 184) which are shared throughout a linguistic or social group by 
virtue of a conmon form of speech. In this way, Jung and Riklin 
suggest, "ideas already automatized and condensed in language assist 
the subject in his effort to comprehend the meaning of the stimulus 
word and to work it over" (1973, p. 138) with the mst economical 
expenditure of effort. 
When concentration of attention on the idea of the stimulus-word 
is possible, on the other hand, "these purely linguistic connections 
are suppressed" (1973, p. 138), and the subject is free to select the 
appropriate level of analysis at which to formulate a meaningful 
association, one which conveys the sense of the associated idea. 
Attention, then, aids the development of the stimulus idea by 
controlling and directing the process of association, and by keeping 
the meaningless verbal patterns of the language, always present in 
memory, excluded from the focus of consciousness. 
The processes of language reflect the dynamics of thought at a 
deeper, mre structural level as well, as Jung wrote in his 1913 
article, "A Contribution to the Study of Psychological Types." There, 
he compared the two orientations of consciousness that he had seen in 
his reaction-types, the outward- or inward-looking attitudes which he 
now called extraversion and introversion, with the dynamics of 
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transitive and intransitive verbs in language. According to 
contemporary linguistic scholar Franz Finck, Jung said, 
... there are two main types of linguistic structure. The 
one is represented in general by the transitive verbs: I see 
him, I kill him, etc. The other is represented by the 
intransitive verbs: He appears before me, he dies at my feet. 
The first type clearly shows a centrifugal movement of libido 
going out from the subject; the second, a centripetal movement 
of libido coming in from the object. The latter, introverting 
type of structure is found particularly among the primitive 
languages of the Eskimos (1971, p. 507-508). 
Thus, a linguistic analysis of function serves as an analogy for the 
differences in attitude which distinguish two types of individuals, the 
introvert and the extravert, whose differing verbal behavior Jung had 
already observed on the word association test. But language is far 
more than a repository of automatic verbal patterns and an indicator of 
the direction in which an individual's consciousness prefers to turn. 
Language is the medium in which the process of cognition actually takes 
place. 
Directed and non-directed thinking. In the work which represents the 
tumultuous process of his own mid-li f e self-analysis,3 Jung began 
an examination of cognitive processing which would lead him to a 
theoretical and personal break with his mentor Freud. Yet his point of 
departure in that work, Symbols and Transformations of the Libido, is a 
discussion of thinking which seems to owe much to ideas Freud had 
expressed in The Interpretation of Dreams. 
Under the heading, "The Primary and secondary Processes," Freud 
had elaborated an operational theory for his mechanical model of the 
psyche based on the process of association between words and ideas. 
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The material of memories, dreams, and conscious thought is acted upon 
by two essentially different cognitive processes, Freud suggests, the 
one driving toward a reduction of tension through a discharge of 
energy, and the other attempting to minimize the accumulation of 
tension by maintaining the entire system in a state of rest. The 
dynamics of the first operation he called the "primary process"; its 
function was manifest in the images of dream and fantasy, in the 
sound-based associations characteristic of depressed attention, in 
impulses, emotions and desires. By contrast, the "secondary process," 
the equilibriating and controlling operation, was that dynamic which 
allowed for the exploratory cognitive work of "experimental thought" 
(1950, p. 452), using pleasure and pain as signals to adjust its 
course as it progressed through the associative network of memory. 
Primary process thinking, Freud suggests, seeks an "identity of 
perception," a sensation-based experience providing the gratification 
of a wish for physical pleasure. The secondary process, on the other 
hand, finds its goal in a more rarefied f orm of pleasure, an "identity 
of thought" (1950, p. 453). "Thought must concern itself with the 
connecting-paths between i deas without allowing itself to be misled by 
their intensities;" that is, by the enticement of sensual 
gratification they may represent. Nor, Freud says, can thinking allow 
itself to be detoured by the obstacles of pain: 
the tendency of the thinking process must always be to 
free itself more and rrore from exclusive regulation by 
the pain-principle, and to restrict the development of 
affect through the work of thought to the very minimum 
which remains effective as a signal. This refinement in 
functioning is to be achieved •.. with the help of 
consciousness (1950, p. 454). 
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The ability to follow a train of thought with purposive and 
directed attention, avoiding the attractions of pleasure and the 
prohibitions of pain, is one which appears comparatively late in an 
individual's development. The apparatus for the primary process is 
functional at birth, but the operations of secondary thinking develop 
only gradually, Freud says, "inhibiting and overlaying the primary, 
whilst gaining complete control over them perhaps only in the prime of 
life" (1950, p. 455). Both modes of cognition are perfectly normal, 
and both coexist in the mental systems of perfectly normal 
individuals, although in mature adults the primary process tends to 
reveal itself only in the form of dreams and in the symptoms of 
diverted attention--parapraxes, slips of the tongue, temporary lapses 
of memory. 
The means by which the secondary process, what might be thought 
of as "normal," or rational, thinking, gains its ascendancy over the 
supposedly "incorrect" or "defective thinking" (1950, p. 456) of the 
primary process, Freud asserts, is repression. This was the very 
operation which Jung had observed in his experimental work as well, 
and he had attributed to it a similar function, that of excluding 
inferior associations, verbal-motor patterns and sound responses, from 
the focus of consciousness. 
When Jung moved on from the study of verbal behavior to a 
consideration of the mythological and symbolic structure which 
underlies the production of psychotic fantasies, he began his work, 
translated under the title The Psychology of the Unconscious (1916), 
with a discussion of two kinds of thought, "directed" and 
"non-directed" thinking, which seem related to the primary and 
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secondary processes described by Freud, but refined by explicit 
reference to the linguistic matrix out of which "directed thinking" 
develops.6 
The process of conscious thought, Jung says, works itself out in 
the form of words. Language, and verbal concepts, are the material in 
which thought is cast; even the mJst private forms of thought, if 
subjected to an attentive analysis, would reveal themselves in the 
guise of internal speech. This thinking in words, or "logical" 
thinking, is preeminently designed for corrmunication with others. It 
is adapted to the shared reality of society, and through that 
adaptation fosters an outward-looking attitude toward the world. "As 
long as we think directedly," Jung says, "we think for others and 
speak to others" (1916, p. 14), using a system of sounds that over the 
course of centuries have come to carry conmonly accepted conceptual or 
semantic meanings. 
The development of a regularized system of meaning has depended 
historically on the separation of sounds from the concrete, sensual 
and affective realities they originally signified, and a shift to the 
signification of relations and comparisons which alone permit the 
operation of abstract thought. But while containing, and 
transmitting, these standard patterns of information, language also 
permits the development and exercise of private reference, and thus 
serves as a double-edged instrument, with functions in both the 
personal and the social realm. 
Jung agreed with the English philosopher Baldwin, whom he quotes 
extensively, that language systematically delimits thought. 
FurthermJre, it also serves to condition the faculty of judgment, as 
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each individual, through trial and error, learns to adjust and conform 
his own immature and ideosyncratic understanding of words to the 
conventional meanings fixed within the language. social confinnation 
is a sign of the appropriateness of an individual's usage, not only of 
words themselves, but of concepts elaborated from those words as well. 
Thinking by means of internal speech, or "directed thinking," 
Jung writes, "is the manifest instrument of culture," a comparatively 
recent development in historical terms. Education in the methods of 
directed thinking gradually forced the human cognitive process out of 
its inward, subjective orientation to the objective realm of social 
interaction;? this radical reorientation of mind has allowed for the 
advances in science and technology on which modern society as we know 
it has been built. 
But this acquisition of the benefits of l ogical processing is not 
made without cost. Di rected thinking, Jung suggests, requires the 
expenditure of energy, and thus cannot be sustained for extended 
periods of time. And in the interim, when fatigue or inattention 
supervene, an alternative cognitive process is allowed to emerge, one 
which works with images, feelings, and desires, a thought process 
described by psychologist William James as "merely associative" 
thinking, and called by Jung "non-directed" or "fantasy thinking." 
Thus Jung, like Freud, builds a cognitive model on the 
distinction between two contrasting modes of thought: one controlled, 
attentive, objective, governed by the logical principles of 
abstraction, the product of maturity or of rigorous education; the 
other archaic, undisciplined, spontaneous, egocentric, and 
anti-social. "The first," Jung says, 
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working for communication with speech elements, is trouble-
some and exhausting; the latter, on the contrary, goes 
on without trouble, working spontaneously, so to speak, 
with reminiscences. The first creates innovations, adapta-
tions, imitates reality and seeks to act upon it. The 
latter, on the contrary, turns away from reality, sets 
free subjective wishes, and is, in regard to adaptation, 
wholly unproductive (1916, p. 22). 
A representation of the world formed under the influence of one type 
of thought would be quite different from the impression left by the 
operation of the other, Jung suggests, and it is the role of directed 
thought to correct and rrodify the productions of associative or 
fantasy thinking.8 The essential distinction between the two rrodes 
of thought, can be traced to the fact that non-directed thought 
corresponds to the attitude of introversion, a focus on the processes 
of inner, subjective experience, while directed, or logical, thought, 
occupies itself with the objective interests of extraversion. 
By the time of his next major publication, Psychological Types, 
however, Jung had come to realize that the attitudes of introversion 
and extraversion could be adopted with equal ease by thinkers of both 
directed and non-directed rrodes. Furthermore, he had come to realize 
that the process of rational thinking was itself comprised of two 
different functions, one of which is distinguished by a number of 
qualities reminiscent of the subjective, judgmental approach of the 
"predicate type" subjects of his early word association experiments. 
The cognitive process underlying their preferred style of association 
Jung named the "feeling function," and described its logic as the 
opposite of that used in the other rrode of rational cognition, which 
he chose to call the "thinking function." 
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Thinking and Feeling 
The essential difference between analytical and associative 
thought, between discrimination and evaluation, between deduction and 
predication, intellect and sentiment, logic and judgment, is for Jung 
a problem of "psychological types," and in his 1921 IOOnograph of that 
name, he traces the history of typological differences through 
aesthetics, literature, psychopathology and philosophy from the 
nineteenth century back to its roots in classical and medieval 
thought. The question at stake in the unresolved scholastic argument 
over nominalism and realism, and the conflict in ancient philosophy 
between the doctrines of inherence and predication, Jung says, 
is the typical opposition between the abstract standpoint, 
where the decisive value lies in the mental process itself, 
and the personal thinking and feeling which, consciously 
or unconsciously, underlie orientation by the objects of 
sense (1971, p. 36). 
The first process characteristically draws from a multiplicity of 
appearances an idea which orders and contains diversity; the second 
process attempts to reduce the insubstantial idea to something 
concrete and particular. The first is objective and impersonal, the 
second subjective, personal and reductive; the first is a development 
of the function of thinking, the second is related to the operation of 
the feeling function. 
Both thinking and feeling are said by Jung to be "rational" 
cognitive functions; they are IOOdes of infonnation processing, in 
contrast to the "irrational" functions of sensation and intuition, 
which govern the processes of perception. All four functions, he 
says, are available to every individual, and ideally operate in 
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hannonious equilibrium. But in practice, they are developed at 
different rates and employed by an individual in differing degrees. A 
function which is preferred becomes habitual. Chronic reliance on one 
of the four allows it to determine "type," the characteristic rrode in 
which an individual interprets and responds to his environment. 
The two rational functions of thinking and feeling, Jung 
suggests, are both the products of reflection, and both are designed 
to assist in the adaptation of the individual to objective values 
(1971, p. 458). Thinking, in this scheme, includes the active process 
he had earlier described as "directed thought," as well as the passive 
experience he had designated "fantasy thinking." What the two 
operations share in comrron is a process of bringing "the contents of 
ideation into conceptual connection with one another," a coordination 
of ideas under a corrnnon concept (1971 , p. 481). Where the arrangement 
of concepts is made in accordance with objective laws of logic, 
consciously applied, the process is a fully rational one; but even 
when the arrangement occurs unintentionally, in what might be called 
an irrational manner, the act of ordering with reference to a concept 
still distinguishes the result as a product of the thinking 
function.9 
Feeling, on the other hand, has only one criterion by which it 
introduces order: the value of an object, on the basis of which it is 
either to be accepted or rejectect. 10 Feeling "is an entirely 
subjective process," Jung says, 
which may be in every respect independent of external 
stimuli, though it allies itself with every sensation • 
. . . feeling is a kind of judgment, differing from 
intellectual judgment in that its aim is not to establish 
conceptual relations but to set up a subjective criterion 
of acceptance or rejection (1971, p. 434). 
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Simple feeling, Jung says, is concrete, closely allied with sensation 
in its task of evaluation. But as a rational function, feeling is 
also capable of abstraction. 
In the same way that thinking organizes the contents of 
consciousness under concepts, feeling arranges them 
according to their value. The more concrete it is, the 
rrore subjective and personal is the value conferred upon 
them; but the more abstract it is, the more universal and 
objective the value will be (1971, p. 435). 
Like thinking, feeling is rational in that "values in general are 
assigned according to the laws of reason, just as concepts in general 
are formed according to these laws" (1971, p. 435). It must be 
distinguished from affect in that it is a principle of discrimination, 
a criterion of judgment, and not in itself a state of emotional 
disturbance. But the feeling function can lead to an arousal of the 
emotions, if the intensity with which evaluation is performed reaches 
a sufficiently high degree. 
Because the criteria of thinking and feeling are, in essence, 
antithetical to one another, the f unctions are considered opposites. 
The normal adaptation of an i ndivi dual requires the choice of one mode 
over the other; the preferred mode is then developed at the expense of 
the other. Feeling, Jung says, "can never act as the second function 
alongside thinking, because it is by its very nature too strongly 
opposed to thinking. Thin~ing, if it is to be real thinking and true 
to its own principle, must rigorously exclude feeling" (1971, p. 406). 
As cognitive functions, they are equal, but mutually exclusive. 
The characteristics associated with the feeling function--its 
evaluative tendency, its reliance on the sensory dimensions of 
consciousness, and above all its strong subjectivity--are all 
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attributes which Jung had first noticed in the word associations of 
his predicate-type subjects.11 Although he does not explicitly make 
the connection in his discussion of the types, the pattern seems 
compelling, as does the conclusion which follows: that as exemplars 
of the feeling type, individuals with high levels of predication 
would, almost by definition, have difficulty with the use of their 
thinking function. And to the extent that thinking is a process of 
conceptual coordination, those who show a preference for the 
coordination of words with reference to concepts should, by contrast, 
demonstrate a well-differentiated thinking function. However, by the 
time he had completed his work on functions and types, Jung had long 
since abandoned the experimental method which might have given 
empirical support to his theory, which rests instead on clinical 
observations from his practice as a psychoanalyst. 
Thus far, the discussion has centered around several specific 
aspects of Jung's approach to individual psychology, on cognitive 
processes which can be subjected to analysis as isolated phenomena in 
persons equally isolated from one another. What remains to be 
examined is his work in the area of functional systems, his 
observations on the psycholinguistic dynamics of the family. 
The Family Constellation 
Jung warned the students of his early experimental research that 
the results of an individual's word association test should not be 
taken as indicative of an "intellectual" type. The coordinates, 
definitions, or predications which dominate a subject's reaction 
pattern are not, he emphasized, the products of "intellectual 
peculiarities, but depend entirely on emotional attitudes." The 
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better educated subjects 
usually show trivial, well-canalized verbal associations, 
whereas the uneducated make more valuable, often more 
meaningful, associations. This behavior would, from an 
intellectual point of view, be paradoxical (1973, p. 458). 
The clear conceptualizations and orderly verbal arrangements 
which appear in the responses of less educated people, Jung suggests, 
are not so much the result of an evolved thought process as of 
emotional involvement, an interest in the task, which contributes to 
an intensity of attention by means of which the deeper conceptual 
associations may be accessed. The attention of educated subjects is 
not so well concentrated; their emotions are not engaged by the task, 
and as a result the associations they produce arise from the more 
superficial and automated level of semantic and linguistic analysis. 
Attention, Jung suggests, is in i tself an emotional phenomenon 
(1973, p. 525),12 and a critical one, i n that the quality and depth 
of cognitive processing is directly dependent upon it. But other, 
more obvious, signs of emotion are t o be found in the responses of the 
predicate or the complex type individual, which become even more 
striking when the individual ' s associ at i ons are set in context of the 
responses of his family. Certain reaction-types--in particular the 
predicate type--tended to redundancy within family groups, with 
consequences that Jung believed could be detrimental to the 
development of the children within the family. 
The question of reaction patterns within families had arisen in 
the earliest stages of Jung and Riklin's investigation of associative 
behavior in normal subjects. Their original experimental sample of 
thirty-eight individuals had contained eight subjects who shared a 
73 
family connection: two sets of sisters with their respective roc>thers, 
and a mother and daughter pair. All members of each family group, 
when tested, proved to l:lelong to the same reaction-type, and 
furthermore, the differences l:letween and among their individual 
reaction patterns seemed to occur in a regular and predictible way. 
These preliminary observations seemed to the researchers to 
justify the hypothesis of a "familial disposition" (1973, p. 60) as a 
way of explaining the phenomenon, but in order to explore the deeper 
dimensions of this linguistic similarity among members of the same 
family, a second experiment was designed and carried out under Jung's 
supervision by one of his students at the Burgholzli, Dr. Enma Furst. 
Association tests were performed with members of twenty-four families 
of varying levels of education and social status, and the results were 
published in 1909, in the second volume of Diagnostic Association 
Studies. In the same year, Jung presented the material in a lecture, 
"The Family Constellation," at Clark University in Worcester, 
Massachusetts.13 
As had l:leen predicted, members of families were found to show 
striking similarities in their associations, not simply in terms of 
the words with which they responded, but also in terms of their 
response patterns, the way the responses fell into the categories of 
the logico-linguistic classification system. In the absence of what 
we might consider standard statistical tests for the quantification of 
the observed phenomena, Jung invented a simple numerical formula by 
which individual responses could l:le compared with each other, and was 
able to demonstrate that the reaction patterns of relatives show 
greater similarity to each other than do the patterns of unrelated 
persons. Interfamilial agreement was correlated with the relationship 
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of the individuals compared: children's associations were closer in 
type to the mother's responses than to the father's; mothers were 
closer to their daughters than to their sons, and married women seemed 
more affected by the reaction type of their spouse than that of their 
family of origin. 
The linguistic conformity of some respondents in the sample was 
uncanny. Speaking at Worcester of one mother-daughter pair, Jung 
says: 
One might indeed think that in this experiment, where the 
door is thrown wide open to so-called chance, individuality 
would become a factor of the utmost importance ... But, as 
we have seen, the opposite is the case. The daughter shares 
her mother's way of thinking, not only in her ideas but also 
in her form of expression; so much so that she even uses the 
same words (1973, p. 469). 
The kind of thought captured in an associative response, Jung says, is 
"not inconsequent ... nor free, but strongly determined within the 
boundaries of t he environment. 
If, therefore, even the most superficial and apparently 
most fleeting mental images are entirely due to the 
constellation of the environment, what must we not expect 
for the more important mental activities, for emotions, 
wishes, hopes, and intentions? (1973, p. 469) 
The emotional attitude of t he parent, as conveyed in a habitual 
reaction type, can so contaminate the familial environment that the 
child adopts that attitude as his own, complete with its linguistic 
forms of expression. This is particularly the case, Jung says, with 
the reaction-types that are most charged with emotional content, those 
highest in the evaluative terms of predication. 
The wife and daughter of a chronic alcoholic, tested in the 
experiment, were examples of this form of psycholinguistic 
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identification.14 It may be understandable, Jung says, for the wife 
to express her disillusionment with her life through the predication 
of intense value judgments, but 
it is quite unnatural for the daughter to appear as an 
extreme evaluating predicate type. She responds to the 
stimuli of the environment precisely as her rnother does. 
But whereas, in the mother, the type is to some extent a 
natural consequence of her unhappy situation, this simply 
does not apply to the daughter. The daughter merely 
imitates her mother; she follows her mother's pattern 
(1973, p. 473). 
This imitation is neither conscious nor intentional; rather, it is the 
sign of an unconscious and highly dangerous process of empathetic 
identification, a result of the child's inability to protect herself 
from being permeated by the intense emotional environment in which she 
lives. The phenomenon by which emotions are transmitted among living 
beings is biological in origin and was designed to protect the 
individual and the group; the expression of feelings serves survival 
by evoking similar feelings in others. But the engagement of this 
primitive response in more developed surroundings can have devastating 
consequences. Close contact with the emotional force of an evaluating 
predicate type leaves the bystander feeling "infected," overwhelmed, 
"carried away." And, as the associative evidence suggests, the impact 
of this assault on the empathetic system can even transform a young 
girl into the likeness of a dissatisfied and bitter matron, doomed, 
perhaps, to repeat her mother's unhappy destiny (1973, p. 473).15 
This example of the transmission of attitude from rnother to 
child, Jung concludes, highlights the importance of the environment in 
the development of the individual, in the educational setting no less 
than in the hOIIE, 
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It is not pious precepts nor the repetition of pedagogic 
truths that have a moulding influence on the character of 
a developing child; what most influences him are the 
unconscious personal affective states of his parents and 
teachers. Hidden conflicts ... secret worries, repressed 
wishes, all these produce in the child an emotional state, 
with clearly recognizable signs, that slowly but surely, 
though unconsciously, seeps into his mind, leading to the 
same attitudes and hence the same reactions to the environment. 
Among those recognizable signs are the verbal reactions that appear on 
a test of word associations, but other behavioral manifestations may 
serve as signs as well. 
Fathers and mothers deeply impress their children's minds 
with the stamp of their personalities; the more sensitive 
and impressionable the child, the deeper the impression. 
Everything is unconsciously reflected, even those things 
that have never been mentioned at all. A child imitates 
gestures and, just as the parents' gestures are the 
expressions of their emotional states, so in turn the 
gesture gradually produces an emotional s t ate in the child, 
as he makes t he gesture his own. His adaptation to the world 
is the same as his parents' (1973 , p. 474 ). 
Word and gesture then, not onl y convey information about attitude 
and affective state, but can actually induce them in the child. 
Reactions to the environment, habituated through practice and 
reinforced by the milieu, perpetuate themselves across generations, 
leading to the development of what Jung had earlier called "the family 
disposition." An understanding of these processes by educators was 
essential, he believed, in order for them to discharge their 
responsibility to the developing child, in liberating him from the 
debilitating influence of the horne environment, while helping him 
retain whatever might be of value in it. At the very least, they 
ought not to contribute to the child's difficulties by permeating the 
school atmosphere with their own unresolved emotional issues. 
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The discovery of agreement in reaction-type among family members, 
for Jung, was not simply an intellectual curiosity. It had profound 
implications for the cognitive development of children, and an equally 
profound significance for the healthy functioning of the family as a 
group. The mere fact of linguistic conformity was only the surface 
manifestation of a deeper current, one which powered the family system 
and underlay the dynamics of its members' interactions with one 
another. 
In a contemporaneous work, "The Significance of the Father in the 
Destiny of the Individual" (1961), Jung further developed his themes 
of environmental contagion, the influence of evaluative predication on 
the emotional states of others, and the psychological dangers of 
identification, and amplified his theories with case material from his 
therapeutic practice. Although in terms of conclusions it does not 
add to the impression he had left in his speech on "The Family 
Constellation," it indicates the centrality of these ideas to the 
cognitive theory he had evolved from his observations of verbal 
associative behavior. And although it is cast in Freudian terms, the 
work stands as an important link in Jung's own post-Freudian 
theoretical development. In future years, he was to return to the 
same material, and, just as he had found evidence to support Freud's 
views in his days as a young psychiatrist, he would look at the data 
again and find the foundation of his own mature theory of the psyche, 
the theory of archetypes and the collective unconscious. 
Although the word association work done at the Burgholzli Clinic 
at the turn of the century cannot be considered "statistical" in the 
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modern sense of the term--the experimenters worked only in terms of 
mean and modal figures, standard deviations and the correlational 
formula devised by Jung, and had no way of determining such matters as 
validity, reliability or significance--nevertheless, the descriptions 
of logical and linguistic patterns reported in the studies of family 
associations were made in such positive terms as to imply a high level 
of statistical significance. It was the purpose of the present study, 
reported in the chapter which follows, to replicate the Burgholzli 
work on family associations with a more modern statistical analysis, 
and to examine two claims of Jung's early cognitive theory: the 
existence of a family reaction-type, and the interference between the 
processes of thinking and feeling. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
The processes of thinking and feeling, of predication and 
coordination, of associative and analytical cognition that had so 
fascinated C.G. Jung lend themselves to study through empirical means, 
no less so than did his sense that the family environment plays a 
critical role--perhaps the decisive one--in the developrrent of an 
individual's cognitive style. In 1903, even before his first study of 
associative behavior was in print, Jung and his student, Emna Furst, 
were engaged in the analysis of responses from twenty-four families, 
the members of which showed remarkable agreement in terms of 
reaction-type. Once the fact of conformity among families had been 
suggested, however, no further work seems to have been done in this 
area, and as late as 1935, when Jung delivered a series of lectures on 
his psychological theories at t he Tavistock Clinic in London (Jung, 
1968), the material on family association he presented was derived 
from the early experimental work of Dr. Furst. 
Although in an earlier presentation at Clark University he had 
described her study as of "merely theoretical importance" (1973, p. 
466)--that is, without intrinsic therapeutic or psychoanalytic value--
the insight it gave into the underlying structural similarity in 
cognition within family groups can hardly be dismissed so lightly. A 
metacognitive examination of one's reactions to the environnent--and 
in essence, most reactions are purely associative in nature--cannot 
avoid comparison with the reactions of one's parents, siblings and 
other close relatives. such a reflection can bring to light the 
detrimental effects of automatic patterns learned in childhood, and 
lead an individual to the assumption of responsibility for the content 
of his own reactions. 
The present chapter reports an experiment that was designed to 
explore two aspects of Jung ' s early theory of cognition: first, that 
a "family disposition" shapes the associative styles of individual 
members into conformity with one another; and second, that the 
cognitive qualities of the feeling function interfere with the 
operation of logical thought. A simple word association test, coupled 
with a test of deductive reasoning, provided the tools for the 
exploration. Fifty-two members of fifteen different families then 
agreed to grant this special glimpse into the logical and linguistic 
patterns that exist within their households. 
Conditions of the Experiment 
HyPOtheses. This work was begun with four basic hypotheses: 
1. That as Furst had demonstrated, there i s a statistically 
significant level of redundancy in patterns of associative response 
among family members; 
2. That the predicate reaction-type is dominant in any family in 
which it occurs in at least one of the parents; 
3. That mothers and daughters will show a higher degree of 
linguistic conformity than other family members; 
4. That a high proportion of predicate responses on a test of 
word association will correlate negatively with a standard measure of 
deductive logic, one of the major critical thinking skills. 
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In addition, the experiment was designed to provide parameters 
within which the response agreement of normal families might be 
contained. Although Jung, Riklin and Furst were interested in aspects 
of individual psychology and reported their data to reflect the 
behavior of individuals and individual families, the present analysis 
will focus only on trends within the aggregate. 
Selection of subjects. Unlike an experiment that seeks to examine the 
characteristics of a number of free and unassociated individuals, a 
study of families is made much more complex by the fact that consent 
must be given by all members of the group in order for that group to be 
considered as a coherent system. The unavailability, unwillingness, or 
incapacity of one or two members to participate can leave the 
experimenter with an interesting, but incomplete, picture of processes 
operating within the group as a whole, and unfortunately this was the 
case in all but two of the families in the sample. To this 
complication should be added the circumstances of divorce and death of 
a parent, which obtained in four of the sample families; in these cases 
the extent of associative resemblance of the children to the absent 
parent can never be subject to investigation. 
However, these limitations reflect the realities of everyday life, 
and their influence on the sample discussed here is a consequence of 
the experimenter's decision not to design a clinically ideal sample, 
with artificial constraints placed on the compositional or numerical 
definition of "family," but rather to follow the more pragmatic 
practice of Jung and Riklin in selecting the individuals to study. 
Like the thirty-eight men and women who were chosen to serve as 
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subjects in the original Burgholzli experiment on associations of 
normal individuals, the core participants in this study were all 
affiliated with the institution where the experiment took place: they 
were either professional colleagues of the experimenter or fellow 
students in the graduate program. Random chance thus did not play a 
part in the initial selection of the families, but the inclusion of a 
family's data did depend, in the final analysis, on the unpredictable 
agreement of a majority of its members to participate as subjects in 
the experiment. 
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Four of the families who were asked to serve did not do so: of 
these, one refused at the outset; another withdrew after the testing 
was already well underway; and two, who had agreed in principle, found 
it impossible to make themselves available during the time frame in 
which the experiment was conducted. On the other hand, one family came 
forward voluntarily to participate, after the father heard from someone 
in his office that the study was being done.I With this one 
exception, however, all families were personally invited by the 
experimenter through one of their members, usually a parent; and 
consent of other family members was obtained either by the experimenter 
personally or by a member of the family who had already been tested, 
and who could therefore allay the concerns of relatives who might 
otherwise hesitate to participate if asked by a stranger. No subject 
was compensated for participation. 
Characteristics of the sample. A total of fifty-two individuals are 
included in the sample, representing fifteen different families. Six 
might be described as traditional nuclear families; two are 
multi-generational extended families, two are extended families 
involving in-laws, and in addition there are two separate dyads, a 
father and son, and a pair of sisters. The most extensive family unit 
in the sample comprised nine individuals: two parents, six children 
and a grandchild whose father is the parents' oldest son, and who 
frequents the homes of all his older relatives, including the 
grandparents. Two of the families consist of two parents and four 
children, and in one of these groups, the husband of the youngest 
daughter and two children of the oldest daughter also agreed to 
participate. 
The composition of the sample in its final form is detailed in 
Table 1. The unit of analysis is the dyad, a structural relationship 
obtaining between any two members of the family. Abbreviations which 
will be used in subsequent tables to refer to dyadic relationships are 
also given in Table 1 . 
For the sake of simplicity, a family is defined as a nuclear 
group comprised of at least one parent and at least two children; 
thus, the smallest family in the sample will consist of at least three 
dyads. These nuclear groups will be considered as separate units, 
regardless of any relational affiliation which may exist with members 
of other nuclear groups.2 In other words, the extended family 
relationships of aunts, uncles, grandparents, cousins and in-laws 
which are present in the sample as a whole will not be subjected to 
analysis for levels of linguistic conformity. Given this working 
definition of "family," then, the sample contains nine families 
(Families 1 through 7, 9, and 11), and two groups which might better 
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Family 5; 3 members, 3 dyads 
Mother-Companion (m-pc) 1 
Mother-Son 1 
Companion-Son (pc-s) 1 


















Family 8: 3 members, 2 dyads 
Mother-Daughter 1 
Mother-Daughter-in-Law(dl) 1 








Family 10: 4 members, 6 dyads 
Mother-Daughter 1 
Daughter-Husband (d-h) 1 
Husband-Sister (h-s) 1 
Mother-Son in Law (sl) 1 
Mother-Husband's Sister(hs)l 
Daughter-Husband's Sister 1 





Dyad 12 (Family 7) 
Husband-Wife (h-w) 

















separate dyads of related individuals (Families 12, 13, 14, and 15). 
Data from these dyadic groups are not included in all portions of the 
analysis which follows. 
The native language of all subjects is English. With that single 
characteristic in common, the families represent a broad range of 
ethnic, cultural and socio-economic backgrounds. One family is black, 
and deeply involved in the life of its religious corrmunity. One 
family is Jewish, six are Irish-Catholic, and in one family, the 
parents retain a strong fundamentalist Protestant affiliation which 
has been abandoned by the children. In two of the families, expressed 
unorthodox spiritual beliefs prevail, and in two, there was no mention 
made of cultural, religious or spiritual ideation. 
In terms of socioeconomic distribution, no direct data was taken 
on range of family income, but inferences can be drawn from the 
educational level and occupation of family members. Sixteen of the 
adult participants are employed or self-employed in professional or 
administrative capaticies; eleven can be classed as blue-collar 
workers, a category which includes supervisory positions for which a 
college education is not required. Five are primarily homemakers; 
thirteen are full-time students, including nine who are currently in 
grade school or high school; and six reported themselves as retired, 
but with the exception of only one, a businessman, did not specify the 
positions which they held during their working careers. 
All families can be assumed to fall into a moderate to 
lower-middle income range; none were exceptionally prosperous, and 
while some might conceivably identify themselves as members of the 
"working poor," none were below the official poverty level. All but 
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two of the families live in a major metropolitan center; one family 
lives in a small town in a rural area, and one in a moderate-sized 
conrnunity at some distance from any large city. 
In terms of education, twenty of the thirty-one adults in the 
sample held at least the baccalaureate degree. Another eleven, of 
whom four are currently full-time college students, had attended 
between one and three years of college, and twelve had only a high 
school diploma. 
The sample was slightly weighted toward women, with twenty-eight 
female participants, as against twenty-four males. Subjects ranged in 
age from 12 to 76 years of age; twenty-two of the subjects, or 42%, 
fell in the mid-range age bracket of 20 to 39; ten were below the age 
of 19; eight were between the ages of 40 and 59, and twelve were over 
the age of 60. 
Although care was taken as nruch as possible to select only 
families which were not exceptional in terms of emotional difficulties 
or disturbances within the home, information volunteered after the 
test by individual subjects revealed the fact that in at least four of 
the families, conditions in the past had been such as to warrant some 
degree of professional or psychiatric intervention with at least one 
of the members. To what extent such intervention may have been 
necessary in other families whose members were not quite so 
forthcoming will, of course, never be known. It is worth mentioning, 
however, for several reasons: first, as a reminder of how truly 
commonplace psychological dysfunction can be, even within a seemingly 
"normal" population; second, because echoes of disturbance still 
resonate in the responses of a number of the subjects of the test 
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reported here; and third, because past experience with psychological 
assessment practices had made some of the subjects unhappily familiar 
with the specific process of the word association test. 
Since the purpose of this experiment was an analysis of 
linguistic phenomena and their relation to formal-logical processes, 
and not an examination of individual or group pathology, however, it 
was decided that no data would be excluded from the sample solely on 
the basis of the subject's reported or self-confessed psychological 
history. Where data has had to be excluded from some portion of the 
analysis (and in one case this proved to be necessary), it is only 
because the subject deliberately refused to comply with the 
instructions given at the outset of the test. Where this exclusion 
occurs, it will be noted. 
Test administration. The experiment was conducted in two parts. 
First, the subject was asked to gi ve verbal associations to a list of 
one hundred ordinary words, read by t he test administrator one at a 
time. Prior to the beginning of t he t est , the subject was read, or 
was given to read, a set of instructions which asked that he or she 
simply say the first word t hat came to mind, as quickly as possible, 
after the stimulus word had been heard and comprehended. At the 
conclusion of the word association task, the subject was given ten 
minutes to complete eighteen questions from the deductive logic 
section of the Ross Test of Higher Cognitive Processes. These 
instruments are reproduced as Appendices 1 and 2. 
Time constraints, as well as logistical considerations, dictated 
the creation of a research team to assist with the administration of 
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the tests. Twenty-one of the fifty-two subjects were tested directly 
by the experimenter. The rest of the data was collected by nine 
colleagues, each of whom had first been tested and then given a set of 
simple guidelines to govern their behavior as test administrators. 
Each of these nine assistants then obtained data from at least one 
other member of his or her immediate family, and two of them, who 
became entranced by the game-like quality of the process, went on to 
test eight relatives apiece, including parents and siblings as well as 
nieces, nephews and in-laws. 
In all but six cases, the test was administered with subject and 
tester face to face in the same room. In those six cases, where the 
relatives were away at school or permanently living in another city, 
the word association test was administered by telephone, and the Ross 
Test was either mailed or was not given at all. Ten of the subjects 
were tested in their workplace (or the workplace of the parent, in the 
case of one minor child); the remainder were tested either in their 
own homes or in the "family" home, the residence of those members 
around whom the extended family centers. Although every effort was 
made to insure that each subject had the same degree of privacy with 
the tester, in one family it proved necessary to test two members in 
the presence of the mother, who had already given her responses. 
The majority of the testing for each group was carried out at the 
same place, on the same day, and took place either during a holiday, 
when the family had already planned to be gathered together, or in the 
early evening of a workday, after dinner. Two of the subjects had 
just awakened from a nap at the time the test was administered, and 
this condition may have had an effect on both the content of their 
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responses and their reaction-times.3 In three families, the testing 
of individual members extended over a period longer than a week, and 
this was due both to logistical difficulties as well as to uncertainty 
as to whether or not the prospective subjects would agree to 
participate. 
Part of the condition of the experiment was that individual 
subjects not be made aware of responses that other family members, 
previously tested, had given to the stimulus-words. Where groups were 
tested in the home, great care was taken to see to it that the subject 
and the tester were physically isolated from other family members who 
were waiting to be tested. Even in cases where the time period of the 
experiment was prolonged over several days or weeks, it is most 
unlikely that the subjects who were last to be tested had been made 
aware of the responses previously given by thei r relatives. 
In these conditions, a t otal of 5,200 word associations was 
collected, together with thirty-eight completed copies of the Ross 
Test of deductive reasoning. 
The Word Association Exper i ment 
The instrument and classification system. The word list used in the 
experiment was closely modelled on the A.A. Brill translation of the 
list reported by Jung in his 1909 article, "The Association Method" 
(1973). As an instrument, that list had itself been modified in 
practice over the course of time from the list initially devised for 
use in the experiments at the Burgholzli Hospital; in particular, many 
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of the highly-charged affect-laden terms in the original list had been 
dropped in favor of milder words signifying a similar concept, or 
neutral terms evocative of no particular affective response. The 
present list (see Appendix 1) differs from the Brill version of Jung's 
list in twelve items. Of these alterations, seven are different 
translations of the original term, and five are substitutions from an 
earlier version of the list for stimulus words that were thought to be 
redundant or inappropriate for a test involving children.4 
It would be ideal to be able to classify the stimulus-words as to 
grammatical form, with fixed percentages of nouns, verbs, and 
adjectives, and in fact, this sort of computation could be done with 
the formal signs which appear in the written list. In practice, 
however, as the written signs are transformed first into acoustic 
patterns by the speaker and then into mental concepts by the hearer, 
they undergo permutations which take them far from their original, 
clear-cut morphological identity . There are at least thirteen words 
on the stimulus-list that lend themsel ves to ambiguities in 
interpretation, due to the hornonyrnous form they assume when 
functioning in different grammatical r oles. Is "fall," for example, 
an unequivocal verb in the German or i ginal, necessarily a verb in 
English? Might it not also be a noun, or could it perhaps even be an 
adjective, as in "fall foliage"? can "marry" not legitimately be 
heard as "Mary," or "dear" as "deer," leading to unexpected, but 
perfectly direct, associative responses? 
To a great degree, such ambiguity as to nouns and verbs was 
absent from Jung's German list; the formal structure of German verbal 
infinitives instantly distinguishes them as verbs, an identification 
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which must be accomplished in English by the addition of the separate 
prefix "to," as in "to pay," "to ask," "to swim." The Brill 
translation of Jung's list faithfully reproduces the cumbersome 
two-word verbal infinitive for the 24 stimulus-words which were 
single-word verbs in the German original. The present list did not 
formally indicate any differentiation between verbs and other 
grammatical forms, leaving the interpretation, and consequently a 
wider field of choice for a potential associative res:p:>nse, entirely 
up to the subject. Several subjects were uncomfortable with this 
degree of freedom, and wanted to know "which one" of the horoonyrns the 
experimenter meant; the answer was that it was whichever one the 
subject thought it was. The lexicon of responses, which appears in 
the appendix, clearly shows the degree to which subjects differed in 
their interpretation of the given stimuli. 
Classification of response words. The source of numerical data 
on which the following analysis is based is the time-consuming, 
perplexing and at times intensely frustrating process of res:p:>nse word 
classification, a "difficult and unrewarding task" indeed, in the 
words of Jung and Riklin (1973, p. 9). The entire analytic structure 
of comparisons and conclusions, of coherence, of contrast, of 
conmonality and of difference must stand or fall on the foundation 
laid, piece by painstaking piece, in the relationship identified 
between each single stimulus-word and its elicited associate. The 
perils inherent in this process are not to be minimized. Just as a 
word like "fall" is not by nature a noun, an adjective or a verb, but 
is boxed into its semantic function by the verbal environment which 
surrounds it at any given time, so too a superficially self-evident 
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verb-noun pair like "pay-money" or "ride-rollercoaster" may on deeper 
examination prove to be an implied pair of synonyms, on the one hand 
(the pay one receives is in the form of money), or a specification of 
an impl ied substantive, on the other (rollercoaster as one particular 
instance of "a ride"). 
It might be thought that the subjects who gave the responses 
ought to be able to help to clarify their associative relationship to 
the stimulus word, and in some few cases, particularly in response-
pairs which reproduce current advertising slogans or other culturally-
embedded proper nouns (names of television shows, rock groups or 
popular publications), post-test questioning of the subject proved to 
be helpful. For t he most part, however, the subjects either could not 
remember what t hey had actually t hought while producing the response 
in question, or in trying to remember began t o confuse themselves with 
other possible al ternat ives t o the explanation that first came to 
mind. After provoking a few such embarrassing s ituations, the 
experimenter chose to stop asking for subjective explanations, and to 
rely on intuition and t he inner l ogic of the subject's overall 
r esponse-pattern to help classify any quest ionable responses. 
In general, responses have been classified according to the 
schema presented by Jung and Riklin i n t heir 1904 article, "The 
Associations of Normal subjects," whi ch i s described in detail in the 
preceding chapter. The organizing principle of this hierarchical 
system is the degree of logical relatedness obtaining between the 
stimulus and response words. A surrmary of the analytical categories 
is presented in Table 2, on the following two pages. Column 1 gives 
the categories of the most detailed analysis performed by Jung and 
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Table 2 
Response Classification Systems 
Jung-Riklin System 
I. Internal .Associatiais 
A. Grouping 
1. Coordination 
a. By conmon general 
concept ( 0111 ) 
b. By similarity (0112) 
c. By internal relationship (011 3) 
d. By external relationship (0114) 
e. By example (0115) 
2. subordination 
a. Actual subordination (0121) 
b. Specification (0122) 
3. SUperordination (0130) 
4. Contrast (0140) 
5. Groupings of Doubtful 
Quality (0150) 
B. Predicative relationship 
1. Noun and adjective 
a. Internal predicate 
i. objective judgment (0211) 
ii.value judgment (0212) 
b. External predicate (0213) 
2. Noun and Verb 
a. subject relationship (0221) 
b. Object relationship (0222) 
3. Determination of place, 
time, rreans and purpose (0230) 
4. Definition or explanation (0250) 
c. causal relationship (0300) 






2. SUb- and supra-
ordination 
3. Contrasts 
4. Value predicates 
5. Other predicates 
6. Relationship of 
subject and object 
7. Designation of time, 




II. External. Associatioos 
A. Coexistence (0400) 
B. Identity (0500) 
C. Linguistic-motor forms 
1. Canalized verbal 
associations 
a. Simple contrasts (0611) 
b. current phrases (0612) 
2. Proverbs and quotations (0620) 
3. Compound words and word-
changes (0630) 
4. Anticipatory reactions (0640) 
5. Interjections (0650) 
III. Sound Reactims 
A. Word-completion (0700) 
B. Sound (0800) 
c. Rhyme (0900) 
IV. Miscellaneous 
A. Indirect associations 
1. Connection by conman 
intermediate concept (1010) 
2. Centrifugal sound-shift (1020) 
3. Centripetal sound-shift (1030) 
4. Shift through word-completion 
or linguistic-motor form (1040 ). 
5. Shift through several 
intermediate links (1050) 
B. Meaningless reactions (1100) 
C. Failures (1200) 





















Riklin; the numbers in parentheses are the code numbers assigned to 
each category for purposes of the computer analysis perforrred in the 
present study. Column 2 gives the sumnary categories of Jung and 
Riklin's work with normal individuals, and column 3 shows the slightly 
different arrangement of sununary categories used by Furst in her 
analysis of data from families. The analysis which follows will make 
reference to all three levels of complexity in terms of response 
classification. 
The basic numerical data of the analysis derives from a 
classification across the full range of relational categories. Each 
category was assigned a unique four-digit code number on a scale 
proceeding from 0111, representing the tight conceptual bonds of 
coordinate responses, through intennediate numbers indicating the 
increasing marginality of linguistic responses, to the high numbers of 
residual responses and failures. Mean and modal figures for 
individuals and families can be understood with reference to this 
coding scale. A low modal response figure, for instance a 230 or 350, 
would indicate a predominance of conceptual or meaning-based 
associations in an individual's responses; the higher the figure, the 
more superficial the overall pattern it represents. 
Prior to beginning a presentation of the data, however, a word 
remains to be said about some of the aspects of the classification 
system which diminish its capacity to function as an objective 
instrument. The identification of response category has in general 
followed the examples given by Jung and Riklin in their article "The 
Associations of Normal Subjects." In practice, it is difficult, if 
not in fact impossible, to identify the shades of meaning which might 
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distinguish an intended synonym from a coordinate response, and yet 
the difference is one which distinguishes two major relational 
classes, internal and external associations. Contrasts, or antonyms, 
likewise might be classed either as ordinates (internal) or as 
linguistic-motor reactions (external), depending on principles of 
judgment on which Jung and Riklin are not entirely clear. The choice 
of one category over another has implications for the weighting of an 
individual's entire response-profile, and consequently for any 
comparisons which might be drawn between individuals or among groups. 
In consideration of the inconsistencies which seem to have been built 
into the classification system, several principles of analysis have 
been adopted in this study which are intended to minimize the need for 
subjective judgment and provide for a reliable level of consistency in 
classification.5 
The effect of these principles has been to shift the entire 
classification system in the apparent direction of the linguistic, 
less conceptually coherent, more automatized reaction types, with the 
result that individuals who habitually r espond in synonyms and 
antonyms, for example, have a much hi gher numerical coefficient 
assigned to their response profile than they might have if any of 
those associations had been were classified as ordinates of some kind. 
This fact must be bourne in mind if the present data is compared with 
the results obtained by Jung, Riklin and Furst at the turn of the 
century. 
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Response corrmonality. The results from the fifty-two individuals in 
the sample were analysed and compared in a number of procedures which 
examined different dimensions of response corranonality. The first set 
of procedures dealt with the actual word responses given by each 
individual, and the categories assigned to each response. In this 
phase of the work , comparisons among family members were made in such 
a way as to establish par ameters wi t hin which relatives' associations 
are similar to each other; t hese similarities were then compared 
against levels of similari t y wh ich exist in the entire population of 
unrelated individuals. The second phase of the analysis examined the 
patterns which emerged when t he data was sort ed by category and 
grouped according to t he schemas of Furst and of Jung. Here, 
coefficients of difference wer e establ ished for each of the 
interfamilial dyads, and dyads were ranked wi th in each f amily in order 
of t heir manifest agreement. Third , modal response types were 
determined for each family member , and a contingency test was 
performed to see i f the patter ns obtaining between parents and 
children was stat istical ly significant . 
In noticing t hat wi thin a family, a father and son, for example, 
associ ate "like" one another, the observer mi ght be making reference 
to any one of three dimensions in which associat i ve similarity can be 
demonstrated. Firs t, t here is the surf ace level of t he actual 
response words themselves: do father and son give an identical verbal 
response to the same stimulus word? But t he words themselves fall 
into categories which begin to erode t he differences perceived at this 
superficial level; father and son may reply with different words, but 
both words may be antonyms to the stimulus, and thus represent a 
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comnon response at the categorial level of analysis (for the full 
range of categories used in this analysis, see Table 2, column 1). 
Finally, a father and son may each respond with a great overall number 
of antonyms, but not necessarily to the same stimulus-words; a similar 
total percentage of shared response categories may exist, but the 
similarity can only emerge when individual response categories begin 
to be grouped into the more comprehensive summary categories shown in 
the second and third columns of Table 2. 
In the present section, the first two levels of potential 
comnonality between and among family members will be examined, those 
levels which reflect the actual verbal responses made to each of the 
one hundred stimulus words of the test, in the actual order in which 
they were given, and the most specific category into which the 
responses can be classified. The results summarized here are intended 
to be descriptive only; no standard statistical procedures or tests of 
significance were performed at this stage of the analysis. 
Verbal cornnonality. The tendency of family members to produce 
the same verbal response to the same stimulus-word is most startling 
when the response words are unique to that family within the sample, 
or unusual in some other regard. The fact that all members of a given 
family respond with "sister" to the stimulus-word "brother," for 
example, loses its significance if this specific response has a high 
frequency in the sample as a whole. The associate-pair "journey-
adventure," on the other hand, given only by three male members of 
Family 4, out of the entire population of fifty-two respondents, is a 




Most of the coIIUTIOn responses elicited in this experiment are, in 
fact, merely a reflection of conventional associative frequencies found 
in the population at large. However, the fact that linguistic 
convention underlies the shared responses of family members does not 
diminish the level of conformity as such within that family. As a 
matter of interest, the frequency of all responses elicited in the 
sample is given in the lexicon as Appendix 3. 
Percentages of identical verbal responses given by family members 
are given in Table 3. Only those families with at least three related 
members are shown. The top figure in each column represents the number 
of instances in which all members of the family gave the same response 
to the same stimulus word; for example, in Family 4, with nine members, 
4% of the stimulus words evoked an identical response from all members. 
In Family 1, there were no words which evoked the same response from 
all six members; on the other hand, in Family 7, also with six members, 
five stimulus words evoked the same response f rom a l l members. 
Table 3 
Percentage of Identical Responses to Stimulus Words 
Family 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 1 1 
n=6 n=4 n=4 n=9 n=3 n=3 n=6 n=3 n=4 
9 members, same response 4 
8 members, same response 4 
7 members, same response 5 
6 members, same response 0 4 5 
5 members, same response 0 8 7 
4 members, same response 2 6 2 1 6 1 2 5 
3 members, same response 1 8 1 9 15 25 1 0 13 1 9 5 14 
2 members, same response 45 37 43 83 29 23 73 35 35 
At least 2 with same response 59 58 58 93 39 36 89 40 53 
101 
succeeding rows in each column show the percentage of stimulus 
words to which an identical verbal response was given by any 
combination of members, with reference to the total number in the 
family. For example, in Family 2, with four members, three gave 
identical responses 19% of the time, but they were not necessarily the 
same three individuals in every case. 
Because the families are composed of differing numbers of members, 
it is not possible to make many direct comparisons from one family to 
another. However, it seems as though larger families have a greater 
chance of corrmon responses occurring in at least two of the members 
(last line of Table 3) because of the greater number of dyads existing 
within them. 
The consideration of any two responses to each stimulus word leads 
to an examination of responses given by specific individuals in 
comparison with other members of their families; these figures are 
given in Table 4, on the following page. Each member of a family is 
compared with any and all other members for identical verbal responses. 
In Family 1, for example, 38"~ of the father's verbal responses were 
rratched by at least one other member of his family, while only 11% of 
the mother's responses were shared by any other member. Again, higher 
percentages seem to be associated with greater numbers of individuals 
in the family, with commonalities in the 50-60% range appearing in 
Families 4 and 7, but only 27-3'2% in families of three members. The 
lowest corrmonality figures in the sample belong to the mother and first 
daughter of Family 1, and, as will be seen, the response patterns of 
these two individuals will so depress the aggregate averages as to 












Percentage of Responses Shared by Individuals 
with Any Other Member of the Family 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
38 41 38 45 28 29 59 
1 1 36 43 63 28 28 58 
1 1 37 37 47 32 28 52 
27 41 41 54 48 
38 60 55 










Although not every family can be analysed into comparable dyads, 
some overall averages can be established for the degree to which family 
members share corranon verbal responses with each other. The figures 
in Table 5 represent the percentage of instances in which the 
identified family member gave a verbal response which was identical to 
the response of any other member of the family. 
Table 5 
Average Percentage of Responses Shared by Individuals 









These figures suggest that in the average family of three or more 
members, any individual might be expected to produce the same 
association as any other member between 33-38% of the time. 
Once this general level of verbal commonality has been 
established, it remains to compare responses from specific pairs of 
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individuals, to determine the corrnonality which exists between members 
of structural intrafamilial dyads. Results from this analysis are 
presented in Table 6, on the following page. Families of three or more 
members are given on the left half of the chart; families of dyads are 
on the right. 
Here, commonality ranges from 1 to 31%, with about half of the 
dyads (39 out of 77) producing identical responses between 20 and 30% 
of the time. Family groups, conceived as the aggregate of their 
constituent dyads, show commonality averages of between 7.2 and 26.0%, 
with a mean of 19.3%, and the average verbal commonality of all 
intrafamilial dyads is 17.9%. The two highest figures, 29 and 31%, 
belong to mother-daughter dyads, the mother and second oldest daughter 
from Family 7, and the mother and third oldest daughter from Family 4, 
respectively. The next highest figure, 28"/o , is shared by two other 
dyads from Family 7, the mother-father pair, and the pair consisting of 
father and second daughter. Again, the lowest figures in all but one 
of the dyadic categories are to be found in the responses of Family 1. 
The summary given in Table 7 represents averages for the major 
intrafamilial dyads in the sample. These figures indicate the 
instances in which both members of the identified pair produced 
identical verbal responses to the same stimulus word. It seems that 
parental dyads, and mother-elder child dyads, give identical response 
more often than other pairs of relatives, but the differences are so 
slight as to carry no significance. What emerges clearly from these 
figures, however, is that any given pair of family members might be 
expected to produce identical responses to any stimulus word just under 
20% of the time. 
Table 6 
Percentage of Identical Responses Given by Members of Familial Dyads 
FAMILY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 1 1 8 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 13 1 4 1 5 Averaoes 
DYAD 
Father-Mother 4 1 8 26 23 17 21 28 1 9 1 8 1 7 19. 10 
Father-1st Child 6 23 1 0 20 21 21 26 1 6 23 25 19.10 
Father-2nd Child 9 24 18 1 7 28 1 4 18.30 
Father-3rd Child 23 1 8 23 21.30 
Father-4th Child 1 1 23 22 18.60 
Mother-1st Child 4 1 8 24 23 21 1 8 24 1 7 26 1 3 1 8 18.70 
Mother-2nd Child 4 25 14 22 20 1 6 1 8 17.00 
Mother-3rd Chi ld 4 31 29 21.30 
Mother-4th Child 2 20 1 7 13.00 
1st Child-2nd Child 3 20 1 2 17 22 17 1 4 27 26 17.50 
1st Child-3rd Child 4 25 22 17.00 
1st Child-4th Child 1 20 22 14.30 
2nd Child-3 rd Child 13 24 21 19.30 
2nd Child-4th Child 9 24 1 4 15.60 
3rd Child-4th Child 1 1 20 27 19.30 




Average Percentage of Verbal Response 












categorial corrmonality. When the focus of analysis is shifted to 
the next level of abstraction, that of responses among family members 
which share a category designation in common, the figures show a 
marked increase in conmonality. At the categorial level of analysis, 
verbal responses which differ in content may represent the same "type" 
of response. For example, the stimulus-response pairs "bird-fly" and 
"bird-sing" although apparently different, are both "predicate" 
responses to the stimulus, actions or s tates which can be predicated of 
the term "bird," and thus are classified as belonging to the same 
category of response . Again, the full range of categories into which 
responses have been classified is given in Table 2, above. 
As Table 8, on the next page, indicates, for families of six or 
more members, 99-100% of all stimulus-words will evoke responses from 
at least two family members which can be classified in the same 
category, using the thirteen-part Jung-Riklin system shown in Table 2. 
In families of four, between 87 and 100% of stimulus words evoke a 
response of identical category from two or more members of the group, 
and families of three show about a 7(1'/o categorial conmonality rate 
between responses of any two members. 
Families of six or more share between 40-50% responses among half 
their members; families of four have a slightly higher rate of 
commonality among half their members, between 56 and 66%. The highest 
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Table 8 
Percentage of Categorial Responses in Common 
Family 1 2 . 3 4 5 6 7 9 1 1 
n=6 n=4 n=4 n=9 n=3 n=3 n=6 n=3 n=4 
9 members, same category 6 
8 members, same cateoory 7 
7 members, same cateoory 1 1 
6 members, same category 1 1 3 8 
5 members, same category 6 1 9 1 5 
4 members, same category 1 3 1 3 6 28 28 1 5 
3 members, same cateoory 46 29 31 50 22 25 40 21 26 
2 members, same category 77 66 56 79 51 46 74 52 62 
At least 2, same cateoory 99 92 87 100 73 71 100 73 90 
rate of unanimity is found in Family 6, where 25% of the stimulus-words 
evoked responses in the same category from all members of the family. 
Family 1, which had no verbal responses shared by more than four of its 
six members and only two identical responses shared by four members 
(see Table 3, above), shows 13% commonality among four members when the 
verbal associations are converted into their appropriate relational 
classifications. 
Overall, the rate at which a similar category response is produced 
seems to be about twice the rate which occurs when only the actual 
response word itself is taken into account. This result has not been 
subjected to any test of statistical significance, however, and until 
such time as a more detailed analysis is performed, it can only be 
presented as descriptive of a trend existing within the present sample. 
When at least three responses are shared among members of a group 
which comprises four or more individuals, it is possible to analyse the 
percentages of commonality into constituent groupings representing 
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intrafamilial alliances or sub-systems. Of the 46 instances of corrnnon 
category response among three members of Family 1, for example, the 
father was party to 29 of them; seven of them involved the father and 
the two sons, and another eight involved father, mother, and older son. 
Of the thirteen instances in which four responses were shared in 
corrmon, the father and older son were among the respondents in eleven 
of them; the older son was involved in all thirteen; seven of the 
instances included father, both sons, and the younger daughter. 
While space does not permit a detailed analysis of all the 
corrmonalities which are include three or more members, suffice it to 
say here that the results seem to indicate the existence of 
demonstrable internal fissures within family groups, interior groupings 
among members which may indicate stable coalitions or subgroups among 
members. Only a sensitive post-test interviewing process would reveal 
the extent to which these verbal alliances are replicated in other 
areas of the family's interaction, and clearly, such investigation 
falls outside the realm of the present study. As a matter of interest, 
however, the data on interior groupings within family units is 
presented in Appendix 5. 
When the percentage of shared category responses of each family 
member is compared with similar data on the verbal responses, all 
figures are elevated to a striking degree, more than doubled in most 
instances (see Table 9, on the following page). Most surprising of all 
are the figures for the mother and older daughter of Family 1, who 
shared only eleven verbal responses with any other members of their 
family (see Table 4, above). When the words they produced are 
converted into their appropriate relational categories, the daughter 
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Table 9 
Categorial Responses Shared Among Family Members 
Family 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 1 1 
father 73 68 67 85 58 58 90 65 
mother 57 69 60 90 54 53 82 55 68 
1st child 40 59 52 80 55 55 87 57 67 
2nd child 60 70 49 89 82 55 62 
3rd child 84 88 85 
4th child 67 85 79 
5th child 91 
6th child 83 
1orandchild 92 
is shown to share 40% of her responses with others, and the mother a 
stunning 57%, a five-fold increase over her verbal corrm:>nality rate. 
Thus, although her actual words may have been ideosyncratic or unique, 
the way in which she approached the stimulus word--her choice of a 
relational category with which to respond--clearly was not. It is at 
this level of abstraction that deeper levels of agreement among family 
members can begin to become apparent, structural similarities which are 
obscured by the surface differences among individuals' verbal 
responses. The response words themselves differ, but the relations 
between stimulus and response may prove to be the same. 
About 8% of the subjects share at least 90% of their categorial 
reactions with another member of the family, as can be seen in Table 9; 
the mother, second son and grandson of Family 4 and the father of 
Family 7 show this high degree of intersection with others. Another 
eleven persons--roughly one quarter of the sample--responded with words 
whose categories were matched by between 80 and 90% of their relatives' 
responses. Even the lowest degree of commonality was a respectable 
40%, and all individuals with the exception of this one (the older 
daughter of Family 1) shared categories in at least 50% of their 
responses. 
Average figures for shared categorial responses of family members 
are presented below; these figures represent the percentage of 
instances in which the designated family member responds in categories 
which are matched by any other member of the family. As can be seen 
from a comparison with figures given above in Table 5, category 
conmonality can be expected to occur at about twice the rate of the 
average level of commonali t y which exists when only the actual words 
themselves are examined. Again, because no commonly accepted 
statistical procedures were performed on these figures, they must be 
understood as merely descriptive. 
Table 10 
Average Percentage of Cat egory Commonality 
f or Family Members 
Father: 
Mother : 
1s t Child : 
2nd Child: 
70. 5 
65 . 3 
61 .6 
66. 7 
As before, it seems as though t he fathers share a somewhat higher 
percentage of responses with others in the family than do roc>thers or 
children, and that the younger child tends to a slightly higher degree 
of category conmonality overall than the older child or the roc>ther. 
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When categorial choice is examined across the structural dyads of 
which each family is composed (see Table 11, on the following page), an 
overall average family cormonality rate of 38.37% emerges from the 
entire sample of related individuals. Commonality within dyads ranges 
FAMILY 1 2 
DYAD 
Father-Mother 1 9 37 
Father-1st Child 1 5 36 
Father-2nd Child 23 44 
Father-3rd Child 50 
Father-4th Child 36 
Mother-1st Child 1 8 36 
Mother-2nd Child 21 44 
Mother-3rd Child 27 
Mother-4th Child 1 8 
1st Child-2nd Child 1 5 33 
1st Child-3rd Child 22 
1st Child-4th Child 1 1 
2nd Child-3rd Child 31 
2nd Child-4th Child 27 
3rd Child-4th Child 33 
AVERAGES 24.4 38 .3 
Table 11 
Percentage of categorial Commonality AmJng Family Dyads 
3 4 5 6 7 9 1 1 8 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 
37 46 37 40 48 42 41 36 
29 44 42 42 44 39 
37 34 54 34 
43 42 
37 40 
35 43 38 30 43 40 43 30 38 
25 35 40 38 35 
44 40 
36 39 
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from a low of 11% (Family 1, older daughter-younger son) to a high of 
59% (Family 4, third son-grandson). Four of the dyads show a 
conmonality of 50% or above; three of them involve pairs of males 
(Family 1, father-1st son; Family 4, 1st son-3rd son and 3rd 
son-grandson), and the fourth is a father-daughter pair (Family 7, 
father-2nd daughter). Thirty-six percent of the dyads in the sample 
share responses at a level of between 40 and 50%; of these dyads, 
two-thirds are members of Families 4 and 7, which are not only among 
the most numerous of the families, but also the most closely knit in 
terms of shared responses. Even the least closely related dyad of 
Family 7 still has a corrmonality rate of 30%, as compared with 11% for 
the comparable pair in Family 1, and 24% for the least similar pair in 
Family 3. 
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Average figures of categorial conmonality in the most frequently 
occurring intrafamilial dyads are given in Table 12, below. As with 
the figures for individual respondents, the commonality of pairs when 
examined at the categorial level i s about twice that obtaining when the 
words alone are subjected to comparison. 
Tabl e 12 
Average Percentage of Categorial Conmonality 











Only those families consisting of three or more members have been 
figured into these averages. And as before, the father's similarity to 
both first and second children is slightly higher than that of the 
mother. It is also worth mentioning that the father-son dyads which 
occur as isolated units in this sample would raise the overall average 
for fathers and children by several percentage points, for reasons 
which cannot be clarified in the absence of considerably more data. 
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The cohesion of a family's responses can be best expressed in 
terms of the actual percentages of coIIITX)n reactions, but the tightness 
of the range in which the corrm::>nalities are contained is also a measure 
of similarity descriptive of the family as a whole. Because it refers 
to the distance between the most and least similar members of the 
family, the figure for each family's range is rather less dependent on 
the factor of number of family members than is a numeric measure of 
shared responses among members, which tends to increase with increasing 
family size. The most expansive range of category corrm::>nality is 39, 
the difference between the 11% corrm::>nality of the 1st daughter-2nd son 
dyad and the 50% commonality of the father-1st son dyad of Family 1. 
It is rivalled in scope only by the 31 point range of Family 4, the 
distance separating the 1st daughter-1st son dyad (28% commonality) 
from the 59% high point of 3rd son-grandson. The tightest ranges are 
those of Families 5 and 9; the levels of commonality for all dyads in 
these families fall within 5 and 2 points of each other, respectively, 
and thus their levels of commonality with each other are to all intents 
identical. Dyad commonality in Families 2, 3, 6 and 11 occurs within a 
range of between 9 and 12 points, still fairly tightly compressed when 
compared with the wide expanse across which the dyads of Family 1 are 
distributed. 
Table 13, on the following page, presents a comprehensive view of 
the categorial corrmonality shared among all related dyads in the 
Family 1 Family 2 
50 f-1 s 44 f- s 37 
36 f-2S 44 m-s 37 
33 1 S-2S 37 t- m 35 
31 2d-1 s 36 f-1 d 29 
27 m-1 s 36 m-1 d 25 
27 2d-2s 33 d-s 24 
23 f - 2d 
22 1 d-1 s 
21 m-2d 
1 9 f-m 
1 B m-1d 
1 B m-2S 
1 5 t-1 d 
1 5 1 d-2d 
1 1 1 d-2S 
Family 8 Family 9 
41 m-dl 40 m-d 49 
30 m-d 39 d-s 39 
38 m - s 38 
Table 13 
Categorial Cormonality Within Families 
Family 3 Family 4 Family 5 
f-m 59 3s-gs 42 IPC -S 
f- 2 s 58 1 S-3S 38 m-s 
m -1 s 49 1 s-3d 37 m-p c 
f - 1 s 48 f-gs 
m-2S 46 f - m 
1 s - 2s 46 m-3S 
46 m-gs 
44 f - 1 d 
44 m-2d 
44 1 s-2d 
43 f- 2d 
43 m- 1 d 
43 1 s-gs 
42 1 d-2d 
40 m -4S 
39 f-3S 
39 2d-3d 
38 1 d-3d 
38 3d-3s 
38 4s-gs 




Family 10 35 m-1 s Family 11 
35 1 d-3S 
dh-s 35 1 d-4S 43 m - 2S 
m- d 35 1 S-4S 42 f-m 
m-dh 35 3s-4s 39 f- 2 s 
34 f-1 s 37 2s - 4s 
34 2d-as 35 m-4S 
33 2d-3d 34 f - 4 s 
32 2d-as 
32 3d -4s 
31 1 d-gs 
28 1 d-1 s 
Family 6 
42 f-d 54 
40 f- m 48 















36 h-w 37 
59 
1 1 
Dyad 13 48 
8 .67 
43 f- s 
Dyad 14 
36 f - s 
Family 7 
f - 2d 
f-1 d 























sample, arranged in descending order of each family group. The extent 
to which each dyad differs from the average of the sample can be seen 
from the figures for mean and standard deviation given at the end of 
the table. 
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Response predictability: correlation tests. The analysis of data 
presented thus far has been primarily descriptive in nature, based on 
procedures which required nothing more complex than the visual 
comparison of similar words written on a page, or the mechanical 
tallying of similar category codes once words had been converted into 
numbers. Any significant i nferences as to patterns of verbal 
association among family members, however, should be based on some sort 
of recognized statistical procedure, one which might be able to 
distinguish differences--if indeed any exist--between associative 
response patterns of individuals as family members, and patterns which 
exist in the population at large. 
In this phase of the investigat ion , two series of correlations 
were performed on the data of each individual's responses, first, in 
order to determine levels of agreement within the family group, and 
second, in order to compare each ind ivi dual with all unrelated 
individuals in the sample. In t he process of comparing figures for 
related and unrelated groups, i t was expected that any trends 
distinguishing family members from all others would become evident. 
Table 14, on the following page, presents the correlation 
coefficients obtained for each related dyad in the sample. The 
procedure of correlation is intended to determine the level at which it 
is possible to predict one individual's responses, given the data of 
Family 1 
-0 .13 f-m 0.37 
0.02 f-1 d 0.34 
0.25 f-2d 0.42 
0.39 f - 1 s 0 .40 
0 .44 f-2S 0 .29 
0 .11 m-1d 0.12 
-0.11 m- 2d 
0.11 m-1 s 
- 0 .08 m-2S 
- 0.05 1 d-2d 
0.14 1 d-1 s 
-0.06 1 d-2S 
0 .1 8 2d-1 s 
0.19 2d-2S 
0.28 1 S·2S 
Family 8 
0 .18 m-d 0 .29 
0 .19 m-dl 0 .24 
0.14 d-dl 0.00 
Table 14: Correlation Coefficients of Responses of Familial Dyads 
Family 2 Family 3 Family 4 Family 5 Family 6 
f-m 0.08 f-m 0.26 f - m 0 .35 m - pc 0.38 f-m 
f-d 0.11 f- 1 s 0.27 f - 1 d 0 .36 m-s 0.41 f- d 
f- s 0.09 f- 2s 0.37 f-1 s 0.45 pc-s 0.22 m-d 
m- d 0.24 m-1 s 0 .27 f - 2d 
m-s 0.18 m-2S 0 .42 f-3d 
d - s 0.20 1 S- 2S 0.20 f-3S 
0 .32 f-4S 
0.33 m-1 d 
0.41 m-1 s 
0 .27 m-2d 
0.13 m-3d 
0 .37 m-3S 
0.21 m-4S 
0.39 1 d - 1 s 
0.23 1 d-2s 
0.29 1 d -3d 
0.50 1 d-3S 
0.22 1 d-4S 
0.28 1 s-2d 
0.42 1 s-3d 
0.48 1 S-3S 
0.20 1 S-4S 
0.16 2d-3d 
0.12 2d -3s 
Family 9 Family 10 0 .04 2d-4s Family 11 Dyad 12 
0 .42 3d-3S 
m-d 0.27 rn-d 0.18 3d-4s 0.32 f- m 0.13 h-w 
m-s 0.24 rn -dh 0.26 3s-4s 0.11 f - 2s 
d-s 0.23 m-dhs 0.16 f - 4S 
0.27 d-h 0.25 m-2S Dyad 13 
0.15 d-hs 0.23 rn-4S 




















f - 2d 
f-3d 
f-4d 




1 d- 2d 
1 d- 3d 
1d-4d 
2d - 3d 
2d -4d 
3d - 4d 
Dyad 14 






another. Higher figures, then, would indicate closer levels of 
conformity between correlated pairs. The material of the analysis is 
the category code assigned to the verbal reaction given by each 
respondent to each stimulus word, in the actual order in which they 
were presented in the test. Responses were classified according to the 
most detailed category system used by Jung and Riklin, given in Table 
2, above. 
Some correlations are quite low; the children of Family 9 have a O 
correlation to each other, but each shares a correlation greater than 
.23 with the mother. The mother and first daughter of Family 1 
produced responses so divergent as to correlate negatively with other 
members of their family. On the other hand, a substantial number of 
the intrafamilial dyads in Families 2, 4 and 7 gave responses which 
correlate at .30 and above. Among the highest correlations in the 
sample are those of the father and second son of Family 1 (0.44), the 
elder daughter and third son of Family 4 (0.50), the first and third 
sons of Family 4, (0.48), and the parental companion and son of Family 
5 (0.45). 
After this basic set of correlations had been obtained, a series 
of Spearman rank order correlations were performed on all related dyads 
in the sample. This procedure operated with the same category codes as 
were subjected to the preceding analysis, but sorted them in ascending 
numerical order. All coordinate responses (0111-0115) were listed 
first, then subordinations (0121-0122), superordinations (0130), and so 
on through the range of thirty-seven possible relational categories 
(see Table 2), and the numerically ordered data for each subject was 
then correlated with the data for each other member of the family. 
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Spearman rank order correlations for related dyads are given in 
Table 15, on the following page. The strength of these correlations is 
in general somewhat higher than that shown by means of the correlation 
coefficient. Dyads are ranked within each family in descending order 
of response agreement. 
The highest rank order coefficient obtained between related pairs 
of individuals was 0.54, occurring in two instances in Family 4, 
between the oldest daughter and the second youngest son, and the 
(grand)father and grandson. No other dyad in the sample produced a 
coefficient of above 0.50, and the highest overall family average was 
only .3967, the mean of Family 5's three dyadic figures. As might be 
expected, Family 1 produced the lowest coefficients and the lowest 
family average, although the figures for the father and his two sons 
(0.42, 0.38) continue to approximate, or even exceed, the average 
levels of conformity shown by pairs of relatives in other family 
groups. 
Most members of Families 4 and 7 continue to show a moderately 
high degree of correlation, in the 0.30-0.40 range. In Family 6, the 
father's closeness to the daughter contrasts markedly with the mother's 
distance from her (0.38 as against 0. 19); perhaps not surprisingly, 
this is a family in which mother and daughter have had considerable 
difficulty in understanding one another. Likewise, in Family 3, a 
sizeable difference separates the correlation of father-older son from 
that of mother-older son; indeed, in this family the father's 
correlations overall are noticeably below the average, comparable only 
to the figures for Family l's father and daughters, and the dyad of 
father-1st son in Family 11, another historically difficult 
relationship. 
Family 1 
0 .42 f-1 s 
0 .38 f-2S 
0 .27 1 S-2S 
0.19 2d-1 s 
0 .19 2d-2s 
0.18 f-2d 
-0 .14 f - m 
0.13 m-1 d 
0.11 m-1 s 
-0.10 m - 2d 
0 .09 1 d-1 s 
-0.09 1 d-2d 
-0.08 1 d -2S 
0.03 m-2S 
0 .00 f-1 d 
Family 8 
0.26 m-d 
0 .25 m-dl 
0 .16 d-dl 
Table 15: Spearman Rank Order Correlations of Responses of Familial Dyads 
Family 2 Family 3 Family 4 Family 5 Family 6 
0.43 f-d 0.29 m - 1 s 0.54 1 c-5c 0.44 pc -s 0.43 f-m 
0.43 m-d 0.22 m-2S 0.54 f-gs 0.38 m-pc 0.38 f-2d 
0.40 f - s 0.21 f - 2S 0.49 f-4c 0.37 m - s 0 .19 m-2d 
0.39 f-m 0.18 f - 1 s 0 .47 m-1c 
0 .29 m-s 0.18 1 s-2s 0.47 2c-5c 
0 .09 d - s 0 .16 f - m 0.46 4c-5c 
0.44 Sc-gs 
0.42 2c - 4c 
0 .39 f- 2c 
0.39 1 c - 4c 
0 .39 m -as 
0.39 1 c -gs 
0 .38 1 c - 2c 
0 .37 f - m 
0.37 f-6 C 
0 .36 m -Sc 
0.36 4c-gs 
0.34 6c-gs 
0.33 f-1 C 
0.32 m-2c 
0 .32 m -3c 
0 .31 5c-6c 
0 .30 f- Sc 
0 .30 1 c -6c 
Family 9 Family 10 0 .29 2c-3c Family 11 Dyad 12 
0 .27 m -6c 
0 .31 m - d 0.40 m-d 0.26 2c -gs 0.36 f-m 0.22 h-w 
0.29 m - s 0.40 dh-s 0.25 f - 3c 0.27 m-2S 
0.07 d-s 0.38 m-dh 0.22 2c -6c 0 .26 f-4S 
0.37 m-dhs 0.21 1 c -3c 0 .22 m-4S Dyad 13 
0.25 d-hs 0.20 m-4c 0.14 f - 2 s 


























f - 3d 
f-2d 
1 d - 3d 
f - 1 d 
m-3d 
1 d-4d 
2d - 4d 
m -2d 
f - 4 d 









Table 16 shows average figures for the rank correlations of all 
dyads within each family, and averages for the major structural dyads 
occuring in the sample as a whole. Parental dyads have an average 
coeficient of 0.2886, which is slightly higher than the overall sample 
average (0.2753) and higher than the averages for mothers and daughters 
(0.27) or mothers and sons (0.25). When the negative correlations 
occuring in Family 1 are excluded, the sample average rises to .2923, 
and the average parental rank order correlation across the sample 
rises to 0.36, a figure which is higher than that of any other 
interfamilial dyad and one which may suggest that the associative 
patterns of married couples develop in similarity over time. Of the 
couples tested, the lowest figure (0.16) belonged to the youngest set 
of parents; correlations in the 0.36-0.45 range, by contrast, were 
produced by parents who had been married for thirty years or more. 
Table 16 
Average Rank Correlations of Families and Relational Dyads 
Family Correlation Dyad Correlation 
1 .1053 M-F .2886 
2 .3383 M-D .2700 
3 .2067 M-S .2500 
4 .3383 M-Child .2600 
5 .3967 F-D .3000 
6 .3333 F-S .3100 
7 .3180 F-Child .3000 
8 .2233 Sisters .2580 
9 .2233 Brothers .2600 
10 .3350 Siblings .2450 
11 .2267 
Average of Family Rank Order Correlations .2753 
AVERAGE (excluding negative correlations) .2923 
After the figure for parental dyads, the highest average 
correlation belongs to father-son pairs, at 0.31, followed by the mean 
coefficient for fathers and daughters (0.30). The average father-
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child correlation, in fact, is four points higher than the mother-
child figure, although when the figures for Family 1 are excluded, the 
means for mother-child and father-child dyads come to within 1.5 points 
of one another (0.3022 and 0.3168 respectively). Same-gender siblings 
correlate at a slightly higher rate than do brother-sister pairs (0.258 
for sister dyads, 0.26 for brother dyads, and 0.228 for mixed-gender 
groupings), but the coefficients for siblings are, in general, somewhat 
lower than figures for parental dyads or for pairs of parents and 
children. 
In order to ascertain whether or not there is any significance in 
the fact of family membership in these correlations, a series of 1,106 
rank correlations was performed on all pairs of unrelated individuals 
in the sample.6 The father of Family 1, having been situated within 
the correlational matrix of his family, was now compared with all other 
individuals, irrespective of their gender or position in the family, 
and the same was done for t he mother, the daughters, and so on. If an 
effect of family were to emerge at this level, it was to be expected 
that intrafamilial correlation figures would be higher than those 
obtained from across the population at large. 
The differences, however, proved to be so slight as to be almost 
negligible. The overall "family" figure of .2923, obtained by 
averaging all the positively correlated dyads in the sample of related 
individuals, was only four points higher than the average of all 
unrelated pairs of individuals in the sample, .2583. Although no 
formal tests were performed to analyse this small difference, it seemed 
worthwhile to examine the data informally to see at what level of the 
factor of "family" might contribute to a higher correlation. 
Figures for rank correlations between related and unrelated pairs 
are sunmarized in Table 17. 
Table 17 




above 0.40 20 
0.30-0.39 26 
















As can be seen, the 0.40 level seems to be the critical one, at which 
differences between related and unrelated pairs are most apparent. Of 
the related pairs, 20.83% correlate at the level of 0.40 or above, as 
compared with only 14.63% of the unrelated pairs, a difference which is 
about one and one-half times greater for relatives than for individuals 
in the population at large. 
Below 0.39, as above 0.50, the differences seem to level off, 
with essentially the same rates of correlation occurring among related 
individuals as might be found in the population at large. Differences 
at the 0.40 level are such, however, as to suggest that _there may be a 
slight, but effective strength of correlation among family members 
which will distinguish family groups from all others in a population of 
normal individuals. The figures are not so high as to suggest that 
family members can be reliably differentiated from within a population 
solely on the basis of their rank correlations, but seem to suggest 
that family relation may be one of the factors contributing to the 
similarity between two individuals' verbal associations. However, 
further analysis with a larger sample would be needed to determine the 
statistical significance of the small variances shown in the present 
sample. 
Another factor contributing to similarity between individuals is 
reaction-type, the specific pattern which emerges when a set of 
associative responses is grouped according to the frequency of each 
category of response produced. The analysis of modal response type, 
and the patterns of response types which occur within family groups, 
will be the subject of discussion in the section which follows. 
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Reaction-type: the individual and the family. The early word 
association research at the Burgholzli Clinic divided subjects into six 
reaction-types, based on an examination of a number of factors, 
including the kind of response which was given most often by the 
subject. Individuals who reacted to the stimulus-words with primarily 
ordinate responses--coordinates, subordinates or superordinates or 
conceptually-based groupings of a more general sort--seerred to form a 
class which differed markedl y in attitude, level of attention, and 
educational and cultural background from the group of individuals who 
habitually responded with predications, or with the facile responses of 
the linguistic-motor category. 
C.G. Jung's interest in the issue of family influence on reaction-
type arose as result of his observation that all eight of the relatives 
who were among the thirty-eight subjects of his experiment with normal 
individuals shared the same reaction type. Before Jung and his 
coauthor, Franz Riklin, had the results of their experiment in print, 
another psychiatrist, Enma Furst, had begun an experimental study of 
reaction-types within families. Her results, obtained from more than 
one hundred subjects of twenty-four families, seemed to support Jung's 
hypothesis that one single reaction-type tends to dominate within a 
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given family. The data she gathered on IIK)thers and daughters, of whom 
there were eight pairs in her re!X)rted sample of nine families, were 
the same as those of Jung and Riklin: in every instance, mother and 
daughter shared the same reaction type. Furthermore, her data seems to 
suggest that predication is the dominant response in households of 
lower-class or less well educated subjects. 
Leaving aside the issue of educational level, which from Jung's 
data appears not to have been a significant factor in an individual's 
preference for predicates, the emergence of predication as the one 
dominant reaction-type within a family, and the phenomenon of agreement 
between IIK)thers and daughters in modal reaction-type, are both 
fascinating as objects of study. The present experiment was designed 
in part to replicate the work of Furst, and in the pages which follow, 
the analysis of agreement within family groups will employ her 
principles of classification and computation, as well as those used by 
Jung and Riklin in t heir determinati on of individual reaction-type. 
Modal resp:>nse-types: t he Jung-Riklin categories. The statistics 
which best describe the overall pattern of an individual's res!X)nses 
are the basic measures of central t endency, the mean, median and mode 
derived from each subject's reaction data. Figures for each individual 
in the sample are given in Table 18, on the following page. 
The numbers in this table are derived from the code assigned to 
each of the relational categories of the response classification system 
used by Jung and Rikl in in their analysis of data, as shown in Table 2, 
above. As mentioned earlier, the lower numbers, from 111-300, describe 
stimulus-res!X)nse pairs which are tightly bonded in a close conceptual 
network; numbers in the 400-650 range refer to the looser semantic 
Table 18 
Mean, Median and Modal Figures for Family Members 
Family 1 Father Mother 1st D 2nd D 1st S 2nd s 
rean 393 531 674 542 413 376 
redian 500 612 800 500 500 230 
node 500 213 800 213/630 500 500 
Family 2 Father Mother Daughter Son Family 3 Father Mother 1st S 2nd S 
rean 416 383 406 378 mean 370 439 443 437 
median 500 300 300 300 median 230 400 300 300 
node 611 500/611 111 611 mode 213 111 111 1200 
Family 4 Father Mother 1st D 1st S 2nd D 3rd D 3rd s 4th S Grandson 
mean 414 371 328 434 392 392 375 425 423 
redian 500 350 230 611 400 300 350 300 400 
IOOde 500 111 500 611 500 111/611 111/611 611 111 
Family 5 Mother Companion Son Family 6 Father Mother Daughter 
rean 410 328 355 mean 403 379 470 
redian 400 230 230 redian 315 400 500 
IOOde 630 500 611 mode 111 500 611 
Family 7 Father Mother 1st D 2nd D 3rd D 4th D Husband 
rean 368 380 323 406 373 355 423 
redian 350 300 230 500 230 222 500 
IOOde 500 500 500 500 111/500 611 500 
Family 8 Mother Daughter D-in-Law Family 9 Mother Daughter Son 
rean 316 360 374 rean 323 359 404 
redian 221 230 230 redian 250 230 230 
IOOde 213 111 611 mode 500 213 213/611 
Family 10 Mother Daughter Husband Sister Family 11 Father Mother 2st S 4th S 
rean 377 368 391 378 rean 412 414 415 395 
redian 230 222 300 300 median 400 500 500 350 ,_, 
IOOde 111 213 213/611 611 rode 611 500 611/630 500 N ~ 
coherence of associations based on contiguity, similarity and 
linguistic autanation; and numbers higher than 700 indicate reactions 
based on the superficial similarity of. sound, as well as the marginal 
phenomena of indirect responses, repetitions and failures. 
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Given this arrangement of the numerical scale, a mean response 
figure of 328, for example, the figure for the oldest daughter of 
Family 4, would indicate a preponderance of ordinate or predicative 
reactions; an average of 470, that of the daughter of Family 6, reveals 
the presence of rather more linguistic or residual-type reactions. The 
highest mean figure in the sample is 674, the average of the older 
daughter of Family 1, who has already been mentioned a number of times 
for her deviation from the sample norms. Her reactions were, by 
conscious design, almost entirely made up of sound-based pairings, with 
no attention given to the conceptual or lexical dimensions of the 
stimulus-word. 
The median response figure, likewise, gives an indication of the 
point at which the individual's reactions, sorted in numeric order from 
lowest to highest numbers, divides in half. A low median figure, such 
as that of Family 4's oldest daughter, reinforces the impression given 
by her rrean that her overall response pattern is heaviest in terms of 
predicates and ordinate associations. A median of 500 or above is in 
general a good indicator that the individual prefers the linguistic 
superficiality of synonyms and antonyms, which cannot be considered 
"associations" in the true sense of the term as used by Jung and 
Riklin, in that they do not extend beyond the given of the stimulus-
word. Median figures for most of the subjects are somewhat lower than 
the figures for the average. 
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The final measure of central tendency, the mode, begins to 
describe the individual's response pattern in terms of frequency, the 
statistical parameter on which the determination of reaction-type can 
begin to be made. Modal figures presented here refer to the specific 
category which occurs most often among an individual's responses. Some 
of the major relational categories, such as the class of predicates, 
are subdivided in such a way as to make comparisons among frequencies 
at this microlevel of analysis somewhat problematic. An individual who 
has more responses in the category of identity (500), for example, than 
in any single one of the seven categories of predicates (211-230), may 
appear deceptively strong in external associations; but when all forms 
of predication are taken together in a single category, the same 
subject may be revealed as a modal predicate type. 
In nine of the 52 subjects, the mode and the median response are 
identical, and in eight of these cases, the preferred response is 
either 500 (identity) or 611 (contrast). In another five subjects, the 
mode and median fall into the same general relational category, as 
representing differing degrees of predication. Eight of the 
respondants were bimodal, and of these, six showed preference for 
antonyms in combination with some other relational category. 
The distribution of response frequencies for members of each 
family is given in Table 19, on the following page, in the arrangement 
used by Jung and Riklin in their published case studies of the 
associative behavior of normal subjects. Family averages are shown in 
Table 20. The modal reaction-type of the individual takes its name 
from the category containing the highest single percentage of 
responses.7 Where two high-frequency categories differ from one 
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Table 19 
Individual Response Figures, Jung- Riklin categories 
Subiect 1-f 1-m 1-1 d 1 ·2d 1- 1 s 1-21 2-f 2-m 2 · 1d 2-s 3 - f 3 - m 3-1 s 3-2• 
GrolJllin!lll 25 9 4 t 2 21 20 27 23 23 19 20 26 27 20 
Predicates 12 29 9 23 18 32 12 23 26 29 33 14 15 27 
Causal Relations 1 0 0 3 1 2 4 4 3 3 6 5 9 12 
eo.xiatence 8 3 4 5 6 13 5 6 5 8 5 7 1 5 
ldentitv 29 1 4 8 20 18 5 17 9 10 11 8 3 9 
Linauistic-Motor 24 32 25 21 31 7 44 22 24 28 19 26 32 12 
Completion 0 10 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sound 0 0 36 5 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Rhyme 0 1 4 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Indirect Association 1 9 10 16 3 4 2 4 8 3 6 12 7 2 
Meaninaless 0 3 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
Failure 0 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 13 
Reoetition 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 - f 4-m 4- 1d 4-1 s 4 -2d 4 -3d 4 -3• 4-41 4 · 01 5-m 5-DC 5 - s 6-f 6 - m 6-2d 
Grouoinas 27 33 27 25 21 29 26 23 43 21 27 16 21 27 22 
Predicates 10 1 3 29 14 21 15 13 24 1 26 29 38 29 1 6 12 
Causal Relations 4 4 2 1 4 7 1 4 2 1 2 3 0 5 3 
Coexistence 6 8 3 3 6 7 3 5 6 7 3 7 6 4 8 
ldentitv 28 1 7 28 5 18 12 7 8 9 8 26 14 10 21 9 
Linauistic-Motor 19 20 10 48 28 23 38 25 28 30 10 20 27 25 36 
Comoletion 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sound 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rhvme 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Indirect Association 4 4 1 3 2 7 1 8 3 6 1 2 6 0 9 
Meaninaless 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Failure 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 0 0 0 1 2 0 
Reoetition 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 . f 7 -m 7- 1d 7-2d 7· 3d 7 -4d 7- 4dh 8- m 8-d 8-dl 9-m 9-d 9 - s 
Grouoinas 25 18 24 20 2 7 26 14 2 0 26 21 24 21 21 
Predicates 22 29 31 17 2 5 31 29 4 3 25 3 1 3 1 32 32 
Causal Relations 2 7 6 3 2 3 1 8 3 3 6 4 0 
Coexistence 5 8 7 5 3 5 3 4 7 6 7 7 2 
ldentitv 22 1 8 1 7 2 5 15 4 2 0 6 14 9 17 10 8 
Linauistic-Motor 22 14 15 29 23 27 28 1 7 22 26 15 22 29 
Completion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sound 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Rhvme 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Indirect Association 2 5 0 1 5 4 4 1 3 4 0 2 8 
Meaninaless 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Failure 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Reoetition 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10- m 10 -d 10-dh 10-dhs 11-f 11 -m 11 -2 s 11 ·4S 14-f 14-s 15-1 s 15·2S Mean 
Grouoinas 24 14 14 17 23 31 24 25 23 21 25 29 22 .61 
Predicates 3 1 40 35 31 23 5 17 22 20 32 20 17 23 .39 
Causal Relations 3 10 6 5 2 2 0 3 2 1 7 4 3.50 
Coexistence 4 2 4 5 5 6 5 4 7 7 8 9 5.52 
Identity 10 11 9 13 13 26 1 1 15 13 9 8 18 13 .24 
Linguistic-Motor 20 15 27 26 27 25 41 25 24 28 27 1 9 24 .61 
Comoletion 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.30 
Sound 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.87 
Rhvme 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 .26 
Indirect Association 8 7 4 3 4 4 0 6 9 1 5 4 4 .41 
Meaninaless 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.20 
Failure 0 0 1 0 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0.83 
Reoetition 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .04 
TABLE 20 
Family Averages: Jung-Riklin Categories 
l:;gt~g:Q;i;:y FgmiJ.y l fgmily 2 Fgmily 3 Fgmily 4 Fgmily 5 fgmily 6 · fgmily 7 
Grouping 15.17 23.00 23.25 26.38 21.33 23.33 23.33 
Predicate 20.50 22.50 22.25 17.38 31. 00 19.00 25.83 
Causal 1.17 3.50 8.00 3.37 2.00 2.67 3.83 
Coexistence 6.50 6.00 4.50 5.13 5.67 6.00 5.50 
Identity 13.33 10.30 7.75 15 . 38 16.67 13.33 16.83 
Linguistic 23.33 29.50 22.75 26.38 20.00 29.33 21.67 
Completion 2.17 0.25 0.00 0 .13 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sound 6.83 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Rhyme 1.17 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.33 0.00 0.00 
Indirect 7 .17 4.25 6.75 3.75 3.00 5.00 2.83 
Meaningless 1.17 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 
Failure 0.83 0.00 3.75 0.63 0.00 1. 00 0.17 
Repetition 0.33 0.00 0 . 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cat~g:Q;i:;:y Family 8 Eamily ~ Family lQ Family 11 ~ ~ .Tu..t.tl. 
Grouping 23.00 22.00 19.00 25.75 22.14 22.92 22.61 
Predicate 34.00 31.67 35.50 16.75 23. 71 22.54 23.39 
Causal 5.50 3.33 6.50 1. 75 3.96 2.92 3.50 
Coexistence 5.50 5.33 3.00 5.00 5.68 5.38 5.52 
Identity 10.00 11. 67 10.50 16.25 13. 00 12.75 13 .24 
Linguistic 19.50 22.00 17.50 29.50 23.25 27.21 24.61 
Completion 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.08 0.30 
Sound 0.00 0.33 0.50 0.00 1. 57 0.13 0.87 
Rhyme 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.17 0.26 
Indirect 2.00 3.33 7.50 3.50 5.14 3.88 4.41 
Meaningless 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.13 0.20 
Failure 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.25 0.32 1.50 0.83 




another by only a few percentage points, the individual is identified 
as a mixed type. 
The present sample of 52 individuals divides as follows: 
Table 21 
Reaction-Types of Individual SUbjects 
Ordinate Types 7 
Predicate Types 16 
Linguistic-Motor Types 11 
Mixed Reaction Types 17 







The sample is dominated by predicate and mixed reaction types, which 
each account for about a third of all respondents. Moreover, among the 
sixteen subjects counted here as mixed types, eleven, or 69%, have 
predication as one of their two preferred modes of reaction. When 
these subjects are combined with those showing a true preference for 
predicates--and indeed, in terms of overall proportion of predicates 
there may be no difference between members of the two groups--the 
composition of the sample can be sumnarized as follows: 
Table 22 
Individual Reaction-Types 
(combined predicate and mixed-predicate types) 
Ordinate Types 7 
Predicate/Mixed Predicate 27 
Linguistic-Motor Types 11 





In this analysis, half the members in the entire sample are seen as 
having predication as their distinctive reaction-style. Since the 
appearance, and redundancy, of the predicate reaction-type in a family 
will be a point of departure for much of the subsequent discussion, it 
might be useful to look more closely at the single category of 
predication, in order to fix a statistical definition of the predicate 
type which will serve as a consistent measure throughout the remainder 
of this work. 
The true predicate types described by Jung and Riklin seemed to 
have a response profile that included at least 30% predicative 
responses~8 The highest predicate rate in their sample was 61%, held 
by a woman who was the rnother of two other predicate-types, women with 
49 and 32% predicates arrong their responses. 
The highest percentage of predicates in the present sample was 
43%, belonging to a woman whose daughter was a mixed-predicate type 
with 25% predicates. By comparison, her daughter-in-law, at 31% 
predication, might be considered a true predicate type. The second 
highest figure, 40%, also belonged to a woman surrounded by other true 
predicate types: her mother (31%), her husband (35%), and her sister-
in-law (31%). 
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Table 23, on the next page, gives a breakdown of predication rate 
within family units. Each family member is classified according to his 
or her dominant response category, and in the case of birnodal types, an 
indication is given as to whether or not predication is one of the two 
dominating categories. 
Altogether, fourteen individuals have predicate rates of rnore than 
30%; all of them might be considered true predicate-types, and seven, 
or half of them, occur in two families (Families 9, including rnother, 
daughter and son, and Family 10, including mother, daughter, daughter's 
husband, and husband's sister). Two appear among the three members of 
Family 8 (rnother and daughter-in-law), and two rnore arrong the six 
members of Family 7 (the oldest and youngest daughters). 
Table 23 
M:>dal Response Types and Predication Rates for Family Members 
Family Role Reaction Type Predicates Family Role Reaction Type Predicates 
1 father Linguistic 12 7 father Ordinate 22 
mother Mixed Predicate 29 mother Predicate 29 
1st daughter Sound 9 1st daughter Predicate 31 
2nd daughter Mixed Predicate 23 2nd daughter Linguistic 17 
1st son Linguistic 18 3rd daughter Mixed Predicate 25 
2nd son Predicate 32 4th daughter Predicate 31 
2 father Linguistic 12 son-in-law Mixed Predicate 29 
mother Mixed Predicate 23 8 mother Predicate 43 
daughter Mixed Predicate 26 daughter Mixed Predicate 25 
son Mixed Predicate 29 dtr-in-law Predicate 31 
3 father Predicate 33 9 daughter Predicate 32 
mother Mixed 14 son Predicate 32 
1st son Linguistic 15 10 mother Predicate 31 
2nd son Predicate 27 daughter Predicate 40 
4 father Mixed 10 son-in-law Predicate 35 
mother Ordinate 13 "sister Predicate 31 
1st daughter Mixed Predicate 29 11 father Linguistic 23 
1st son Linguistic 14 mother Ordinate 5 
2nd daughter Linguistic 21 2nd son Linguistic 17 
3rd daughter Ordinate 15 4th son Mixed 22 
3rd son Linguistic 13 14 father Mixed 20 
4th son Mixed Predicate 24 son Predicate 32 
grandson Ordinate 1 15 1st sister Mixed 20 
5 mother Linguistic 26 2nd sister Ordinate 17 
son Predicate 38 
6 father Mixed Predicate 29 
mother Ordinate 16 




Another six individuals might be included in the group as 
borderline predicate types, with 29% predication. All are classified 
as mixed predicate types, and in all but one, predication is the 
stronger of the two dominant responses. Their identification as 
predicate types gives the profile surrmarized in Table 24. 
Table 24 
Predicate Types in Families (P=.29) 
Family Members P Types Roles 
1 6 2 mother, 2nd son 
2 4 1 son 
3 4 1 father 
4 9 1 1st daughter 
5 3 2 companion, son 
6 3 1 father 
7 7 4 mother, 1&4 D and SL 
8 3 2 mother, DL 
9 3 3 all members 
10 4 4 all members 
11 4 0 none 
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In one of the family groups, no one had at least 29% predicates among 
their responses; in two other groups, all of the members qualify as 
predicate types, and already with predication fixed at the rate of 29%, 
three of the remaining nine groups have a majority of members who can 
be classified as predicate-types. Given Jung's results with predicate 
types, none of whom were men, it is interesting that this sample 
contains two families in which the fathers tested as predicate types, 
and were the only members of the family to do so. 
When figures are added for those individuals classified as mixed 
predicate types, in whose reactions predicate responses outweigh the 








































mother, 2nd D, 2nd S 
mother, daughter, son 
father, 2nd son 
1st daughter, 4th son 
all members 
father 






With these parameters, in nine of the thirteen groups at least half the 
members tested can be identified as predicate types. Four of the 
groups (Families 5, 8, 9 and 10) are composed entirely of individuals 
with predicate rates of 23% or higher. In Family 7, only the father 
and the second daughter fall below the criteria! level of predication; 
likewise in Family 2, only the father deviates from the preference for 
predicates shown by the rest of the family. And still at this level, 
the group that previously appeared without predicate-type members 
remains without predication in its family profile. 
It is interesting to note that in those families where predication 
does not dominate among members, no other single reaction type 
dominates to the extent that predication does in other families, 
although the linguistic-motor type, the second most conmon response, 
does tend to appear most regularly as the alternative modal type in a 
family. It appears twice, for example, in Family 1, in the father and 
older son; and twice in Family 11, again in the dyad of father and 
older son. Three of the siblings in Family 4 share the linguistic-
motor type, making it the actual dominant mode within this group, along 
with the ordinate type, also shared by three members of the family. 
In Family 6, all three members represent different types; in Family 4, 
mother and older son are also of different types, and both differ from 
the predicate pair of father and younger son. 
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The question of predication and its influence within a family 
group will arise twice more in this study, first, in context of the 
contingency tests performed on data from the sample, and second, in the 
discussion· of predication and its relationship to deductive reasoning. 
At this point, however, it is appropriate to turn to a consideration of 
agreement as measured by the calculations used by Furst in her study of 
family associations, the analysis on which Jung's own understanding of 
familial conformity was based. 
Familial agreement: Furst's categories and the coefficient of 
difference. By the time that Furst began the process of classifying 
the responses she had obtained from one hundred members of twenty-four 
separate families, the Burgholzli researchers had recognized some of 
the inadequacies of their classification system, and as a result, the 
arrangement in which she presents her data is markedly different from 
that in which Jung and Riklin had made their determinations of modal 
frequencies. Specifically, the later classification system combines 
the four categories of marginal responses under one single heading, 
condenses the two categories of sound ·and rhyme into one, 
differentiates word-completions from the aggregate of linguistic-motor 
responses, and specifies three varieties of ordination in place of the 
single "grouping" category of Jung-Riklin system. The mst important 
mdification, however, is the expansion of Jung and Riklin's single 
category of predication into five separate categories: value 
predication, internal and external (descriptive) predicates, subject-
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object relations, predication of place, time, means and purpose, and 
definitional predication. In all, the schema used by Furst has fifteen 
categories, with a distribution which allows for a much finer 
differentiation within major relational classes than was possible given 
the arrangement of the earlier system. 
In Tables 26 and 27, the response profiles for individuals and 
families are presented in terms of the revised categorial hierarchy 
used by Furst. The modal center of gravity for most individuals shifts 
somewhat in this arrangement, as can be seen. It is rare, for example, 
for any one of the five predicate categories to carry an individual's 
modal reaction, yet it does happen, in the mother of Family 1, for 
example, whose 19% so-called "other predicates" serve as a good 
indication that her borderline identification as a predicate type is 
most likely the correct one, despite her numerically higher percentage 
of linguistic-motor responses. The only other instances of this 
predominance of a single type of predication among the range of 
possible reactions, in fact, occur in the case of three unmistakeable 
predicate-types, the mother of Family 8, and the husband and wife of 
Family 10. In the rest of the sample, however, the distribution of 
predicates over five su~ategories allows for the emergence of other 
modal points, and highlights in particular the occurrence of synonyms 
and antonyms (identities and contrasts) in individuals' reaction 
patterns. 
The virtue of this finely-tuned system is not so much its 
usefulness in determining a reaction-type--that function is more 
adequately served by the Jung-Riklin arrangement--as the precision of 
comparison it allows between the response patterns of individuals. 
Subi•ct 1 • f 1·m 1 · 1 d 1 · 2d 1 · 1 s t · 2S 
coordination 21 4 4 10 20 8 
sub/supraordinatian 4 5 0 5 2 13 
con trast 15 2 3 6 14 4 
value oredicat• 0 0 0 0 1 1 
athar oredicat• 3 19 4 12 6 11 
sub iect/obiect 7 9 4 8 8 12 
place/time 1 1 1 2 2 8 
deli nition/causal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
cocu:istence 8 3 4 5 6 13 
identity 29 1 4 8 20 18 
linguistic-motor 5 17 3 3 8 2 
word formation 5 13 18 12 8 1 
word comolation 0 10 2 1 0 0 
sound 0 1 40 6 0 1 
residual 2 15 13 22 5 8 
Subioct 6·1 6·m 6 · 2d 7 . f 7-m 
coordination 14 17 19 1 3 12 
sub/1uoraordination 7 16 6 14 13 
contrast 13 19 19 16 10 
value predicate 9 1 0 0 2 
othar predicate 6 5 4 7 4 
subi•ctiobiect 10 5 3 7 12 
Diaco/time 4 5 5 7 9 
definition/causal 0 0 0 1 2 
coexistence 6 4 8 5 8 
identitv 10 21 9 22 18 
linauistic-motor 12 1 8 4 3 
word formation 2 5 9 2 1 
word completion 0 0 0 0 0 
sound 0 0 0 0 0 
residual 7 2 10 2 6 
Table 26 
Individual Response Figures, Furst categories 
2 . f 2·m 2·1 d 2·• 3 · 1 3 · m 3 - 1 S 3·2S 4 · 1 4 · m 4· 1d 4.15 4 · 2d 
22 15 1 6 18 12 24 30 15 12 22 12 17 15 
9 12 10 4 14 7 6 1 7 19 15 17 9 10 
31 17 9 19 10 1 5 15 8 15 16 7 23 8 
1 5 2 4 0 1 2 2 1 0 2 1 0 
3 5 10 13 1 3 4 6 1 0 1 3 10 9 10 
6 9 12 8 1 3 3 4 5 4 6 9 4 6 
2 4 2 4 7 6 3 10 3 3 8 0 3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
5 6 5 8 5 7 1 5 6 8 3 3 6 
5 17 9 10 11 8 3 9 28 17 28 5 18 
5 2 3 5 4 6 6 0 2 1 2 12 7 
8 3 1 2 4 5 7 11 4 2 3 1 13 13 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t 0 
1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2 4 8 3 6 12 12 15 6 4 1 3 2 
7·1d 7-2d 7 •3d 7 -4d 7 -4dh 6 · m 8·d 8 -dl 9 - m 9 · d 9·S 1 O· rr 1 O·d 
13 1 3 17 17 5 16 21 13 13 16 7 15 6 
17 10 12 1 2 10 1 2 8 11 17 9 14 9 8 
7 8 12 22 8 9 10 14 7 10 15 13 9 
1 0 0 0 0 7 3 2 1 1 1 1 3 
11 7 12 1 2 1 9 21 10 8 11 14 15 14 20 
9 7 9 1 5 9 9 6 14 9 9 10 6 14 
10 3 4 4 1 6 6 7 10 8 5 10 3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 10 
7 5 3 5 3 4 7 6 7 7 2 4 2 
17 25 15 4 20 6 14 9 17 10 8 10 11 
4 9 4 2 4 3 4 6 4 2 7 0 1 
4 12 7 3 16 5 8 6 4 10 7 7 5 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 
0 1 5 4 5 2 3 4 0 2 8 8 7 
4 · 3d 4 · 3S 4·4• 4·0S 
20 25 13 30 
1 6 12 14 15 
1 3 24 20 25 
6 1 0 1 
3 6 10 0 
3 4 9 0 
3 2 5 0 
0 0 0 0 
7 3 5 6 
1 2 7 8 9 
1 3 0 2 
9 11 5 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 
7 1 11 1 0 
10· d 1 O·dhs 11 · m 
9 12 16 
15 5 9 
18 21 20 
2 3 3 
19 14 6 
10 4 5 
4 10 9 
6 5 0 
4 5 5 
9 13 13 
1 1 2 
8 4 5 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
5 3 7 
















11 · 1 11 ·2 
21 11 
12 13 

































































Family Avera<Jes: Furst cate<Jories 
Category Eamily l Eamily 2 Eamily 3 Eamily ~ Eamily 5 Eamily 6 E/3,mily 7 
Coordinate 11.17 17.80 20.30 17.00 11. 00 16.67 14.17 
Sub/supraord. 4.83 8.75 11. 00 14.00 12.30 3.67 13.00 
Contrast 7.33 19.00 12.00 15.75 11. 70 17.00 12.50 
Value predicate 0.33 3.00 1.25 1. 38 1. 00 3.33 0.50 
Other predicate 9.17 7.75 8.25 6.50 10.70 5.00 8.83 
Subject/object 8.00 8.75 6.25 5.88 11. 30 6.00 9.83 
Place/time 2.50 3.00 6.50 3.38 8.00 4.67 6.17 
Definition 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.50 
Coexistence 6.50 6.00 4.50 5.13 5.67 6.00 5.50 
Identity 13.33 10.30 7.75 15.38 16 . 70 13.33 16.83 
Linguistic 6.33 3.75 4.00 3.50 8.33 7.00 4.33 
Formation 9 .50 6.75 6.75 7.13 0.00 5.33 4.83 
Completion 2.17 0.25 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sound 8.00 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.33 0.00 0.00 
Residual 10. 83 4.25 11. 30 4.38 3.00 6.33 3.00 
Category Eamily 8 Eamily 9 Eamily lQ Ea.mily 11 N.om.e.n Men .l'..o..t.a.l. 
Coordinate 18.50 12.00 10 . 50 15.75 14.97 15.63 15.15 
Sub/supraord. 10.00 13.33 8.50 11. 75 10.41 10.75 10.87 
Contrast 9.50 10.67 11. 00 15.00 12.07 16.00 13. 67 
Value predicate 5.00 1. 00 2.00 1. 00 1. 69 1. 33 1. 52 
Other predicate 15.50 13.33 17.00 6.75 9.52 8.42 9.13 
Subject/object 7.50 0.33 10.00 4 . 75 8.00 7.21 7.78 
Place/time 6.00 7.67 6.50 4.25 5.24 4.38 4.80 
Definition 0.00 0.33 6.50 0 . 00 0. 72 0.33 0.56 
Coeidstence 5.50 5.33 3.00 5.00 5.69 5.46 5.52 
Identity 10.00 11. 67 10.50 16.25 12.69 13. 46 13.24 
Linguistic 3.50 4.33 0.50 4.75 4.17 4.42 4.26 
Formation 6.50 7.00 6.00 9.75 6.76 6.67 6.67 
Completion 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.48 0.08 0.30 
Sound 0.00 0.67 0.50 0.00 1. 86 0.29 1.13 
Residual 2.50 0.33 7.50 4.75 
..__. 
5.76 5.58 5.63 w 
-.J 
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Comparison can, of course, be done using the thirteen-part scale, but 
since a number of its categories are aggregates, any resultant analysis 
would certainly be less accurate, and less precise, than one which 
operates at the level of the constituent categories. 
In order to quantify the similarity, or agreement, obtaining 
between any pair of classified reactions, Jung devised for his student 
a simple formula yielding a coefficient of difference (D). The 
calculation is a sum of the differences between two individuals' 
classified responses in each of the relational categories (the smaller 
percentage of coordinates, sul:x:>rdinates, value predicates and so on 
subtracted from the larger percentage), divided by the total number of 
categories, fifteen. The resultant figure describes the degree to 
which one response pattern conforms to another. Two response profiles 
which are identical to one another would have a "D" value of O; the 
maximum D value possible, assuming that that two individuals responded 
in such a way that none of their categories coincided, would be 200/15, 
or 13.3. AD of 2.0, then, would signify an average of only two points 
difference between individuals' responses in each of the fifteen 
categories, and indicates a fairly close agreement in the patterns of 
the individuals' reactions. 
Table 28, on the following page, presents D figures for the 
members of all families in the present sample. The dyads are arranged 
in order from highest degree of conformity to lowest. Statistical 
parameters for each family are given in Table 29. 
Table 28 
Coefficients of Difference for Familial Dyads 
Family 1 Family 2 Family 3 Family 4 Family 5 
2.00 f-1 s 2.53 m-s 2.00 m-1 s 2.13 m-3d 3 .33 IPC-5 3.20 
4.27 m-2d 3.33 m-1 d 2.67 f- 2s 2.27 1 s-3s 3.73 m-s 3 .40 
4 .93 2d-1 s 3.33 1 d-s 3.60 m-2s 2.53 f-m 4 .67 m-pc 4.33 
4.93 2d-2s 3.47 f- s 3.73 f-m 2.67 f-1 d 
4.93 1 s-2s 4.00 f- m 4.67 1 s-2s 3.07 3s -gs 
5.33 1 d-2d 4.00 f- 1 d 5.33 f-1 s 3.20 f-3d 
5.60 f- 2s 3.33 m- 3s 
6.13 f-2d 3.33 m-4s 
6.53 m-1d 3.33 m-as 
6.93 m-1 s 3.33 1 d-2d 
6.93 m-2s 3.33 1 s-2d 
8.00 1 d-1 s 3.33 3d-3s 
8.47 f-m 3.47 m-2d 
8.47 1 d-25 3.47 3d-4s 




3.87 1 s-4s 
3.87 4s -as 
4.00 f-4 s 
4.00 1 d-45 
4.00 2d-3s 
4.13 m- 1 d 
Family 8 Family 9 Family 10 4.27 f-2d Family 11 
4.40 f-g s 
2 .53 d-dl 2.53 m-d 2.00 d-h 4.40 1 s-3d 2.40 2s-4s 5.20 
2.93 m-d 3.20 d-s 2.00 m-hs 4.80 m-1 s 2.93 f-45 
2.93 m-dl 3.73 m-s 2.27 m-sl 4.80 1 d-3d 3.20 f - m 
2.27 h-hs 4.87 1 s-as 3.60 f-25 
2.53 m-d 5.07 f-35 3.73 m-4s 
3 .33 d-hs 5.60 1 d-35 4.00 m-2s 2.53 
5.73 f- 1 s 
6.13 1 d-1 s 
6.27 2d - gs 





























































Statistical Parameters of Familial Coefficients of Difference 
Family 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
mean 6. 1 3.5 3.7 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.3 2.8 3.1 2.4 3.3 
max 8.9 4.0 5.3 6.5 4.7 4.3 5.2 2.9 3.7 3.3 4.0 
min 2.0 2.5 2.0 3.3 2.1 3.2 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.4 
range 6.9 1.5 3.3 3.2 2.6 1.1 2.9 0.4 1.2 0.6 1.6 
As was shown with previous measures of family agreement, some of 
the families tested are very tight indeed: Family 10, with its 
collection of four predicate-type individuals, has five of its six 
dyads in the 2.0-2.5 range of difference, and its most distant dyad is 
still as close in conformity as is the closest dyad of Family 5. Nine 
of the eleven families have at least one dyad that falls within the 
2.0-2.5 range; Family 4 has three, two of which involve the mother, and 
Family 7 has a substantial seven out of fifteen. In nearly half the 
dyads of Family 7, the reaction patterns of the members have less than 
2.5 points of difference between them; two thirds of the father's 
relationships and half the relationships of the oldest daughter are 
included in this closest of categories. Even Family 1, with its 
extravagant range, has one of the closest dyads in the entire sample: 
the father and older son agree at a difference of only 2.0, more than 
twice as close as the next dyad in the household, the mother and 
younger daughter (4.3), and nearly three times as close as the father's 
next relationship, that with his younger son (5.6). 
In total, 21 dyads in the sample, or 19.4%, show conformity at a 
level closer than 2.5. Six involve mothers and their children, four 
involve fathers and their children, and five involve siblings; 
interestingly, the only sibling dyads at this level of agreement are 
pairs of the same gender. Three married couples, two of them parents 
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of families, are included in the most closely conforming group, as are 
three pairs of inlaws, all from Family 10. The largest single group is 
comprised of IOC>ther-daughter dyads, who make up some 26.7% of the 
entire set of individuals with the highest level of agreement. 
Another 30 pairs, or 27.7% of the sample, fall into the next 
category of agreement, that defined by D at 2.6-3.5, making for a level 
of conformity at 3.5 or closer for nearly half the dyads in the sample. 
This group now includes all members of Families 8 and 10, 62% of the 
relationships in Family 7, nearly 40% of the pairs in Family 4, four 
out of six dyads in Family 2, the daughter's relationship with both 
parents in Family 6, the daughter's relationship with her mother and 
her brother in Family 9, and the father's relationship with his wife 
and his younger son in Family 11. 
Half the parental dyads in the sample are included at the 3.5 
level of difference, as are nine of the fourteen mother-daughter dyads, 
or about 65%. The remainder of the mother-daughter pairs are to be 
found in the vicinity, within the 3.7- 4.2 range, with the exception of 
the sound-producing daughter of Family 1, who relates to her mother at 
a D-figure of 6.5. Her relation to her father, at 8.9, is the most 
distant of all dyads under comparison in the entire sample. 
One indication of the reliability of the D coefficient as a 
measure of associative similarity might be found in a comparison of its 
figures with measures based on other procedures, such as the Spearman 
rank correlation. When the rank order of dyads within a family, as 
determined by the closeness of the D coefficient, is compared with the 
rank order derived from a comparison of Spearman correlations, in five 
of the eleven families the same dyad is listed first; that is to say, 
the degree of associative conformity between the designated pair was 
considered to be the strongest in the family in both analyses. 
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When the dyads ranked as the three closest by Spearman and Furst 
calculations are compared, seven of the families show at least one pair 
in the top three common to both analyses, and in one group (Family 3), 
the same three pairs comprise the top ranked dyads in both 
arrangements. Four of the closest five pairs in Family 1 are the same 
on both lists, but in Family 4, only one of the top five dyads is 
identified in each group. In Family 7, the situation is better, with 
three dyads appearing in the closest six in both Furst and Spearman 
rankings. The pairs showing least agreement in both lists are 
different in every family, with the exception of Family 1, where father 
and first daughter maintain their distance at the bottom of both ranked 
lists. 
In terms of general trends, the figures presented in Table 30, on 
the following page, are indicative of levels of associative conformity 
that might be expected in a normal sample of family members. Figures 
in the first column are those obtained from the subjects of the present 
study; those in the second column are averages calculated by Furst from 
the sample she tested at the turn of the century. 
The closest relationship in both samples is that between nothers 
and daughters. Fathers' associative patterns in the present sample are 
slightly more distant with both daughters and sons, but both 
relationships are closer than that between mothers and sons. Same-
gender siblings have close agreement, and in terms of conformity fall 
midway between the mother-daughter and father-daughter figures. 
Brother-sister pairs, on the other hand, are the least close of all 
Table 30 
Average Coefficient of Difference 
Dyad Current Furst 
Father-M:)ther 4.04 4.70 
Mother-Daughter 3.45 3.00 
Mother-Son 4.05 4.70 
Father-Daughter 3.91 4.90 
Father-Son 3.98 3 .10 
Brothers 3.60 4.70 
Sisters 3.68 5.10 
Brother-Sister 4.57 4.40 
Mother-Child 3.75 3.50 
Father-Child 3.94 4.20 
Related Males 3.80 4.10 
Related Females 3.56 3.80 
figures. Married couples' D-coefficients are higher than the averages 
for all related pairs of men and of women, and furthermore are higher 
than the differences associated with parents and their children. 
143 
It is interesting to note that the mothers and daughters in 
Furst's sample, who also showed the highest level of associative 
conformity, were considerably closer to one another than members of the 
present sample. The same is true of the group of fathers and sons, who 
were on average nearly one full point closer in Furst's sample than in 
the population of this study. On the other hand, the roc>ther-son and 
father-daughter pairs tested in the early 1900's are discernably rrore 
distant from one another than the comparable dyads in the current 
sample. These variations may reflect social practices which today 
allow for roc>re consistent interaction between parents and their 
opposite-sex children; in fact, the fathers in the Furst sample are 
rather roc>re distant from their children than are the current fathers, 
and considerably roc>re distant than the roc>thers among their own 
contemporaries. 
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Siblings, as well, seem to have been more distant at the turn of 
the century, with sisters showing less agreement than brothers, a 
pattern which still obtains in the present sample, but to a much 
attenuated degree. The difference, however, is probably not 
significant. Parents, too, in the earlier study were more distant from 
each other than those of the present day. Interestingly, the pattern 
of closeness between mother-father dyads and mother-son dyads, although 
expressed in different numbers, is proportionally the same for dyads in 
both samples. From the figures given for related pairs of men and 
women, it seems as though family members of the present sample 
associate at a somewhat higher level of conformity than did those 
subjects who participated in the Furst study. An overall average 
figure for related individuals is 3.68 for the current population, as 
against 3.95 for related members of the earlier sample. 
It is in the context of t hese figures that the instances of close 
conformity, at the level of 2 . 5 and below, ought to be examined. The D 
coefficient is intended to serve as a general measure of the degree to 
which one individual's associative pattern conforms to that of another, 
but since it is an average, it cannot give an indication of the 
specific relational categories i n which two individual's reponses are 
most alike. This kind of information · is perhaps best shown by 
composite graphing of the category figures for the individuals whose 
associative profile is being analysed. At the tightest level of 
agreement, 2.0-2.5, some very striking patterns emerge. 
In the twelve graphs which follow, the perpendicular axis 
represents percentages of responses given in each cagetory. The 
fifteen relational categories of the Furst schema are plotted along the 
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Figure 1. Comparison of response profiles of father and oldest son 
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Figure 2. Comparison of response profiles of :rrother and older son 
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Figure 3. Comparison of response profiles of husband and wife of 
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Figure 4. Comparison of response profiles of father and mother of 
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Figure 5. Comparison of response profiles of father and mother of 
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Figure 6. Comparison of response profiles of mother and third 
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Figure 7. Comparison of response profiles of father and oldest 
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Figure 9. Comparison of response profiles of mother of Family 10 and 
her daughter's husband's sister (mother graphed with solid line). 
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Figure 10. Comparison of response profiles of father and rrother of 
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Figure 11. Comparison of response profiles of oldest daughter and 
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Figure 12. Comparison of response profiles of parents and three 
oldest daughters of Family 7. Coefficient of difference for individual 
dyads ranges from 2.27 to 3.73. 
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Figure 1 shows the associative conformity of a father and his son, 
the closest dyad from Family 1. Figure 2 is a composite profile of a 
mother and son from Family 3. Figures 3, 4 and 5 give a picture of the 
conformity of the closest married couples in the sample, the husband 
and wife of Family 10, and the parents of Families 4 and 7. The 
closest mother-daughter dyad in the sample, the mother and third 
daughter of Family 4, is shown in Figure 6; the father-daughter pair 
with the closest conformity, the father and oldest daughter of Family 
7, is compared in Figure 7. Figure 8 shows a pair of brothers with 
close agreement, from Family 4. 
Most remarkable of all, perhaps, is Figure 9, which shows two 
in-laws, the mother of Family 10 and the sister of her daughter's 
husband. The profiles of these two unrelated predicate-types are in 
virtual point-by-point correspondence. Except for the frequency of 
contrasts, which the younger woman produced half again as often as the 
older one, the patterns of the two women coincide in near-perfect 
conformity. 
For the sake of comparison, Figures 10 and 11 show the composite 
profiles of family members whose coefficient of difference is not 
carried within the 2.0 - 2.5 range of close agreement. The quality of 
the "difference" becomes inmediately apparent in these two graphs, of 
related individuals whose modal response falls into entirely different 
categories. Figure 10 shows the husband and wife of Family 1, with the 
husband stronger in linguistic-motor responses and the wife in 
predication; Figure 11 is a brother-sister pair from Family 4, with the 
same clash of reaction types, between linguistic-motor and predicative 
responses. This sort of diversity among response profiles can only 
heighten an observer's appreciation of the symmetry obtaining between 
profiles of the more closely conforming individuals. 
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Finally, Figure 12 is composite response-profile for five of the 
six related individuals tested in Family 7. The parents and three 
oldest daughters of the family show extraordinary similarity in 
reaction-type; the only dissention in the family came from the youngest 
daughter, who responded with antonyms in marked contrast to her 
relatives' preference for synonyms. 
The example of the mother and her son-in-law's sister serves as a 
powerful reminder that the dimension of associative conformity measured 
in terms of the D-coefficient is closely connected with the analysis of 
reaction-type. Any two unrelated individuals who share a corrmon modal 
response pattern might conceivably generate composite graphs with the 
same exquisite resemblance as that shown by the two predicate-type 
inlaws of Family 10. As the analysis of Spearman rank correlations for 
related and unrelated individuals demonstrated, agreement in response 
patterns is not uncorrnnon in the general population, although within 
certain parameters family members might be expected to show a somewhat 
higher degree of similarity more regularly, or more often, than members 
of the population at large. 
Furst's analysis included the computation of more than 8,000 D-
coefficients for unrelated dyads in her sample, and she found evidence 
to suggest that relatives show closer conformity in their associative 
response patterns than do unrelated individuals. The average of 
related women in her sample was 3.8, that of related men 4.1, as 
against figures of 6.0 and 5.9 for unrelated men and women. Although 
time constraints did not permit a similar analysis of the eleven 
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hundred unrelated pairs in the present sample, future work is needed in 
this area to ascertain the effect of family relationship on reaction 
patterns. It is to be hoped that analysis of the data on reaction 
types might yield a more telling result than that of the Spearman rank 
order correlations reported above, which showed only a very slight 
effect of family when the categorized responses of entire sample were 
subjected to analysis. 
The extent to which the same reaction-type tends to redundancy 
within a family becomes the point on which the difference between 
related and unrelated pairs of individuals comes to rest, and in order 
to explore this dimension of familial agreement, a series of chi-
square (contingency) tests were performed on selected members of the 
sample, in order to determine the significance attendant upon the 
multiple occurrence of the same reaction-type among members of the same 
household. 
Reaction-type within the fami l y unit: redundancy and contingency. 
Jung's first observations about associative patterns within families 
derived from the accidental involvement in his sample of mothers and 
daughters from three families, all of whom shared the same reaction 
type. One group, a mother and two daughters, was composed of solid 
linguistic-motor types; the other two groups, a mother with two 
daughters and a mother-daughter pair, reacted to the stimulus-words in 
a way that identified them as predicate reaction-types. 
The redundancy of a single type among these relatives led Jung and 
his coauthor to hypothesize the existence of a "familial disposition," 
which shaped the responses of the daughters in the families and which 
could be traced in the children's reactions with reference to their 
birth order. The older the child, the more like the parent her 
reactions were observed to be, and there was a tendency for the 
associative center of gravity to shift in the direction of more 
superficial reactions as the experiment proceeded from from mother to 
younger daughter. 
It was this phenomenon of progressive "blunting" that Jung wished 
to pursue with material collected from members of other families. 
Furst, who devoted a part of her analysis to this problem, found that 
as a general principle it was the case only with children over the age 
of sixteen,9 and only occurred with children and their mothers. In 
comparison to fathers, most children showed less superficiality in 
their responses, and most wives gave more internal associations than 
did their husbands. 
But the issue which engaged her more directly was the phenomenon 
of predication within families. Her sample was composed of at least 
54% true predicate types, and of those persons she classified as mixed 
reaction types, half had predication as one of their most strongly 
preferred modes. Her analysis thus began with material from a sample 
containing 72:'~ predicate types, with women--mothers, daughters and 
sisters--represented at a ratio of 17:10 in comparison with men. 
The nine families she selected to report were dominated by 
predication: 22 of the 37 individuals were pure predicate types, and 
another four were mixed predicate types, yielding a 7CJX, proportion of 
the total family membership. These figures are considerably higher 
than those of the present sample, as can be seen from the following 
comparison. Mixed-predicate types are included as predicate types in 
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both columns. In each column, the figure identifies numbers of 
predicate types out of the total number of family members tested. 
Table 31 











































In three of the Furst families and four of the families in the present 
sample, all tested members proved to be predicate types. In one family 
of each set, 75% of the members were predicate types; in two families 
of each group, half were predicate types. In both families of seven 
members, the majority were predicate types, and in both samples, there 
was one family in which no predicate types were to be found. The 
primary source of difference between the two samples resides with 
Family 4 of the present study, seven of whose nine members preferred 
non-predicative categories for their associative responses. 
Both Jung and Furst seemed to accept, as fact, what observation 
bore out in both their samples: that families tend to produce members 
whose associative behavior is similar. In the specific case of the 
predicate type, Furst speculated that it was linked to a subjective or 
egocentric attitude which in both women and men tends to increase with 
greater age.IO The relatively high predication rate of young 
children is a somewhat different matter, and although it is not 
discussed by Furst, her understanding of the phenomena is implied in 
her statement that associations of children below the age of sixteen 
are predominantly inner associations, a class composed almost entirely 
of either ordinate or predicative responses. 
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Aside from these descriptive observations, however, neither Furst 
nor Jung were able to examine the phenomenon of intrafamilial 
predication, or the redundancy of reaction-type, from the standpoint of 
its statistical significance in the IIDdern sense. Intuition would 
suggest that the appearance of so many predicate-types in the same 
household is, in fact, a matter of significance, one that calls for a 
closer look at the relationships of those who share the predicate 
reaction type. There is a great discrepancy between the samples in 
terms of the familial relations represented; for the purpose of the 
analysis which follows, therefore, comparisons will be made only in 
terms of comparable family roles, and the primary focus will be on the 
one intrafamilial relationship which is stable in both groups--the 
parent-child dyad. 
The chi-square test of contingency. The chi-square test is one of 
the methods available to IIDdern statisticians to determine the degree 
of significance which can be attributed to an observed phenomenon, the 
degree to which the phenomenon differs from results which might be 
obtained by chance. In order to be valid, it requires larger numbers 
of subjects than were available in the present sample, such that there 
is a minimum of five subjects in the smallest cell of the contingency 
table. Even the addition of Furst's subjects to the numbers of the 
present sample would not reach the requisite minimum number for a valid 
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chi-square analysis to be performed. Nevertheless, a number of such 
tests were undertaken, in both the 3 x 3 and 2 x 2 format, in order to 
see if any trends might emerge from the data which would indicate the 
need for further research. The results presented in this section must 
be seen, therefore, as descriptive, and no statistical significance can 
be attached to them at this time. 
The first analyses were done using data from the thirteen mother-
child dyads occurring in Furst's sample. In the 3 x 3 format, all 
predicate mothers were found to have either predicate children (seven 
instances) or children with mixed-predicate reaction-types (two 
instances). Mixed type mothers accounted for one predicate child, two 
mixed reaction-types, and one of the rare non-predicating members of 
the sample. There were no mothers of a non-predicate type. Although 
the distribution of these frequencies seems weighted toward the 
occurrence of predicate type children in the household of predicating 
mothers, the numbers are too small to indicate any level of 
significance. 
When subjects classified as mixed predicate types were combined 
with the true predicate types in a 2 x 2 format, twelve out of thirteen 
children fell into the same analytic cell, that of mothers and children 
sharing reaction type. However, with · this arrangement the x2 result 
was O, a figure which would lead one to the counterintuitive conclusion 
that the observed phenomenon was one which could have been produced by 
chance. 
Part of the difficulty in working with this data is the low number 
of dyads available for analysis. In the sample of the present study, 
there were 49 parent-child pairs and 26 mother-child dyads, twice the 
number of rnother-child dyads in the Furst sample.11 When chi-square 
tests were performed on them, the results proved to be somewhat more 
reasonable, but still fell below the criterial level of statistical 
significance. 
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For the purposes of the first two tests reported here, the 
predicate type was defined at a predication rate of 30% and above, and 
mixed predication was fixed between 23 and 29%. Children of the eleven 
families were compared with either mother or father, depending on which 
of the two denvnstrated the criterial levels of predication. Unlike the 
Furst group, no household in the present sample had two predicate-type 
parents among the members tested, although it is quite possible that if 
the missing parents of children in the sample could have been tested, 
this situation might have changed. 
With P (predicate type) fixed at 30% predicative responses, and M 
(mixed-predicate type) at 23-29%, two fathers and three mothers were 
determined to be true predicate types; one father and two mothers were 
mixed-predicate types, and the rest were defined as non-predicating 
(N). Although the x2 value of the 3 x 3 analysis performed on the 
parent-child dyads remains far below the level of statistical 
significance at the .05 level, some interesting trends can be seen in 
the distribution of the data. SUmmary figures from the original 
contingency table are presented in Table 32, on the following page. 
The observed figures for homogeneous dyads (parent and child 
sharing the same reaction type) are about twice what would be expected 
through the operation of chance for both predicate and non-predicating 
types. In other words, predicate parents tend to have predicating 
children, and non-predicate parents tend to have non-predicate type 
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Table 32 
Chi-Square Analysis, Parent-Child Dyads 
Dyad Observed Expected x2 
P parent, P child 4 1.88 2.39 
P parent, M child 2 1.88 0.01 
P parent, N child 1 3.23 1.54 
M parent, P child 3 2.96 0.00 
M parent, M child 3 2.96 0.00 
M parent, N child 5 5.07 o.oo 
N parent, P child 0 2.15 2.15 
N parent, M child 2 2.15 0.01 
N parent, N child 6 3.69 1.45 
Total 26 7.55 
children, about twice as often as might be expected. other dyadic 
combinations are quite close to the expected figures, with the 
exception of the seventh category (non-predicate parents with predicate 
children), where the observed is far below the expected: when neither 
parent is a predicate type, there are no predicate type children in the 
household, although the workings of chance would apparently place some 
of them there. Again, because the total numbers analysed are too small 
to be subjected to a valid chi-square procedure, there can be no level 
of significance attached to the results of the analysis; 
Within the limitations of small sample size, a refinement of the 
picture presented by parent-child dyads is achieved when the dyad of 
mother and child is analysed. Here, the comparison with the Furst 
sample is a rrore direct one. Again, there are twice the number of 
pairs in the present group as in her sample, and the resultant x2 
figure is alrrost 2.5 times higher than hers, although it remains below 
the .05 level of significance. A summary of results from the original 
3 x 3 contingency table is given in Table 33, on the following page. 
Table 33 
Chi-Square Analysis, Mother-Child Dyads 
Dyad 
P rrother, P child 
P rrother, M child 
P rrother, N child 
M mother, P child 
M mother, M child 
M rnother, N child 
N mother, P child 
N mother, M child 



































In this distribution, the occurrence of predicate-type children in 
association with predicating mothers is three times what would be 
expected, and the rate at which non-predicate mothers have children who 
are non-predicating is about 1.5 times the expected rate. Mixed 
reaction-type mothers, with their strong penchant for predication, have 
predicate children about 1~3 times more often than expected, and where 
mother's predication rate is at least 23%, there are fewer non-
predicate type children in the household than might be expected. As 
was the case in the Furst sample, no non-predicate mother had a child 
who was a predicate type; and when the only parent taken into account 
is the mother, it seems to be the case that no predicating rnother had a 
child who was a non-predicate type. 
A comparison of reaction-types between mothers and daughters in 
the sample nrost rely on a very small number of pairs, only fourteen, 
too few for any level of significance to be determined. However, the 
pattern of distribution remains essentially the same as was seen with 
the roother-child dyads. The x2 figure improves slightly when . the 
two roothers and one daughter with borderline predication figures of 29% 
are mJVed from the mixed category into the category of predicate types. 
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Table 34 
Chi-Square Analysis, Mother-Daughter Dyads 
Dyad Observed Expected x2 
P rrother, P daughter 4 3.21 0.19 
P rrother, M daughter 3 2.57 0.07 
P rrother, N daughter 2 3.21 0.46 
M rrother, P daughter 0 0.35 0.35 
M mother, M daughter 1 0.28 1.85 
M m::>ther, N daughter 0 0.35 0.35 
N mother, P daughter 1 1.42 0.12 
N rrother, M daughter 0 1.14 1.14 
N mother, N daughter 3 1.42 1. 76 
Total 14 6.29 
However, with P fixed at 29%, the pattern of distribution changes, 
in that now, for the first time, a predicating daughter is to be found 
in the household of a non-predicate type mother. Oddly enough, this 
individual's father is also a non-predicate type, and of her five 
siblings, only one, the youngest brother, achieved a predicate rate as 
high as 24%. In the absence of rrore extensive information, one is left 
to wonder at the origin of this woman's anomalous preference for 
predication. 
In this distribution, observations in all the dyadic categories 
remain fairly close to the expected figures, except in the cells of 
mixed-reaction type children of either mixed or non-predicate type 
mothers, and in the final category of non-predicate type dyads. 
Although the appearance of a predicate-type daughter with a non-
predicate type mother is, in this analysis, what would occur simply by 
chance, it is quite remarkable given the patterns established earlier. 
Contingency figures were also determined for other combinations of 
parents and children, and with P fixed at other points. The results 
are summarized as follows: 
Table 35 
Chi-Square Analysis of All Dyads 
Dyad Total P=.30 P=.29 P=.23 
Parent-Child 26 7.55 6.57 5.07 
Mother-Child 26 10.58 7.86 7.23 
Mother-Daughter 14 5.00 6.29 3.80 
Mother-Son 12 4.60 5.87 4.67 
Father-Child 24 2.40 1.00 o.oo 
Father-Daughter 11 1.33 1.33 1.33 
Father-Son 13 3.36 1.42 0.69 
The figures are the result of 3 x 3 analyses, except for the last 
column, where 2 x 2 analyses were performed. Again, it nru.st be noted 
that no single grouping of dyads in the sample was large enough to 
produce a chi-square analysis with statistically significant results. 
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Although it is impossible to make any valid generalizations from 
these figures, it does seem as though there is a slightly higher 
correlation between the figures of rnother and child, at all values of 
P, than between any other intrafarnilial dyad. The figure for rnother-
daughter correlation is highest when P=.29, and the same is true for 
the mother-son pair, although the actual figure is somewhat lower (6.29 
for mothers and daughters, 5.87 for mothers and sons). Figures for 
fathers and their sons are higher at all three P values than the 
figures for fathers and daughters, and when P=.30, the difference is in 
the ratio of 2.5 to 1. 
In this analysis, mothers and sons correlate somewhat higher than 
do fathers and sons at all levels, suggesting that the key factor in 
the appearance of predication in the children--if any exists at all--
may be found in the influence of the mother in the household. It is 
interesting to note that this result differs from the comparisons of 
parents and children in terms of the Spearman rank order correlation of 
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their associative responses, noted earlier, in which fathers and 
children correlated at a somewhat higher level than did rnothers and 
children. In the absence of any post-hoc significance tests on these 
observations, however, they are put forth only as descriptions of 
phenomena observed in this sample; and the reasons for the difference 
between the Spearman results and the chi-square results remain, at this 
time, unexplored. 
The slightness of these figures prevents any positive conclusions 
from being drawn as to the significance of the apparent redundancy of 
reaction-type within normal families. In a 3 x 3 analysis with an 
appropriately large number of subjects, the chi-square figure would 
need to reach 15.51 in order to attain a .05 level of significance. 
With only 26 dyads reported, the highest level of significance attained 
in this sample was 10.58, the figure achieved when rnothers and children 
were compared. In a 2 x 2 analysis, only the mother-child dyad (7.23) 
approximates the 7.81 figure necessary for significance at the .05 
level, but again, the numbers are too small for appropriate validity to 
be attained. 
However, the trends inherent in t he data might well become more 
apparent if greater numbers could be added to t he sample. Further work 
with a larger population will be required to decide the question of 
significance either for or against the intuition of Jung, Riklin and 
Furst: that it is no accident that the same reaction-type tends to 
occur among multiple members of the same household. 
The Experiment in Deductive Reasoning 
At the conclusion of the word association test, subjects were 
asked, in the second part of the experiment, to complete a 
standardized test in deductive logic, one of the seven sections of the 
Ross Test of Higher Cognitive Processes. The juxtaposition of the two 
kinds of instruments, the one a free-flowing, oral-auditory, 
subjectively-oriented, essentially open-ended experience, and the 
other a serious, pencil-and-paper exercise with real right and wrong 
answers, demanding reading comprehension and concentration of 
attention, was one that many subjects found quite jarring; the effort 
required to shift gears mentally was evidently no easy matter for 
some. 
As a discipline of thought, deductive logic may be among the most 
dreaded of all "higher cognitive" skills, and part of the disaffection 
many individuals feel toward it, quite apart from the dry and 
unrelated way in which it is so often t aught, may derive in part from 
a cognitive style rooted in a pref erence for predication. It was 
Jung's belief that the "feeling function," one of the four modes which 
operate in his theory of cognition, does not easily acconmodate the 
process of the "thinking function." Because there is much in his 
description of the "feeling type" individual that is reminiscent of 
his earlier analysis of the traits of the "predicate reaction-type," 
it seems worthwhile to examine critical thinking ability, in one of 
its classical forms, against predication as an associative reaction 
type. Jung's theory would suggest an inverse correlation between 
predicative reactions and logical reasoning skill. 
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Experimental conditions. Thirty-eight of the individuals who 
participated in the word association task went on to complete Part II 
of the Ross Test. The parents of Families 4, 7 and 11 were not asked 
by the test administrator (in each case a member of their own family) 
to take the test, due to considerations of age and failing eyesight. 
Logistical difficulties prevented the participation of three of the 
individuals who responded to the word association test by telephone; 
in three other cases, the administrator judged that the patience of 
the subject would not bear a prolongation of the experimental period. 
In one case, the subject failed to complete the last page of the test 
before turning it in, and in the final instance--unfortunately an 
individual with one of the highest predication figures in the 
sample--the subject turned the test booklet back at once with the 
corrment that he knew he would not do well if he tried to take it. 
The group of those who did not participate in the deductive 
portion of the experiment consisted of eight persons who were 
classified as non-predicate types in the analysis of word association 
results; three who were predicate types, at the criteria! level of 30% 
predicate responses; one borderline predicate type (P=29%), and two 
mixed-predicate types. Although the loss of their contribution is 
regrettable, their removal from the sample did not appreciably change 
the overall distribution of response-type frequencies. 
SUbjects who took the test were given ten minutes to complete its 
eighteen true-false questions. Most took less than five minutes to 
give their answers. Thirty-five subjects took the test immediately 
after the word association portion was concluded, in the presence of 
the administrator. If subjects expressed difficulty in understanding 
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the written directions, the administrator gave an explanation that 
helped to clarify the process, prior to the beginning of the test. 
Once the test had begun, subjects with expressed difficulties were 
invited to write their conments directly on the test paper, but 
otherwise received no support from the administrator. The remaining 
three subjects, all of whom live at some distance from their 
designated administrators, received the test by mail and completed it 
under their own supervision. 
The instrument. According to the administrator's manual, the 
deductive reasoning portion of the Ross Test of Higher Cognitive 
Processes was developed to measure ability in the "Evaluation" (level 
6) subgroup of Bloom's Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook I: 
Cognitive Domain, "Judgments in Tenns of Internal Evidence," and in 
particular, "the ability to indicate logical fallacies in 
arguments. 11 12 As a whole, the seven parts of the Ross Test are 
considered adequate for the assessment of "higher-level thinking 
skills" in "gifted and non-gifted" individuals of at least fourth-
grade level. 
In formal construction, Part I I of the Ross Test is a series of 
true-false questions about possible conclusions to the premises of a 
formal syllogism. It consists of six sets of premises, or predicative 
statements, four cast in the classical mode of major and minor 
premise, and one each containing three and four premises. Three are 
categorical syllogisms, two are conditional, and one an informal 
statement of associated facts. At the end of each series of premises, 
three possible conclusions are stated, and the respondent is asked to 
determine whether each of the conclusions does or does not follow from 
172 
the given premises. A copy of the test is included at the end of this 
report, as Appendix 2. 
The Ross Test was chosen from among other tests of logical 
reasoning because of the peculiar nature of its predications. Unlike 
those classical syllogisms which require a movement from known (or at 
least believable) premises to a conclusion which contributes to the 
general state of knowledge, the premises of the Ross Test are built on 
contrafactual predications, nonsense words, and substantives which are 
quite startling in their sensory inmediacy. Individuals who are 
attuned to the perceptual dimensions of reality, and who are inclined 
to make evaluative judgments about that reality, two characteristics 
which Jung found in association with predicative verbal behavior, were 
thought by the experimenter to be likely to suffer cognitive 
interference in the sort of processing required to work with the Ross 
premises. 
Thus, any difficulty that such i ndividuals might have with 
reasoning, or critical thinking, as such would be magnified by their 
predicted inability to suspend t heir disbelief sufficiently to move 
through the vivid, but impossible, universe of the Ross Test. Those 
whose response pattern gave no hint of a preoccupation with the 
sensory and evaluative qualities of predication, on the other hand, 
were expected to operate quite easily with the words of the Ross 
premises. 
Results of the analysis. In Table 36, the scores of the individuals 
who took the Ross Test are listed in the order of their predicative 
response rating. The figures in the "Ross" column indicate the number 
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of items missed, out of a possible eighteen; the "P" figures are 
percentages of predicate reactions on the word association test. 
Table 36 
Predication Rates Compared with Ross Test Error Rates 
Subject p Ross subject p Ross subject p Ross 
1. 081 43 -5 14. 061 29 -2 27. 015 18 -4 
2. 102 40 -1 15. 012 29 -1 28. 074 17 -2 
3. 053 38 -3 16. 024 29 -1 29. 113 17 -1 
4. 103 35 -5 17. 034 27 -8 30. 062 16 -0 
5. 031 33 -2 18. 023 26 -3 31. 033 15 -2 
6. 142 32 -5 19. 051 26 -3 32. 046 15 -6 
7. 073 31 -8 20. 075 25 -7 33. 032 14 -3 
8. 104 31 -4 21. 048 24 -9 34. 044 14 -3 
9. 076 31 -6 22. 022 23 -4 35. 047 13 -3 
10. 101 31 -5 23. 014 23 -0 36. 021 12 -6 
11. 083 31 -0 24. 045 21 -0 37. 011 12 -0 
12. 043 29 -3 25. 141 20 -3 38. 013 9 -0 
13. 077 29 -5 26. 151 20 -4 
A cursory glance at this list gives the impression that it is 
top-heavy in terms of missed items on the Ross Test; and indeed, of 
the ten individuals who were highest in predication (P greater than 
.31), six missed five or rrore items; seven missed four or rrore, and 
eight missed at least three. One made six mistakes, and one had the 
second worst score in the entire sample, with eight incorrect answers. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the ten individuals with the 
lowest predicate ratings (Pless than .17) seemed to do quite a bit 
better as a group: three had no mistakes at all; five missed two or 
less, eight missed three or less, and no one missed rrore than six. 
The scores of the ten highest in predication accounted for a 
total of 44 errors, for an average of 4.4 per individual. The ten 
lowest in predication missed 24 altogether, making an average of 2.4 
errors for each individual. The difference--with the predicate types 
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erring in deduction at nearly twice the rate of those lowest in 
predication--is a fairly striking result. 
When the scores of the borderline predicate-types (P=.29) are 
added to those whose predication rate was .31 and above, the average 
error rate is lowered to 3.7, which still remains 1.5 tirces higher 
than the average rate of the comparable number of individuals from the 
bottom of the list, a figure which rises to 2.5 errors per person. 
The inclusion of all the individuals who were identified as mixed 
predicate-types in the analysis of word association results brings the 
average error rate for the group of twenty-one subjects to 3.9 
mistakes per individual, as against 2.5 per person for the fifteen 
subjects classified as non-predicate types. In general, then, it 
seems as though individuals high in predication on the word 
association test make mist akes in deductive reasoning one and one-
half to two tirces as often as individuals with a low proportion of 
predicative responses. 
Table 37, on the fol l owing page, gives a ranking o~ subjects in 
accordance with their scores on the Ross Test; those with the most 
errors are at the top of the list. The top ten on this list have an 
average predication rate of 27.5%. The individual with the highest 
percentage of predicates is among this group of ten, and only two of 
the ten are individuals who gave less than 24% predicates on their 
word association tests. 
The average predication rate for the lowest ten subjects on the 
list is 22.7%, a figure which is surprisingly close to that of the top 
ten, and indeed, four of these high scorers were also high in 
percentage of predicates. Post-test interviewing of these individuals 
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Table 37 
Ross Errors Compared With Predication Rates 
SUbject Ross p subject Ross p subject Ross p 
1. 048 -9 24 14. 022 -4 23 27. 074 -2 17 
2. 073 -8 31 15. 151 -4 20 28. 033 -2 15 
3. 034 -8 27 16. 015 -4 18 29. 102 -1 40 
4. 075 -7 25 17. 053 -3 38 30. 012 -1 29 
5. 076 -6 31 18. 043 -3 29 31. 024 -1 29 
6. 046 -6 15 19. 023 -3 26 32. 113 -1 17 
7. 021 -6 12 20. 051 -3 26 33. 083 - 0 31 
8. 081 -5 43 21. 141 -3 20 34. 014 -0 23 
9. 103 -5 35 22. 032 -3 14 35. 045 -0 21 
10. 142 -5 32 23. 044 -3 14 36. 062 -0 16 
11. 101 -5 31 24. 047 -3 13 37. 011 -0 12 
12. 077 -5 29 25. 031 -2 33 38. 013 -0 9 
13. 104 -4 31 26. 061 -2 29 
revealed the fact that three had studied fonnal logic at some time in 
their past, and one had previously taken the Ross Test as well. The 
fourth was quite surprised at her high score, since she had only been 
guessing at the answers. When the data for the three who had studied 
logic is set aside, the average rate of predicates for the ten best 
scorers on the Ross Test falls to 18.3, nearly a full ten points less 
than the average for the ten who missed the most items on the test. 
A further refinement of t his picture becomes possible through an 
examination of the composition of the group that forms at each level 
of error. When the sample is divided into predicate and non-predicate 
types at the criterial percentage of 30%, all those who missed five 
items and half of those who missed five or more were predicate-types. 
When borderline predicate types are included, 58% of those who missed 
five or more and half of those who missed four or more can be defined 
as predicate types. 
When the scores of predicate and mixed predicate types are 
combined, 100% of those who missed more than six are in their company, 
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as are 71.4% of those who missed six or more, and 83.3% of those who 
missed at least five. 
Conversely, when predication is defined at 30%, and those who 
studied formal logic are excluded from the sample, there was no 
predicate type individual with a perfect score. Only 10% of those who 
missed less than two are predicate types, as are only 9.1% of those 
who missed three or less. With the addition of figures for the 
borderline types, the proportions remain the same: no member of the 
group had a perfect score, and only 7.1% of those who missed less than 
three belonged in the predicate category. When the mixed predicate 
types join in the sample, 14.3% of those who missed less than three 
have the requisite proportion of predicates, and the remainder, 85.7%, 
are all individuals that can be identified as non-predicate types, 
with less than 23% predicate responses on the word association test. 
A final aspect of this list t hat requires examination is a 
frequency distribution of scores: 2.6% of the respondents missed half 
the questions on the Ross Test; 5 .3% missed eight of eighteen; 18.4% 
missed more than one third of the items . 31.6% made at least five 
mistakes, and 42.1% had at least four errors. A total of 57.1% of the 
sample missed three or less, with the largest single percentage, 21%, 
making three mistakes; 26.3% missed less than two, and 15.7% achieved 
a perfect score. 
When the list is divided in half, eight individuals in the top 
half had at least 30% predicates, as contrasted with only three in the 
lower half, two of whom had studied deductive logic. Seven of the 
thirteen individuals in the top third of the list can be identified as 
predicate types by this criteria, as against two in each of the middle 
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and lower thirds. When Pis fixed at 29%, ten of the nineteen 
individuals with the most errors are included as predicate types, as 
compared with three (not including the three who studied logic) in the 
half with the highest Ross Test scores. With the addition of the 
mixed predicate type respondents, fifteen of the worst-scoring 
nineteen individuals can be considered high in predication, with the 
same three (or eight, if those who studied logic are included) holding 
their own among the nineteen with the highest scores. With the list 
divided into thirds, the figures are still more telling: eleven 
predicate or mixed types appear in the worst-scoring third of the 
group, five in the middle, and only two among the third with the best 
scores, those who missed, at most, one item on the test. 
By way of comparison, the scoring information given in the 
administrators' manual to the Ross Test indicates that an error rate 
of six, or 67% correct responses, is t he average score for a 
non-gifted student in the sixth grade. By contrast, a gifted student 
in the sixth grade would be expected to miss no more than three 
questions on the test. On average, non-gifted children miss three 
items more than gifted children at all grade levels tested (fourth, 
fifth and sixth). 
When raw scores are converted into percentiles, a perfect score 
falls into the 91st percentile for gifted students in the sixth grade, 
and the 99th percentile for non-gifted students. Three errors, a 
corrmon score in this sample, would rank at the 48th percentile for 
gifted, and the 87th percentile for the non-gifted. With five 
mistakes, an individual would fall at the 17th percentile for gifted 
sixth-graders, and the 65th percentile for non-gifted students in the 
sixth grade. 
None of this, of course, is to suggest that those predicate type 
subjects with high error rates are less intelligent than others with 
better scores; in fact, the Ross Test was found not to correlate with 
standard measures of intelligence. It may suggest that they have not 
had training in deductive logic comparable to that which may have been 
given to a gifted sixth-grader; yet again, it may indicate that their 
concern with the sensuous quality of each predicate in the Ross Test 
prevented them from putting the predicates together in a way that 
would eliminate inappropriate conclusions. There is nothing to find 
fault with in the logic of these individuals' daily lives; the most 
that can be said is that the artificial practice of the syllogism is 
not one in which they have cared to develop a high degree of skill. 
As a final analysis, a Pearson Product Moment Correlation was 
performed on the Ross error rates and predication rates of subjects in 
the sample. The result, r=.57, suggests that there is a moderately 
strong correlation between high predication rates and high numbers of 
errors in deductive reasoning, at least as measured by the syllogisms 
of the Ross Test of Higher Cognitive Processes. The fact that 
predicate types had two times the rate of errors as those who were 
non-predicate types is certainly a phenomenon that merits further 
study, and additional work with other kinds of logic tests might 
reveal whether the anomaly is to be found in the thinking function of 
the predicate type individual, or in the peculiar predication of the 
Ross Test of Higher Cognitive Processes. 
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Conclusions 
The experiment described in this chapter was designed to examine 
two different dimensions of thinking, both related to measures of 
verbal behavior. The test of word association, administered to 
fifty-two members of fifteen families was intended to highlight 
similarities in associative patterns and reaction styles shared among 
members of the same household. The test of deductive reasoning, given 
to thirty-eight of the subjects of the word association test, was 
performed in order to show comparative facility in this critical 
thinking skill among individuals of different associative reaction 
styles. In both examinations, the focus of attention was the reaction 
style distinguished by a preference for predication. 
Limitations of the study. In the course of the analysis, comparisons 
were made between findings in the current sample and results from the 
experiments in word association performed by C.G. Jung, Franz Riklin, 
and En1na Furst and the Burgholzli Clinic in Zurich between 1904 and 
1904. There are, for a modern researcher, several difficulties in 
working with the published data of Jung's research team, not the least 
of which is the difference in population and the vastly different 
social and cultural setting in which the subjects of that time and 
place raised their families and led their lives. Furst's families, in 
particular, were more extended groups of relatives and tended to be of 
a greater age than the subjects of this sample, most of whom were 
nuclear groups of parents with minor children. The absence of 
instruments of mass media, and the different standards of public 
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education, which obtained in tum-of-the-century SWitzerland might be 
am:>ng the contributing factors in the higher agreement in familial 
association as against association of nonrelated individuals than was 
evident in the present sample. In any event, a direct comparison 
between the two samples did not prove to be possible. 
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A second, and equally daunting, difficulty is presented by the 
methods of the Burgholzli analysis itself. At the time, the swiss 
researchers were on the cutting edge of statistical or psychoIIEtric 
investigation, not simply in the realm of verbal association as such, 
but in the ancillary phenomena of reaction-time, pulmonary and galvanic 
skin response, a line of research which foreshadowed the modern medical 
interest in the interface between emotional and biophysical or somatic 
phenomena. In many respects, they were creating the discipline of word 
association research as they worked; frequency tables and standardized 
word lists had not yet been i nvented (the firs t such table was not 
published until 1910), and, as we have seen, Jung went so far as to 
invent a mathematical formula of his own in order to quantify some of 
the qualitative differences he and his student observed in the patterns 
of their data. 
Working with pen and paper at t he t urn of t he century, limited to 
the manual calculation of means and "mean variations," neither Jung nor 
Furst had access to any of the procedures that modern statisticians 
would recognize as valid. Their word list was not subjected to any 
validity test, nor were their results examined through any post-hoc 
test of significance, and it is impossible to rule out entirely the 
factor of subjectivity in the procedure which they followed in 
assigning responses to the relational categories of their 
classification system. As a consequence, any discussion of their 
findings must remain at the level of description. 
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In the present work, the sane limitation as to the word list 
remains, but with an added complication. The list chosen for use with 
the present sample was not the sane list used in the early Burgholzli 
research; it was based on a later version of the list which had been 
neutralized of emotionally-loaded stimulus-words, and had been toned 
down even further for the purposes of administration to pre-adolescent 
children. As a consequence, many of the reactions to these co:rrmonplace 
substitute words are also comrronplace; thus there was less opportunity 
for the exhibition of significant group patterns that may have emerged 
if Jung's highly-charged s t imuli had been used, and emotional themes on 
which family members might have shown agreement, and which might have 
differentiated fami l y members from nonrelated i ndividuals, were not 
subject to examinat ion. 
As part of t he determinat i on of agreement, Jung and Furst examined 
the dimension of verbal content --what i t was that the respondent said 
to the stimulus, not s imply the way, or category , in which he 
responded. Qualitative similarities between and among family members 
have not been analysed in t h is study , although t he data remains for 
further work; nor were the close int rafamilial alliances, those between 
some fathers and sons, for example, further examined. Those areas, 
where the evidence of "familial agreement" showed most clearly, are 
reserved to an analytic realm which is alt ogether outside the scope of 
this research. 
In addition, this experiment stopped after only one hundred words 
had been administered. Jung's original research involved a test of at 
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least two hundred words, as did Furst's; some of their subjects were 
asked to associate to four hundred stirrruli. The determination of 
reaction-type, therefore, is somewhat less than secure in this work, 
since Jung found that it was often not until the end of the longer test 
that an individual's true "style" would emerge. 
The composition of the families in this sample, though no less 
heterogeneous in this sample than in Furst's, posed difficulties for 
statistical work that were not as problematic with the descriptive 
approach she adopted. F.qual n's in families would have made direct 
comparisons amJng them IIX)re possible, and would allow for the 
establishment of IIX)re reliable ranges within which the associative 
behavior of normal families can be expected to take place. Although 
the logistics proved to be impossible, it would have strengthened the 
sample if intact families could have been tested. The parent or 
children who were missing from the sample families might have held the 
key to significance in pattern redundancy in their household, but 
unfortunately, the truth of the matter will never be known. 
The small sample size made a number of statistical tests which 
might have been performed impracticable, including the chi-square, 
which was designed to examine the significance of pattern redundancy. 
The results may be suggestive in terms of trends, but within such 
slight tolerances as to forbid discussion. The same is true of the 
comparison of average family rank order correlations with the average 
rank order correlations of nonrelated individuals. No post-hoc 
significance tests were performed on the results of any of the 
statistical analyses, so the figures rrrust stand without the assignment 
of any degree of significance. 
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outcome of hypotheses. With the foregoing limitations in mind, any 
conclusions based on this work must be held as preliminary and 
tentative in the highest degree; prior . to validity and significance 
testing, it would be premature to make any positive claims based on the 
work reported in this chapter. Nonetheless, the data gathered in this 
study seems at least suggestive with respect to three of the 
hypotheses, and somewhat more strong in the case of the fourth. 
The first hypothesis, that pattern redundancy in families occurs 
at statistically significant levels, could not be proven because the 
sample size was too small for a reliable chi-square test to be 
performed. However, even with the small number of dyads subjected to 
each test, the dyad of mother and daughter, when analysed in a 2 x 2 
format as either predicate or non-predicate type, did come to within a 
few points of the 7.51 chi-square result necessary for significance at 
the .OS level. A larger sample size might serve to strengthen this 
trend. 
The second hypothesis, that predication is the dominant 
reaction-style in any family in which it occurs in one of the parents, 
was also suggested by the evidence. In all but one case, predicating 
parents were shown to have at least one predicate-type child, and in 
that exceptional case, if all the children could have been tested, it 
is possible that it also would conform to the pattern of the other 
families. Furthermore, in households where neither parent was a 
predicate type, there were no predicate types found among the children. 
In the absence of acceptable significance tests, this result must 
remain, like the similar results obtained by Furst, descriptive only. 
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Mothers and daughters, the objects of the third hypothesis, were 
seen to have the closest degree of conformity of any familial dyad when 
reaction-patterns were tested by the formula devised by C.G. Jung to 
show associative similarity. However, Spearman correlations performed 
on a different set of data, the classified responses, showed mothers 
and daughters to be close, but not as close as fathers and sons, or as 
close as parents are with one another. When category choice was 
examined, children were found to be more similar to their fathers than 
to their mothers, but to a degree which is probably not significant. 
The final hypothesis, on the interference between predication and 
deduction as modes of thought, seems to be supported by the evidence of 
this experiment. subjects identified as high in predication on the 
word association test made nearly twice as many mistakes on a test of 
deductive logic as did those subjects with few predicative responses, 
when only these two factors were examined. A Pearson Product Moment 
correlation between percentage of predicates on the word association 
test and number of errors on the deductive logic section of the Ross 
Test of Higher Cognitive Processes yielded a result of r=.57, 
indicating a moderately strong correlation between high predication 
rates and high numbers of mistakes in deductive reasoning. 
A further intention of this work, above and beyond the testing of 
the four initial hypotheses, was to establish a set of parameters 
within which members of normal families might be expected to agree with 
one another in associative response. In this sample, any two members 
of a family were found to produce the same word to a given stimulus, on 
average, just under 20% of the time; any given individual member's 
response was matched by a response by any other family member about 30% 
of the time. When the dimension of response category was examined, 
these figures rose by a factor of two, with responses of any two 
members coinciding between 34-38% of the time, and any member sharing 
responses with any other member on 50-60'% of the stimulus words. 
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The degree of difference between "family" and non-family 
associations, although not among the original hypotheses of this work, 
was a dimension examined by Furst in her population of more than one 
hundred subjects. Her 8,000 manual calculations according to Jung's 
formula for the quantification of difference yielded figures suggestive 
of a small but discernible closeness in family associations as compared 
with the associations of unrelated people. In the present work, an 
analysis of variance might have been a useful procedure for bringing 
any effect of "family" to light. The comparisons of related and 
non-related individuals' Spearman correlations gave an average result 
of .29 for family members and .25 for unrelated individuals overall. 
Although this small difference was not tested for levels of 
significance, it was analysed further to reveal the fact that 
individuals related to each other had correlations on their word 
association tests at the level of 0. 40 and above about one and one half 
times more frequently than did non-related individuals in the 
population at large (20.8% for related individuals, 14.8% for 
non-related individuals). 
Although the significance of this phenomenon has yet to be 
determined, and indeed it may prove not to be significant on further 
analysis, it does seem at least suggestive of a "family factor" which 
may involve individuals in patterns of verbal reaction specific to the 
family as a group, and may serve as one of a number of launching-points 
for further research in the area of family associative behavior. 
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Directions for further research. This work, as mentioned earlier, is 
the fourth in a series of theoretical explorations of the material 
contained in the first article of Volume 1 of C.G. Jung's Diagnostic 
Association Studies, "The Associations of Normal SUbjects," coauthored 
with Franz Riklin; nor is it likely to be the last. Previous studies 
by this writer have focused on Jung's complex theory, in light of 
modern cognitive and structuralist ideas of associative clustering and 
semantic fields; on Jung's view of repression, as evidenced in the data 
of his word association experiments, and in comparison with the 
Freudian clinical model of repression and the various defense 
mechanisms, including the controversial phenomenon of "perceptual 
defense," which have been tested to greater or lesser effect in 
experimental laboratories by a number of cognitive psychologists; on 
his classification schema, in which an incipient "levels of processing" 
approach to associative encoding and retrieval can be seen; and 
finally, on a criterion-based approach to his associative typology, 
using a statistical perspective to reinterpret the "types" assigned by 
Jung to the participants in the first Burgholzli experiment on the 
associations of normal subjects. 
The family dimension, expl ored in the present study, is certainly 
not the final theme worthy of exploration in Jung's earliest 
publication on verbal associative behavior. The interface between 
verbal association and visual imagery, which underlies his article like 
a structural support, is one element which lends itself to experimental 
investigation. Longitudinal work, such as that done by Jung with 
subjects 19 and 24 of his initial experiment, might serve to 
demonstrate the stability of reaction-type over time, thus opening 
toward a study of personality in which the word association test might 
conceivably be correlated with such tests as the Myers-Briggs Type 
Indicator. 
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But even within the bounds of the family research begun in this 
study, much more remains to be done to establish reliable and 
statistically valid baselines for the associative behavior of family 
members. This work is, in essence, preliminary; it was intended to 
provide the experimenter with experience in techniques of 
administration and analysis of the word association test that can be 
used in subsequent work with larger populations and a more adequate 
statistical design. Perhaps the most valuable result of the present 
work is the quantification of the Jung-Riklin classification system, in 
its hierarchical arrangement reflecting decreasing tension in logical 
relatedness between stimulus and response; the coding scale presented 
in this chapter can be used in computer-assisted analysis of response 
patterns, although it must await validity and reliability testing 
before its use can be too widely generalized. 
In terms of the response patterns evidenced in this study, an 
analysis of variance should still be done in order to isolate the 
meaning of the small differences which appeared in this sample between 
related and unrelated individuals. Significance tests should be 
performed on the correlational averages to determine whether a 
difference of four points between related and unrelated individuals is 
meaningful, assuming that correlational averages themselves represent a 
meaningful way of ascertaining levels of difference. And comparison of 
sample response frequencies with normative associative frequencies 
ought also to be done. 
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Assuming, for the rroment, that the difference between family and 
the general population proves to be insignificant from a strictly 
statistical perspective, the establishment of that fact in itself might 
be of tremendous importance in the future work to which this study is 
only a prologue. As mentioned in the introduction, this project was 
conceived to follow in the tradition of the Burgholzli doctors, who 
looked first at psychometric patterns of normal subjects before 
beginning clinical work with pathologically disturbed individuals. In 
this paradigm, the small--and perhaps statistically insignificant--
difference between related and nonrelated individuals in this sample 
might be indicative of the level at which a "family factor" operates 
within a normal population. The difference might be found to increase, 
perhaps, in dysfunctional family groups whose thought and behavior are 
distinguished by pathological enmeshment, to the point that "family 
resemblance" becomes a problem. 
SUch a new hypothesis, however, belongs rrore properly to a 
subseqent phase of research. What renEins to be examined here, 
however, are the implications of the rrost striking result to emerge 
from the present findings: that there is a rroderately strong 
correlation between preference for predication on the word association 
test, and greater numbers of errors on a test of deductive reasoning. 
This finding seems to support Jung's theory, described in Chapter 3, 
that there is interference between the two cognitive functions he 
called "thinking" and "feeling." The metacognitive implications of 
this finding will be discussed in the chapter which follows. 
CHAPTER V 
IMPLICATIONS FOR METACOGNITIVE PRAXIS 
When Aristotle taught his course on reasoning, which became 
codified from his lecture notes in the five books of the Organon, his 
point of departure was predication: the categories of being, quality, 
attribute and action which may be asserted of any object. With the 
mastery of categorical assertion, the student of his method would have 
all the tools necessary to construct propositions, predicative 
statements with truth value, and would be ready to combine propositions 
in such a way as to deduce from what was stated some other, ungiven 
truth. Clearly, it was his experience that thinkers could move on from 
one stage to the next, although the step may have seemed neither 
natural nor easy at first; but indeed, as the evidence of this study 
suggests, it is just this movement, the transcendence of the static 
proposition with its truthful given, that the individual who prefers 
predication seems less inclined than others to make. 
There is much in Aristotle's approach to language and logic that 
would inform a modern discussion of "critical thinking skills;" but 
unfortunately, the rigorous beauty of his system has been undervalued 
in recent times, perhaps because of the historical overemphasis on 
method which has rendered the deductive syllogism an empty exercise 
(Baron, 1985, Ennis, 1987), perhaps because of an intellectual bias 
within American education which values innovation over continuity. 
Nevertheless, the practice of deduction, and of judging deductive 
conclusions, is a major component of what Robert Ennis, of the Illinois 
Critical Thinking Project, has termed "critical thinking ability;" and 
many of those who are currently part of the educational IIX)Vement in 
critical thinking might be somewhat surprised to learn that their new 
approach to thinking has very old antecedents indeed. 
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"Critical thinking," as Ennis defines it, is "a practical 
reflective activity that has reasonable belief or action as its goal" 
(1987, p. 10). It implies not only the operation of a set of methods, 
but also a particular disposition toward reason and reflection, a 
personal attitude which values clarity, order, flexibility, open-
mindedness, and an analytical approach to information. The result of 
this alliance between method and disposition is reasonable belief, an 
opinion which can stand the test of argument to the contrary, and which 
serves as the basis for reasonable decisions and actions. 
Ennis' criteria for the critical attitude bear striking 
resemblance to the characteristics attributed by C.G. Jung to the 
thinking disposition in his 1921 IIX)nograph Psychological Types. But 
Jung's discussion of the positive aspects associated with the thinking 
function was balanced by an assessment of those qualities which might 
militate against the development of critical thinking ability in an 
individual; these qualities are the foundation of what he called the 
"feeling" disposition, an approach to information which is rooted in 
the inmediacy of predication. 
Vygotsky's developmental work (1986) has provided a theoretical 
framework within which predication can be seen as the permanent residue 
of childhood's egocentric speech patterns, and the natural IIX)de of an 
individual's "inner speech." He suggests that it becomes externalized 
as a IIX)de of corrmunication with others only within closed systems whose 
members are all engaged in a single frame of reference. Brown (1958b) 
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speaks tellingly of the shaping influence a parent's predications may 
have on the world-view of a child, leading to the formation of 
attitudes or prejudices which may seem appropriate in context of the 
family system, but may clash with the values of the collective society. 
Laing (1972) goes so far as to suggest that a habit of evaluative 
predication within a household can have disastrous longterm effects on 
the child's self-concept and ability to think. 
An individual who has been overnourished on predicates, then, may 
come to a course in critical thinking skills with a background which 
predisposes him to fail. All the hallmarks of what Jonathan Baron 
calls "poor thinking" (Baron, 1985) are in evidence in the predicative 
attitude: a need for certainty, an overconfidence in the irrmediacy of 
sensory data, a preference for delimited possibility, an unwillingness 
to examine opinion, a belief that "t hinking" is difficult or useless. 
Predication is, by its nature , a hedge agai nst ambiguity, a form of 
categorical and determinate negation; it rules out multiple 
possibilities and alternatives , and i t s concrete specificity is the 
very opposite of t he abstraction which is required for reflective 
thought. 
Baron's work on rational i ty and intell i gence has included a study 
of factors which might inhib i t the processes of critical thought. 
Paramount among these forces are personal attitudes and values which 
are developed in the home and reinforced by the socio-cultural norms 
which operate in an individual's environment; he is explicit in his 
recognition of the potential for family attitudes to sabotage a 
teacher's efforts to cultivate rational thinking skills. A child who 
exhibits what may appear to be resistance or "mental laziness" when 
given sorre critical thinking task in a classroom might actually be 
manifesting the dynamic of a vast alternative system of thought, a 
rationality with rules and methods of its own which may violate the 
rules of academic rationality, but are no less adapted to the 
circumstances of that child's world than formal logic might be to the 
world of the academician. 
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Sensitivity to such background paradigms is an essential component 
in any attempt to make logical methods attractive to individuals whose 
rationality runs by other rules. The opinions and attitudes 
characteristic of the predicative, or to use Jung's term, the feeling, 
disposition, are not evidence of "irrmature" thinking, which can be 
developed through casual instruction in method. They may rather be the 
products of a fully-developed form of thought which operates by 
criteria equally "critical" as those by which "critical thinking" 
proceeds, and as such, may require a massive transformation in order 
for the rules of academic rationality to begin to operate. 
Not without cause did Jung designate feeling as a "rational" 
function, since reason, ratio, is, in its essence, the predication of 
relationship. Thinking operates with the relationships between 
concepts, with the coordination of abstractions; feeling operates with 
relationships between values, through an association of attributes 
which are grasped at the level of concrete reality. As preferred ways 
of relating to the data of the environment, both deserve understanding 
and tolerance, but only the former is accepted within the educational 
corrmunity, and the latter is often made to suffer unnecessarily through 
teaching and testing methods which assume that there is, by definition, 
only one right way to think. 
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Luria's series of "anti-cartesian experiments" in Soviet Central 
Asia (1979) revealed the fundamental ethnocentrism inherent in such an 
attitude toward thinking. He connected the ability to "reason," in the 
critical sense, with prior experience of systematic instruction in 
grammar. Simple premises and predications which reflect the known 
world are, he found, quite adequate in primary socio-cultural 
conditions. It is only when external circumstances require the 
movement l:leyond the concrete that abstract reasoning l:lecomes at all 
useful. 
One need not go abroad to discover that critical thinking may l:le 
neither useful nor desirable within certain communities, but Luria's 
point as to the interconnection l:letween language and logic is profound, 
and in some respects, subversive of the established educational order 
in this society. Seen in its light, the current movement in teaching 
"critical thinking skills" may l:le little more than an elaborate form of 
damage control for the failure of the educational establishment to 
maintain appropriate standards of instruction in the fonna.lities of 
language at the primary and secondary leve1.l 
Put another way, the laudable goals of critical thinking programs 
would l:lenefit from a systematic approach to language, of the kind that 
Aristotle himself outlined in his methods course. It is significant 
that he chose to devote so much attention--two complete books--to the 
process of predication and the construction of well-formed 
propositions, l:lefore moving to the more arcane matters of deduction, 
dialectic and paradox. The same sequence might l:le helpful to the 
individual of feeling disposition, when he is faced with the necessity 
of learning to think critically. It is an approach which values the 
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predicate, which establishes itself firmly in the known universe, which 
allows for the statement of a truth, and permits a moment of rest in 
the security of the given. It is just this safety and groundedness 
that a predicate type individual may need, before he is launched into 
the troubled waters of critical thinking. But program.sin "critical 
thinking" often begin with the premise that relativity is better than 
certainty, that authority must be repudiated, that judgrnent--the 
guiding faculty of the feeling function - -must be suspended, demands 
which may well be too abrupt and too dislocating for the predicative 
disposition. 
A negative experience of the process of "learning to think" may 
guarantee the foreclosure of an individual's option to develop the 
thinking function. But if such damage at the hands of undoubtedly 
well-rneaning instructors can be avoided, however, the natural dynamics 
of psychological equilibrium can assist the feeling individual in the 
development of his thinking function. The opposing, or as Jung terms 
it, the inferior, function of thinking holds an enormous fascination 
for the person of feeling disposition, precisely because it is 
underdeveloped. It is the missing piece of his cognitive puzzle, and 
represents all the undiscovered potential of his future development. 
But because the operational criteria of thinking and feeling are 
mutually opposed, they cannot be forced to coexist, and Jung warns 
against any attempt to approach the inferior function directly. He 
suggests instead a method of development which will enlist the support 
of one of the perceptual functions, sensation or intuition, in helping 
the individual learn to shift safely and comfortably from one 
information-processing mode to the other. 
Even so handled, however, the transition is not an easy one to 
make. The cognitive habits of a lifetime are difficult to alter, and 
even if the process begins in childhood, it may be forced to work 
against the linguistic and cognitive preferences of the family system, 
the distillation of cumulative lifetimes, generations of cognitive 
habit. SUch work may of necessity go beyond the limits of formal 
education, and into the ultimate realm of metacognitive praxis, 
psychological analysis. 
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Rather than recognizing its own appropriate boundaries, however, 
education has tended to take upon itself the role that properly belongs 
to analysis. Classical psychoanalytic theory, with all its doctrinal 
overtones, underlies the "critical thinking" approach to a remarkable 
degree.2 Richard Paul, of the Center for Critical Thinking at Sonoma 
State University, for example, makes an argument for the development of 
thinking skills which stems directly from the Freudian paradigm. 
People have a primary and secondary nature, he declares, the former 
egocentric, irrational, opinionated and defensive, the latter "an 
implicit capacity to function as rational persons" (Paul, 1987, p. 
130), an innate tendency which requires diligent and systematic 
practice in order to succeed in its task of recognizing and correcting 
the inadequacies of the primary nature. The goal of this work is the 
development of "a passion to seek reasons and evidence," Paul says, and 
any instruction which does not foster this evidentiary and 
discriminative rationality does not, in his view, deserve the name of 
education. 
Although Paul's argument stresses the importance of dialectical 
(his term is "dialogical") process in breaking down the irrationality 
of "egocentric identifications," his solution to the problem of one 
form of rronolithic thinking is the substitution of another, equally 
monolithic form, just as Freud's answer to the vitality of the primary 
process was the repression of the secondary process. Given such a 
framework, the praise Paul bestows on the ability to enter 
sympathetically into the "mind set" of another has a somewhat hollow 
ring; such cognitive rapprochement can only take place on the 
playing-field of systematic rationality, a field on which not everyone 
may be equally suited to play. 
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While Paul, Baron, Ennis and others in the critical thinking world 
have stressed the superiority of rational thinking and the critical 
point of view, a second stream of cognitive theory recognizes the 
existence, and value, of "multiple intelligences," operating with modes 
of perception and information-processing which are quite distinct from 
the bipolar rational/irrational dichotomy of mainline critical thinking 
theory. The diversity with which human beings approach the data of the 
world is celebrated in Howard Gardner's Frames of Mind (Gardner, 1983), 
in a way which is compatable with Jung's theory of functional typology. 
Drawing on research in the neurophysiological and biological 
fields which had earlier established the theory of hemispheric 
dominance in cognition, Gardner suggests that every individual has 
access to seven independent forms of information processing, and that 
each individual's cognitive profile is a result of the specific 
combination he makes of these distinct "intelligences." Logico-
mathematical intelligence is one of the possible modes in which an 
individual may prefer to function; linguistic intelligence is another. 
Historically, the assessment of "intelligence" has depended on measures 
198 
of skill in these two areas, yet five other domains, equal in 
importance, which Gardner identifies as musical, spatial, kinesthetic, 
interpersonal, and intrapersonal intelligences, have been neglected and 
devalued by the educational establishment, and individuals whose 
natural combination of functions inclines them to one of these 
unrecognized intelligences have been ill-served by an overemphasis on 
the systematic rationality of linguistic and logical ability. 
Gardner's sensitivity to alternative modes of cognition is 
reminiscent of Jung's theoretical challenge to the Freudian concept of 
unidimensional rationality.3 Both theories emphasize the variability 
of perception, the relative importance of sensation and abstraction, of 
matter and of form, of pattern and relationship; both stress that the 
cognitive system depends on the interplay of a number of different 
functions, each attuned to a different dimension of reality, each 
operating with its own rules of analysis and synthesis. Jung's feeling 
disposition might find its home i n Gardner's "spatial intelligence," 
with its concern for the visual world ; or again, in the "interpersonal 
intelligence" of Gardner's theory, with its caring discernment of mood 
and atmosphere. 
A child of feeling disposition , i f offered such options to develop 
his natural inclinations in his early years, might then be able to 
approach the tasks of logical thought from a position of strength, and 
come with an open mind to the beauty and clarity of systematic 
thinking. SUch an individual, forced prematurely or without adequate 
preparation into the strait-jacket of logico-linguistic structure, on 
the other hand, is certain to develop an aversion for rational thought 
from which he may never recover. 
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The key to discovering the mode of one's natural inclination, as 
Jung suggests, lies in the patterning of everyday language, in the 
preference for a particular kind of associative relationship, and in 
the clusters of ideas that constellate around the sounds and rneanings 
of words. But a question arises as to the origin of that "natural" 
disposition: that which has become so automatized and habituated as to 
seem natural may in fact, he suggests, be the product of speech 
patterns instilled in childhood by the language habits of parents; and 
far from serving the purposes of natural development, may hinder the 
development of one or more of his four "intelligences," to use 
Gardner's elegant expression. 
The effect of language on attitude has been recognized by scholars 
and practitioners of the art of rhetoric at least since the days of 
Aristotle. But its influence on an individual's nental health and 
stability may be somewhat less obvious. Whorf was among those who have 
pointed out the etiological role of language in the compulsion of 
neurotic behavior. Bateson's work with schizophrenogenic families 
suggests that cognitive processes can actually break down under 
repeated violation of the metalogical and metalinguistic rules of 
conmunication, when interaction among family members creates a context 
in which the formal aspect of the message is at variance with its 
verbal content. 
Language abused may lead to cognitive dysfunction, and provides 
the means through which symptoms of the dysfunction are conveyed as 
well. The distinctive speech patterns of schizophrenia, for example, 
as Bateson suggests, can be compared to a conflation of predicates in a 
syllogism: where normal thought rroves through the predicates to a 
conclusion, the schizophrenic will draw a relationship of equality 
between the predicates and remain trapped in his own fictitious 
identification, unable to rrove beyond his distorted recombination of 
the given. 
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While the overt symptoms of cognitive dysfunction may be 
manifested by a single individual, both Bateson and Laing agree that 
the entire family, the system itself, is the living source of the 
dysfunction. This was Jung's view as well, as can be seen from his 
early writings on the family, and although his own therapeutic career 
was spent in working with individuals on the end-results of their 
attempts to adapt to the experience of family interaction, a number of 
innovative clinical psychologists working in South Africa and in London 
have recently l::egun to take the Jungian concept of collective 
patterning directly into t herapeutic work with dysfunctional families 
(Papadopoulos and Saayman, 1989). 
It is not to be expected that examples of pathological conformity, 
such as the one discussed by Jung (see Chapter 3), would have been 
found in the sample population of the present study of verbal 
associative behavior in normal families. It would be equally mistaken, 
however, to deny on the basis of the present sample that such cases 
exist. Future investigation may indeed discover that evaluative 
predication is at the heart of such systemic dysfunction, as Jung's 
clinical work indicated, and as Laing of the Tavistock Clinic also 
seems to suggest. 
In the clinical setting, the word association test may take on new 
significance and open new avenues of approach to systemic dysfunction, 
and the maladaptation of personal "types" to one another. No longer of 
"merely theoretical importance," as Jung himself had described it in 
his Clark University lecture of 1909, verbal association within 
families may serve as a practical technique for revealing cognitive 
similarities at the systemic level which exert an influence on 
individual thought and behavior. 
Further experimental work with normal families, building on the 
work begun in this study, may succeed in establishing reliable 
parameters within which normal associations may be expected to 
coincide, parameters which can serve as a baseline against which 
abnormal processes may be contrasted. One might speculate that, given 
an appropriately designed instrument,4 pathologies of identification, 
the paralyzing possession of unconscious role-playing, the destructive 
dynamics of the dysfunctional family drama, all might come to light, 
and be shown to differ from the patterns and levels of agreement found 
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in normal families such as those of the present study. The themes and 
images which emerge from a group association test in the clinical 
setting may offer powerful evidence of the collective patterns which 
structure the interactions of the group, indeed perhaps the most 
compelling evidence that can be brought to light, for as Jung himself 
found, beneath the phenomenon of the association is the gramnar of 
thought itself, the deep-lying structure of relationship to which the 
word is a most eloquent and honest witness. 
The exposure of patterns--of language, of thought, of behavior--is 
the essence of any rnetacognitive work, and the precondition for any 
process of conceptual change, whether it take place in the context of 
education, as in Bateson's vision of "secondary learning," "learning to 
learn," or in the realm of therapeutic analysis. Both approaches are 
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transformative of the quality of thought itself; both have recourse to 
the trerrendous restorative power that is released through clarity of 
thought and insight into underlying order. Jung's theory of cognitive 
functions suggests that an individual's mental health requires a 
balance between the thinking and feeling functions, but the development 
of the ideal state of cognitive harrrony can only be achieved by a 
struggle against the tension of these two opposing forces. 
For many people, the struggle may seem too difficult to engage; 
for others, the educational system itself may serve as an impediment to 
the struggle. The individual who prefers "thinking," who is encouraged 
to explore the world through logical rationality and who excels in the 
tasks of academia, may find himself lost at some point in his life, 
isolated by an impoverished feeling function. The predicative 
personality, who may begin life with a disadvantage as regards 
thinking, may be confirmed in his intuition that he "can't" think 
rationally by unfeeling teachers, and go through life without once 
experiencing the satisfying clarity of systematic thought. And 
unfortunately, for the development of the whole personality, the 
feeling individual, who is the one most critically in need of 
developing the thinking function, may be the one most resistant to it 
as well. 
For the student who comes from a family whose thought is 
overdetermined by evaluative judgments, or worse, from a dysfunctional 
household where nothing is clear or secure, critical rationality may 
not be an irrmediately acceptable alternative. On the other hand, the 
cultivation of the thinking function may be such a child's best defense 
against becoming overwhelmed by the emotional chaos of the household. 
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Strengthening the thinking function may be seen as literally a matter 
of life and death, requiring the utrnost sensitivity and professionalism 
on the part of the teacher, or therapist, into whose presence such a 
child may come. 
As Baron and others have suggested, prior to critical skill is 
critical attitude, a sense of security with rational analysis, the 
questioning of assumptions, the sequence of cause and effect, which 
cannot be effectively transmitted by a teacher who is insecure within 
the framework of his own system of thought. If, on the other hand, he 
is too rigid, too much under the domination of his own "thinking" 
function, his lack of feeling may alienate those who have the rnost to 
learn from him. What is needed is a process of mutual interchange, 
mutual influence and mutual development; for while the predicative 
student is at the task of learning to think, t he thinking pedagogue 
might learn something about values and sensory realities from the 
feeling individual. 
Genuine human development requires more of education than that 
everyone should become a systematic logician. But by the same token, 
everyone should be allowed to have a positive experience of reasoning, 
to enjoy the refreshing clarity of formal logical thought, which, even 
when it enters the "critical thinking" curriculum, is preceded by 
abject apology and left behind with great relief by teachers and 
students alike. It is no wonder, given its historical treatment, that 
logic is looked upon as anxiety-provoking by the vast majority. It is 
too often introduced without adequate preparation, without groundwork 
of the kind--to return to the Aristotelian metaphor with which this 
chapter opened--that Aristotle so carefully laid in his courses. 
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The predicament involved in developing the thinking function of 
the predicative personality is not one which can be addressed easily. 
It is not a matter for some new prescriptive pedagogy or curriculum 
unit. It cannot be achieved by the formulation of more slogans, 
acronyms and devices to assist students to remember discrete critical 
procedures or operations of thought. The differentiation of a critical 
consciousness out of the matrix of an unexamined life can hardly be 
scripted, since it is, in and of itself, the creation of a unique human 
individual, one who comes to the process with a unique set of 
experiences, understandings, values and patterns of reaction to both 
language and the environment. 
Any true educational process--and under this rubric psychoanalysis 
is also to be included--must take into account the tremendous variety 
of cognitive habit or disposition in which individuals present 
themselves, and rather than imposing a strict template on everyone, 
must begin with the strength of the individual--the preferred 
"intelligence," in Gardner's sense, the personal learning style, the 
personal typology discovered by C.G. Jung. 
The capacity for critical consciousness exists to some degree in 
everyone, no matter how primitive, or how damaged, his background, as 
Luria's fieldwork and Jung's psychiatric research so tellingly 
revealed. The challenge for educators is to cultivate the thinking 
faculty in a sensitive, positive and non-threatening way, related to 
the patterns of development each individual has brought from his own 
background, keeping in mind the fact that those backgrounds may be 
overdetermined with predicative value judgments and an aversion to the 
labor required for "thinking." Individuals from those backgrounds may 
not be ready to move on in "critical thinking" as quickly as someone 
from a more objective, thinking-oriented household--but the educator 
who abandons the slow one or the resistant one with a poor grade in 
"reasoning skill" has failed in his own mission, and compounded the 
problem as well. 
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The operation needed in this work is a gentle and compassionate 
leading out from the limitations of the habit of judging--not a 
judgmental or dismissive confrontation of them, or a slick and facile 
exposure of their inadequacy, their "incorrectness." It moves with the 
laws of logic, not through dictation in an unrelated and rigid fashion, 
or through meaningless and nonsensical exercises, but in a living, 
organic way. Most people never see a syllogism in the entire course of 
their lives--but they live with them on a continuous basis. It is 
perfectly legitimate, therefore, to wonder "why" one should study logic 
as long as its ultimate use remains a mystery, as it almost invariably 
does in the course of formal ins truction, even instruction in "critical 
thinking." 
But the fact is that logic is as much about revealing premises as 
it is about drawing conclusions. The process of forward motion through 
the terms of a deductive syllogism may be next to useless for the 
purposes of most people's daily lives. But beneath every predication, 
every value judgment, every prejudice, may lurk a universal premise, an 
archetypal patterning of the individual's conceptual universe which 
will exercise its ruthless power until it can be exposed, through a 
"reversal" of the normal direction through which logic is conducted. 
such a forward-and-backward running approach meets the learner on 
his own ground, as Plato and his student Aristotle would have done, and 
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works with his language, his conceptual world, the patterns of reaction 
that are evidenced in the interchange of language between two people, 
the one revealing, the other discerning, listening, questioning, then 
himself revealing, in a dynamic and living rhythm which allows the 
other to discern, and learn to discern, for himself. The rnoment in 
which pattern is discovered between them--pattern in behavior, in 
language, in thought--is the moment of liberation from its tyranny. 
The only tool the work requires is language: the material in which the 
dysfunction is revealed is also the source of its transcendence. The 
method is the dialectic.5 
Aristotle's focus on the language of predication may be--as he 
himself no doubt realized--the best starting point for the development 
of skill in reasoning. His extraordinary care for the precision of 
language served as the foundation on which the critical consciousness 
of Western civilization for the following two thousand years was 
constructed. Perhaps he understood, better than we do today, that 
imprecise formulations of thought, clothed in inadequate terminology, 
can impede the operation of clear and coherent reason. But he knew as 
well that in dialogue, through speech--dialexis--language can be 
reshaped to a more adequate representation of reality, fostering a more 
adequate adaptation to the necessity of circumstance. And perhaps he 
might have glimpsed its healing power as well, its power to constellate 
order out of chaos, to channel the force of emotion along networks of 
associations arranged and rearranged in such a way as to mitigate harm. 
we could do worse, at the end of our rnillenium, than take another 
look at the fundamental approach to thinking bequeathed to us from a 
past that valued reason as the quintessential attribute of the free 
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individual, a reason tempered with feeling and with sense, devoted to 
the task of individual and social development. Perhaps through the 
ancient approach to human reason, we might rediscover in language the 
mediating principle between individual and system, mind and society. A 
change in language, as Wharf said, can transform our appreciation of 
the CosmJs; it may serve as well as the source of both psychological 
and ecological harmony. 
NOTES 
Introduction. 
lsir Francis Galton's work with composite portraiture was reported in 
his Inquiries into Human Faculty and its JJevelopment (1907) , and is 
discussed by Brown (1958b, p. 87-88), and Anglin (1977, p. 11), where 
it is cited as an argument for the existence of conceptual 
"prototypes." Jung (1971) uses Galton's work as an analogy for his 
sketches of the psychological types; Vygotsky (1986) also mentions it, 
and says it cannot serve as an adequate model for the process of 
concept formation. 
2Jung's initial experiment is reported in "The Associations of Normal 
subjects," coauthored by Franz Riklin (Jung, 1973). Furst's work was 
translated as "Statistical Investigations on Word Association and on 
Familial Agreement in Reaction Type Among Uneducated SUbjects" (Jung, 
1918). Jung's lectures at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, 
were published as "The Association Method" and "The Family 
Constellation" (Jung, 1973). By modem statistical standards, these 
works would be considered qualitative in nature, since they do not go 
beyond work with means and standard deviations. This is not a 
criticism of the level of analysis pursued in these texts; more 
advanced statistical methodology was not available at the time. 
3The theory of multiple intelligences is the work of Howard Gardner 
(1983). Primary and secondary process thinking were first proposed by 
Freud (1950) in 1900. Piaget's theories of the development of logic 
are discussed in Gardner's history of the structuralist movement 
(1973). Dispositional bias is discussed in Baron (1985). The 
predicative nature of inner speech is described by both Vygotsky (1978, 
1986) and Luria (1982). 
4This is not, of course, to suggest t hat conformity represents the 
only form of pathology, or that conformity is in and of itself 
pathological. Jung's psychiatric focus, however , was on the pathology 
of conformity, imitation and identification (see Chapter 3), and it is 
my personal interest as well. 
5The work of Sabina Spielrein has been studied by Carotenuto (1982) 
and Bettelheirn (1983), and is also discussed in the Freud-Jung 
correspondence (1974). Alexander Luria began his psychological career 
with a fervent devotion to the ideas contained in Jung's word 
association articles, as he attests in his memoirs (1979). 
Chapter I. 
lM.D. Eder suggested, in the introduction to his translation of the 
Burgholzli Studies in Word Association (1918), that Jung had derived 
the insights leading to his conceptions of the persona and the 
collective unconscious from his work with the word associations of 
families. The linguistic dimension of the collective unconscious has 
been explored in depth by Papadopoulos (1980, 1984) and Kugler (1982). 
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2The controversy between Platonic and Aristotelian viewpoints is 
apparently still raging in the fields of psycholinguistics and 
cognitive psychology, as can be seen from a number of articles in Simon 
and Scholes (1982). 
3Freud is actually discussing the "abnormal" process of condensation 
in this passage, but it may be seen as merely an intensification of the 
normal process of concept formation. 
4There may be variations in the process which might be accounted for 
by the concept of "labelling" with reference to the links of an 
associative network. 
5These bits of information are, of course, the categories of 
Aristotelian logic. The term "predication" itself comes from Boethius' 
sixth-century Latin translation of Aristotle's categories, a treatise 
on the formation and analysis of simple propositions. There is much in 
Anderson's approach that is reminiscent of the Aristotelian system; the 
"cognitive revolution," in fact, seems to have gone to great 
intellectual and technical lengths to restore a mode of analysis that 
would have been perfectly accessible, despite its inelegant computer-
inspired expression, to the logically trained minds of the classical 
age. 
6cognitive psychologist carol Smith suggests that infants, as well as 
children of the age discussed by Brown, are capable of conceptual 
abstraction. 
7carey (1988) argues that this process involves not only 
differentiations, but also "coalescences," which lead to the formation 
of superordinate category conceptions in young children. 
8These "late syntagrnatic" responses may be characteristic of the 
"predicate type" respondent observed by Jung, Riklin and Furst in their 
work with the associations of adults; see below, Chapter 4. It seems 
as though the developmental sequence is not a strict one; young 
children can evidence "mature" ordinate, subordinate and superordinate 
responses, and adults can persist in the predication which is 
characteristic of children. The process may be one of a successive 
relocation of emphasis, rather than an evolution of the capacity to 
associate in specific categories. 
Chapter. II. 
lrt is significant that Saussure's associative complexes are not 
hierarchically arranged, as are those of the later structuralist 
psychologists, such as Deese and Pollio (see Chapter I). Further on 
the construction of Saussure's complexes, see Kugler (1982). 
2The therapeutic implications of this theory were not lost on Whorf; 
see, for example, the passage in one of his late essays, "Language, 
Mind and Reality (Whorf, 1956, p. 269): "neuroses are simply the 
compulsive working over of word systems, from which the patient can be 
freed by showing him the process and the pattern." Wharf's writing 
abounds with references to the theoretical work of Jung, which must 
have had a profound effect on his own psychological vie-wpoint. 
3saussure's influence on the Russian formalists, who in turn 
influenced both Vygotsky and Luria, is traced by Jameson (1972). 
Vygotsky makes explicit reference to the work of Sapir in at least one 
of his books (1986). Luria (1982) mentions a critique of the 
Sapir-Whorf theory, but does not develop it at length. The position 
taken by Vygotsky on the social origin of language is, of course, the 
opposite to that espoused by Piaget. 
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4Both Vygotsky and Luria emphasize a great deal in their writings; I 
have chosen not to replicate all their underlinings, in the belief that 
they would rather distract attention than enhance it. 
5For a ITXJre recent view of this process, see carey (1988). 
Chapter III. 
lThis connection was explored in a previous study, "C.G. Jung's 
Diagnostic Association Studies: A Cognitive Perspective," (unpublished, 
1990). The levels of processing theory was first enunciated in an 
article by Craik and Lockhart (1972) and is unique aITXJng cognitive 
models in that it does not rely on a computer analogy to explain the 
functioning of the human mind. 
2Jung and Riklin proposed t he existence of six reaction types in all, 
of which three were varieties of t he complex type. 
3Jung's adult subjects who were found t o prefer predication might 
possibly be described by Entwisle (1966) as those who have made a shift 
back to "late syntagmatics." 
4Educational level seems to have been t he distinguishing factor 
between these two objective types. uneducated people responded with 
value-neutral ordinates and definitions; educated objective types 
responded with more linguistically-advanced reactions. Jung's 
subsequent research suggests that the preference for a reaction type is 
stable over time; see for example, his longitudinal study of Subjects 
19 and 23. However, it is at least implied that formal education may 
play a role in changing a reaction type, and that emotional disturbance 
may temporarily transform an otherwise objective individual into a 
"complex" type. 
5That Jung used his writing as a method of resolving his complexes 
was suggested by his wife Ermna, in a letter to Freud of Nov. 6, 1911 
(Freud and Jung, 1974, p. 456); the application of the term 
"self-analysis" is that of Papadopoulos (1980, p. 244). 
6Transformations and Symbols of the Libido was later substantially 
rewritten and appears in the collected works of Jung as Symbols of 
Transformation (1956). In the interest of historical consistency, I 
have used the 1912 version in this work. Vygotsky (1986) traces the 
polarity between "directed" and "non-directed" thinking to 
psychoanalytic theory by way of Eugen Bleuler's theory of "autistic 
thinking;" Bleuler was the director of the Burgholzli Hospital at the 
time of Jung's psychiatric research. Ultimately, the distinction may 
go back to the psychology of Plato (Republic, Book 4, 439D). 
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7Jung singles out the training in dialectical logic fostered by the 
scholastic philosophers during the medieval period of Western 
civilization as particularly noteworthy in this historical evolution of 
directed thinking. 
8rn the later version of this work, Jung expanded this section to 
include an argument to the effect that both world-views, that of the 
rational and of the fantasy process, were equally grounded in 
psychological reality, and thus were equally valid. 
9An example of this irrational process of conceptual coordination 
might be the "bisociation" process of creativity discussed by Koestler 
(1964). Much of the current "right/left brain" literature might also 
find a place in this discussion. 
lOrhe differentiation between what is to be accepted and what is to 
be rejected is the criterion in the operation of ancient Stoic logic, 
which arose as a challenge to the methods of the Aristotelian school. 
Jung does not discuss the body of Stoic literature, but it would be 
interesting to trace his analysis of thinking and feeling through the 
fundamental philosophical opposition showed by the Stoics to the 
Peripatetics. On Stoic logic, see Mates (1973) and Rist (1978). 
Jung's theory of the four functions has classical antecedents as well, 
in the four stages of cognition presented in the Platonic "allegory of 
the line" (Republic, Book 6, 509D and following), which influenced 
Western philosophy both directly and through the works of the 
Neoplatonists, including Porphyry and Boethius. 
llThis is a point that has been made by James Hillman (von Franz and 
Hillman, 1971). 
12Jung attributes this statement to his director, Dr. Eugen Bleuler. 
13prior to publication, Jung sent Dr. Furst's manuscript to Freud; it 
is clear from his remarks in his letter that he was rrK)re interested in 
the adaptation of statistical methodology to his complex theory than in 
any particular aspect of family behavior. Freud's reply focuses 
entirely on Furst's analysis of individual psychology, and says nothing 
about the family dimension (Freud and Jung, p. 66ff). Although 
Papadopoulos and Saayman (1989) make an eloquent case for the depth of 
Jung's interest in the family, it does not seem to be in evidence in 
this correspondence. En1na Furst remained with the Freudians after 
Jung's split in 1913. 
14rhe coefficient of difference between this pair was 0.5, 
considerably lower than any of the pairs tested in the present 
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experiment, and almost certainly pathological. Further on the 
contaminating effect of the predicate type, see Jung, "The Significance 
of the Father in the Destiny of the Individual" (1961). Freud 
discusses cases of such close psychological engagement as examples of 
telepathy in his lecture on "Dreams and Occultism" (Freud, 1965). 
15Further on this concept, see Bateson on the phenomenology of 
analogic communication (1972), and Vygotsky's analysis of animal 
corrmunication: "a frightened goose ... does not tell the others what it 
has seen but rather contaminates them with its fear" (1986, p. 7). 
Such is the mechanism of empathetic engagement. It is the absolute 
antithesis of thinking: rational, fantasy, critical, creative, or 
otherwise, and belongs with the phenomena of participation mystique 
studied by Jung in their psychotic manifestations. The ancients 
recognized its danger: they called it bewitchment, or possession by a 
god, and did not dare to invoke its effects casually. We with our 
lofty theories of creativity are not nearly so wise as were they. 
Chapter rv. 
lQuite a number of individuals asked if they could participate, in 
fact, including friends and roommates of adult children living out of 
town. One participant in the study suggested that the word association 
test would make a wonderful parlour game for families and friends 
alike, and ought to be marketed as such. The sheer fun people had with 
it was an unexpected outcome of the experiment. 
2Specific familial intersections are as follows: Family 4's first 
daughter is the parental companion (pc) of Family 5; Family 4's oldest 
son is the father of Dyad 13. Family 7's first daughter is the mother 
of Family 9; the fourth daughter is the wife of Dyad 12. Families 8 
and 9 are, in point of fact, collections of related dyads rather than 
families; however, their long-term social closeness seemed to justify 
the inclusion of inlaws as family rrembers in some aspects of the 
analysis. in the analysis of related against unrelated individuals, 
these members of extended families were excluded from the calculation. 
3Reaction-tirne data is not part of the analysis presented in this 
report, but was taken in 21 cases and is available for future study. 
Reaction-time is a significant factor· in the analysis of individual 
responses, but was not considered by Furst in her work with the 
associations of families. 
4A1terations of the Brill version of Jung's stimulus list are as 
follows. One represents a choice of Jung's original word over Brill's 
substitution (no.78, frernd, strange, given as "friend" in the Brill 
list). Four instances (no. 32, 43, 52, and 81) are alternative 
translations of the German original, and two others (no. 62, 94) are 
words which represent a related, although not identical, concept. In 
the case of the five remaining alterations, (no. 36, "play," no. 40, 
"ride," no. 85, "dog," no. 89, "fire," and no. 100, "talk," instead of 
"die," "pray," "stork," "bride," and "abuse," respectively), substitute 
words were chosen from the original Jung-Riklin list and inserted at 
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points where the pattern of stimulus-words might be likely to touch on 
or exacerbate an emotional complex. If it were the purpose of the test 
to explore individual psychology, then any complexes associated with 
each of the deleted words could adequately be revealed by responses to 
other related words on the list. Since this was not the purpose, 
however, it was decided to lighten the list in the areas of religion, 
sex, birth, death and violence represented by those five stimulus 
words, and to offer more neutral terms instead. In particular, it was 
thought to be highly inappropriate in context of the present experiment 
to end a list of terms to be read to children with the stimulus-word 
"abuse." 
5These principles of classification are as follows: 
1. All opposites and antonyms, substantive or adjectival, are 
classified as contrasts (external responses). 
2. All implied opposites which are substantive (where no true 
opposite is possible, e.g. "brother-sister") are classified as 
ordinates (internal responses). 
3. All potential coordinate responses which seemed intended as 
synonyms are classified as such (external responses). 
4. All part-whole relat i onships are classified as subordinate-
superordinate, and vice versa. 
5. All clearly egocentric responses (those in which the 
association is "me," "I," "mine" and the like) are classified as 
indirect responses. 
6. All substantive attributes (e.g. "fur-animal," "bird-
feathers") are included as indefinite grouping responses. 
7. All paralinguistics and kinesics are classified as failures, 
even though they may have been intended to serve as a "meaningful" 
response. 
It should be noted that no formal computation of the statistical 
validity or reliability of the Jung-Riklin classification system has 
yet been done. 
6This analysis was performed on fifty individuals, before the data 
from Dyad 15 were obtained; it is doubtful t hat they would have 
significantly influenced the results. 
7The individuals in Jung and Riklin 's sample divide fairly evenly 
into four main groups, three of which reflected a specific reaction 
category, the ordinate, the predicate, and the linguistic-motor 
response. A fourth group gave associations which reflected no specific 
categorial approach to the stimulus word, but rather bespoke some inner 
emotional reflection on the stimulus; their mixed production was 
described as being organized around "complexes," or affectively-charged 
clusters of associations with highly personal content. The 
identification of a "complex type," of which Jung and Riklin offered 
examples of three degrees of subdivision, requires a consideration of 
factors which go beyond the simple classification of response words 
into their appropriate relational categories, and for that reason, 
although the present discussion will refer to a "mixed reaction type" 
in instances when no single relational category is found to 
predominate, this designation is not in any way meant to be interpreted 
as referring to the presence of complexes. And even though nearly all 
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of Jung and Riklin's "complex type" subjects show the diffuse figures 
of a mixed reaction style, the mixed type, as discussed here, is not to 
be taken as identical to the Jung-Riklin complex type. 
BJung and Riklin's use of the term "predicate type" has psychological 
implications beyond the identification of a tendency to produce 
predicates IOC>re than a third of the time on a word association test. 
Their "predicate type" individuals were distinguished by an ability to 
produce vivid internal imagery in response to the stirrrulus-word, and 
proved incapable of dividing their attention in the distraction portion 
of the Burgholzli experiment. Because these two factors were not 
investigated in the present experiment, it may not be entirely 
appropriate to refer to those with high predication rates as "predicate 
types" in the technical sense of the term. For lack of a better term, 
they are so designated in this text, but with the understanding that 
they may not share the other characteristics distinguishing Jung and 
Riklin's "predicate types." 
9Th.is would, in fact, be the case if the children conformed to the 
pattern observed by Entwisle (1966) in young children. Children too 
young to have made the "paradigmatic shift" would have responded with 
syntagrnatic (predicative) reactions, classified as "internal" 
responses, and would thus not show the "blunting" associated with an 
increasing number of external reactions. 
10Furst (1918, p. 441) attributed this increase to the tendency of 
older people to allow themselves more access to their em::>tions. She 
also found predication to be inversely correlated with educational 
level, in contradiction to the observation made by Jung and Riklin, 60% 
of whose predicate-type respondents were among their well educated 
subjects. 
llrn the present sample, there were twelve m::>ther-son dyads, eleven 
father-daughter dyads, twelve father-son dyads, and fourteen 
mother-daughter dyads, for a total of 49 parent-child dyads altogether. 
Mothers were present in all eleven analysed families, fathers in only 
eight of them. 
12 11 Ross Test of Higher Cognitive Processes: Manual," p. 5. The test 
has been in use since 1976. 
Chapter v. 
lvygotsky (1986) credits Piaget with the insight that granunar rrrust 
precede logic in a child's cognitive development. An educational 
system which bypasses the fundamentals leaves little for later 
instruction to build upon. 
2This fact becomes all the more surprising in light of the evident 
absence of a critical attitude on the part of some critical thinking 
theorists toward the work of their own unacknowledged and unnamed 
authorities. The popularity of these secondary thinkers is in direct 
proportion to their failure to identify their sources, and 
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unfortunately, their clientele is not intellectually well-enough versed 
to be able to identify the sources on their own. There may well be 
those who, in good faith, believe that the primary and secondary nature 
expounded by Paul is an insight which originated with him, or that 
"dialogical process" is something new under the sun. 
3Gardner (1983) imagines that Freud would have been appreciative of 
his theory of :multiple intelligences. It is unclear what would have 
led him to this conclusion. Jung, on the other hand, would certainly 
have welcomed the insight Gardner has brought to the problem of 
personality and cognition. 
4such work would most certainly require the construction of a 
different word list than the one used in the present study; 
furthermore, the test would need to run to a minirm.un of 200 words. The 
procedure of adapting the word list to the specific situation presented 
by the client was one Jung frequently employed. 
5This is dialectic in the specifically Platonic sense, not the 
dialectic of Hegel, Marx, Sartre or any of the modern philosophical or 
political dialecticians. Jung referred to his own therapeutic method 
as dialectical, and may have had in mind some passage like this one 
from Plato's Republic (Book VII, p. 254): " ••• the method of dialectic 
is the only one ... doing away with assumptions and travelling up to 
the first principle of all, so as to make sure of confirmation there. 
When the eye of the soul is sunk in a veritable slough of barbarous 
ignorance, this method gently draws it forth and guides it upwards, 
assisted in this work of conversion by the arts we have enumerated." 
Plato believed, however, that a true dialectical exploration could not 
be done with individuals prior to the age of thirty, and that a 
rigorous course of instruction in music and mathematics should precede 
any inquiry pursued by means of dialectic. Anicius Boethius (see 
Chapter 1, note 5, above), the sixth-century Roman public 
administrator, :musicologist, and avid student of the interface between 
language and logic, whose great project of translation literally 
bequeathed the texts of Aristotle to a Roman empire on the very brink 
of the Dark Ages (a slough of barbarous ignorance indeed) made an 
impassioned plea for the study of logic as a means of staving off 
social and cultural disaster. His career ended in disaster, with an 
unjust imprisonment and execution, but prior to his death he was able 
to complete a brief manuscript, The Consolation of Philosophy, which 
may contain the first recorded use of the dialectic for 
psychotherapeutic purposes. In an earlier essay, I described this 
small masterpiece as a complete course in the methodology of critical--
and creative--thinking. 
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APPENDIX 1 
List of Stirrnilus l'k>rds, Word Association Experi:rrent 
1. head 51. frog 
2. green 52. separate 
3. water 53. hunger 
4. sing 54. white 
5. death 55. child 
6. long 56. pay attention 
7. ship 57. pencil 
8. pay 58. sad 
9. window 59. plum 
10. friendly 60. marry 
11. table 61. house 
12. ask 62. love 
13. cold 63. glass 
14. stem 64. quarrel 
15. dance 65. fur 
16. village 66. big 
17. lake 67. carrot 
18. sick 68. paint 
19. pride 69. part 
20. cook 70. old 
21. ink 71. flower 
22. angry 72. beat 
23. needle 73. box 
24. swim 74. wild 
25. journey 75. family 
26. blue 76. wash 
27. lamp 77. cow 
28. sin 78. strange 
29. bread 79. happiness 
30. rich 80. lie 
31. tree 81. conduct 
32. stab 82. narrow 
33. pity 83. brother 
34. yellow 84. fear 
25. mountain 85. dog 
36. play 86. false 
37. salt 87. anxiety 
38. new 88. kiss 
39. custom 89. fire 
40. ride 90. pure 
41. money 91. door 
42. stupid 92. choose 
43. notebook 93. hay 
44. despise 94. quiet 
45. finger 95. ridicule 
46. dear 96. sleep 
47. bird 97. month 
48. fall 98. nice 
49. book 99. woman 
50. unjust 100. talk 
APPENDIX 2 
Part II, Ross Test of Higher Cognitive Processes 
Section II, Deductive Reasoning 
In this part of the test, you will be asked to read some statements and then decide 
what conclusions could logically follow from what the statements say. 
Read the following statements: 
Alf quarks are purple. 
All purple things melt in the sun. 
If you assume these statements to be true, which of the following conclusions would 
logically follow from them? 
Therefore, 
Quarks melt in the sun. 
All purple things are quarks. 
All things which melt in the sun are purple. 
The first conclusion, "Quarks melt in the sun," does follow from the statements 
above. The other two do not follow, since other things besides quarks can be purple 
(such as grapes), and other things will melt in the sun (such as snow). You would 
mark your answer sheet this way: 
Quarks melt in the sun. 
A. conclusion follows .. ............... (A) r81 
B. conclusion does not follow .... .. .... . (B) 0 
All purple things are quarks. 
A. conclusion follows .......... . .... . . (A) 0 
B. conclusion does not follow . ......... . (8) ~ 
All things which melt in the sun are quarks. 
A. conclusion follows .. . . . ......... . . . (A) 0 
B. conclusion does not follow ..... . ... . . (B) C3l 
You will be given some statements like the ones above. Do not be concerned about 
the truth of the statements-Just assume that the statements are true. You must 
decide whether the conclusions beneath them do or do not follow from the informa-
tion gjven in the statements. More than one conclusion ,nay folloW; or none of the 
conclusions may follow. 
When you are told to do so, turn to the following page. 
Read the statements carefully. Then read each conclusion. 
Mark your answer sheet (A) if the conclusion follows. 
Mark your answer sheet (B) if the conclusion does not follow. 
If spiders can fly, then spiders have wings. 
Spiden do not have wings but they all have feathers. 
Therefore, 
15. Either spiden fly or they have wings. 
A. conclusion follows .. . . . ........ . ... (Al D 
B. conclusion does not follow . . ...... .. (Bl D 
16. If spiders have feathers, then they fly. 
A. conclusion follows ................. (Al 0 
8. conclusion does not follow ...... . ... (Bl D 
17. Some spiders have no feathers. 
A. conclusion follows .. .. ........... . . (Al D 
B. conclusion does not follow . .. .. . .... (Bl D 
All palimons are known to be fish eaters. 
Palimons are also migratory creatures. 
Therefore, 
18. All fish eaters are palimons. 
A. conclusion follows ... . . .. . . ... .. . . . (Al D 
B. conclusion does not follow . . . .. .. . .. (B) 0 
19. All fish eaters are migratory. 
A. conclusion follows ..... . ... .. .. .. . . (Al 0 
B. conclusion does not follow .......... (Bl D 
20. All migratory creatures are palimons. 
A. conclusion follows . ..... . .. .. .. . .. . (Al D 
B. conclusion does not follow .... .. .... (Bl 0 
l 
~ 
All of Joyce's pets have four legs, but none of them have tails. 
No gremlies have four legs and no greml ies have tails. 
Therefore, 
21. Some gremlies have tails, but none have four legs. 
A. conclusion follows ..... . .. .. . . .. . .. (Al D 
B. conclusion does not follow . . . .. ... . . (Bl D 
22. If a gremlie has a tail, it will have four legs. 
A. conclusion follows ... . .. ... .. . . . ... (Al 0 
8. conclusion does not follow . .... .. ... (Bl 0 
23. None of Joyce's pets are gremlies. 
A conclusion follows .. . . .. . . . . ... . .. . (Al 0 
B. conclusion does not follow .......... (Bl D 
Ten Arabs left the town of Sahib and went into the desert with eight camels. 
One week later, five of these Arabs arrived at the first oasis. 
Each one was riding on a camel. 
The camels were very thirsty and immediately began drinking water from the oasis. 
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Therefore, 
24. The three camels who did not arrive at the oasis returned to Sahib. 
A. conclusion follows .... . . . ..... . . .. . (A) 0 
B. conclusion does not follow .......... (B) 0 
25. Arabs can travel from Sahib to the first oasis in less than nine days. 
A. conclusion follows . . ..... . . . ....... (A) 0 
8. conclusion does not follow ...... . ... (B) 0 
26. The three camels who did not arrive at the oasis are not being ridden 
by Arabs. 
A. conclusion follows . ..... . . . ... .. .. . (A) 0 
B. conclusion does not follow .. .. ...... (B) 0 
If a person is a Caledonian, he is a pragmatist. 
Persons who are Simians are also pragmatists. 
Therefore, 
27. Simians are pragmatists. 
A. conclusion follows ........... .. .... (A) D 
B. conclusion does not follow .. . ..... . . (8) D 
28. Caledonians are Sim ians. 
A. conclusion fol lows .......... . . . ... . (A) D 
B. conc lusion does not follow .. ....... . (B)O 
29. If you are a pragmatist you are a Simian. 
A. conclusion follows .. .... ........... (A) D 
B. conclusion does not follow . . ........ (B) D 
All Frenchmen eat meat. 
Frenchmen from Normandy eat only beef and Frenchmen from Brittany eat 
only mutton. 
Some Frenchmen are blond. 
Therefore, 
30. Some mutton eaters are from Brittany. 
A. conclusion follows .......... ... .... (A) D 
B. conclusion does not follow .. . . . . ... . (B)('] 
31. All Frenchmen eat beef. 
A. conclusion follows . .. . . . ........... (A)O 
8. conclusion does not follow ...... . .. . (B)O 
32. Blond Frenchmen from Normandy eat only beef. 
A. conclusion follows ........... . . . ... (A) D 
8. conclusion does not follow ......... . (8)0 
(This is rfl• end of S«tion II.) STOP! Please close your test booklet. 





A P P E N D I X 3 
LEXICON OF RESPONSES 
(First 50 respondents only. Number in parenthesis indicates 
frequency of response) 
head: toe (9), foot (8), shoulders (6), feet (3), body (2), brain 
(2), hair (2), eyes (2), games (2), neck, shoulder, Ed, brains, cold, 
tail, tails, heart, family, me, ear, dick, butt, (*) 
green: blue (20), grass (7), yellow (4), red (3), purple (2), nail, 
pink, foot, money, black, water, tree, plant, head, white, peppers, 
orange, Irish 
water: wet (6), drink (4), blue (3), ocean (3), swim (3), cold (2), 
fire (2), sand (2), H20 (2), sea (2), air (2), ice (2), rnayim, pure, 
water, land, beach, clear, fall, falls, sled, brook, tea, snow, wash, 
snake, salt, steam, pink 
sing: song (20), dance (5), music (4), voice (2), bottled, rupture, 
opera, loud, note, choir, chorus, church, hymns, notes, tune, choral 
union, songs, whistle, object,--, rap, yell, cry 
death: life (21), birth (2), wish (2), funeral (2), me (2), end (2), 
dentist, black, cold, grim reaper, heaven, sadness, alive, Poe, 
misery, Woody Allen, live, eternity, grief, dirt, undertaker, die, 
napalm, peace, sorrow 
lcmg: short (43), life (3), tall, string, line, winding 
ship: sail (14), boat (13), ocean (4), sea (3), sailing (2), water 
(2), wreck (2), awash, ahoy, anchor, cruise, float, shore, oil, 
shape, fool, fools 
pay: money (25), work (4), day (2), toll, peg, hair, cash, scale, 
good, rent, spend, party, wages, debt, remit, later, not, not enough, 
broke,--, paymaster, shit 
window: pane (12), glass (10), door (6), sill (3), light (3), view 
( 2) , broken ( 2) , frame ( 2) , clear ( 2) , shade, "pain" , Quincy, look, 
see, box, look, wash 
friendly: nice (9), happy (5), mean (4), hostile (3), ice cream (3), 
unfriendly (2), dog, waitress, smile, courteous, pleasant, monkey, 
people, neighbor, short, helpful, ghost, Quaker, cheerful, warm, 
amicable, me, sad, hate, frank, stubbornness, mad, loving, family, 
table: chair (31), cloth (4), top (3), chairs (3), dirty, tennis, 
silverware, spoon, eat, legs, house, manners, network 
ask: question (14), receive (8), tell (6), why (4), answer (3), seek 
(2), reply (2), care, say, (phrase), speak, please, demand, help, 
told, offer, given, give 
cold: hot (34), warm (5), ice (2), nose, coal, hope, soft, hand, 
freezing, heat, snow, grip 
stem: flower (20), rose (7), stern (2), plant (2), leaf (2), blossom 
(2), petal, from, stamina, root, branch, turn, piece, glass,--, 
thorn, base, peas, trees, apple, greens 
dance: sing (13), music (6), walk (4), waltz (3), hop (3), move (3), 
ballet (2), song (2), fast (2), twist (2), club, jitterbug, dancing, 
floor, happy, around, polka, play, shoes, sit 
village: town (14), people (13), city (4), house (4), country (2), 
Indians (2), pretty, hut, shepherd, houses, villain, small, green, 
hot, cottage, blacksmith, idiot 
lake: pond (11), water (9), ocean (5), river (4), sea (3), swim (3), 
placid (2), fish (2), glassy, lace, clear, shore, Champaign, green, 
tree, restful, cold, cool, swan boats 
sick: well (13), ill (9), healthy (4), health (3), medicine (2), 
mind, dog, old, dying, fever, dead, bed, weak, thermometer, me, 
better, poor, not well, ail, tired, puppy, cold, humor, flu 
pride: joy (12), prejudice (4), proud (3), lion (3), -- (3), honor 
(2), self-esteem (2), courage (2), card, country, punishment, "goeth 
before a fall," (2), fall (2), people, humility, passion, honesty, 
loyal, happy, lie, accomplishment, invention, anger, pompous, sorrow 
cook: food (12), clean (10), eat (5), burn (2), raw (2), meat, done, 
house, spaghetti, hook, winter, heat, fishing, pan, often, job, make, 
ship, meal, roast, fry, good, never, hungry 
ink: pen (17), well (6), blot (4), write (3), blue (3), black (3), 
red (2), blotter (2), paper (2), damage, foot, business, spot, paint, 
mess, pencil, lead 
angry: mad (13), sad (11), happy (8), upset (2), joy (2), --, IIE, 
squid, frustrated, anger, mean, cry, red, temper, shout, hate, nice, 
irate, sin 
needle: thread (19), sew (11), point (3), sewing (3), haystack (3), 
pin (2), extraction, pins, lion, tattoo, medicine, stick, nose, pain, 
sharp 
swim: water (10), sink (7), drown (3), dive (3), lake (3), float (3), 
ocean (2), sea (2), pool (2), fun (2), swam, pleasure, wet, sport, 
murky, suit, jog, can't, sun, exercise, paddle, beach, tide 
journey: trip (14), travel (10), adventure (3), long (2), far (2), 
thousand miles, earth, bad rock bands, center of the earth, dot, life, 
mountains, path, backpack, end, unknown, roads, Ohio, London, 
vacation, voyage, forward, me, tour 
blue: green (9), sky (7), red (6), black (3), white (3), water (2), 
purple (2), ocean (2), pink, color, lagoon, flag, ink, gold, cold, 
moon, Frank Sinatra, sad, grass, coat, eyes, velvet, clear, door 
lalll): light (30), shade (11), post (3), table, bulb, illumination, 
candle, see, on 
sin: evil (6), bad (5), hell (3), wrong (2), church (2), mortal (2), 
confession (2), mean, none, fun, religion, pale, God, how, repentance, 
confess, redemption, dirt, -cerely, Kristen, hook, daily, offense, 
death, joy, good, embarrasment, kill, deed, lie, enemy, fall, burn, 
blessing, --
bread: butter (18), water (14), food (5), wine (2), dough (2), glare, 
blood, eat, milk, wheat, peanut butter, chew, jelly, crumbs 
rich: poor (43), money (3), food, mousse, rest, wish 
tree: leaves (7), green (6), wood (4), plant (3), flower (3), leave 
(3), fall (3), top (2), house (2), shade (2), trunk (2), limb (2), 
leaf (2), leafs, grass, bark, chop chop, shrub, spring, bush, timber, 
branch, bird 
stab: knife (16), wound (7), kill (7), cut (2), hit, blood, hurt, 
no!, stick, stale, heart, Puerto Rican, gore, back, dagger, death, 
dead, fight, bleed, shoot, bad, sharp 
pity: sorrow (12), sad (7), sorry (4), poor (4), -- (3), compassion 
(2), don't, pittance, help, (*), ending, jealousy, tears, scorn, 
people, bullshit, shame, pathetic, sympathy, happy, pain, empathy, 
crook, blessing 
yellow: green (9), orange (5), flower (5), blue (4), rose (3), brown 
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(2), white (2), sun (2), buttercups (2), fever (2), ribbon (2), banana 
(2), --, rope, bright, dandelion, bus, gold, purple, black, coward, 
vegetable 
mountain: top (9), climb (6), hill (5), snow (4), high (3), height 
(2), molehill (2), stream (2), valley (2), peak, sky, dew, mound, ice, 
landscape, mountains, range, woods, pretty, lake, ski, higher, forest, 
walks 
play: game (7), fun (7), theater (3), work (3), enjoy (2), 
Shakespeare (2), happy (2), children (2), L'il Abner, play set, 
ground, friends, theater, jump, hopscotch, around, recess, good, room, 
act, hard, run, frolic, stay, fall, sports, show, games, toys, pen 
salt: pepper (39), water (4), food (2), battery, salt, shaker, swing, 
earth 
new: old (44), expensive, clothes, nu?, basic, needle, new 
custan: tradition (9), ritual (3), habit (3), house (3), -made (3), 
-- (2), design (2), old (2), radio, fit, customer, culture, mores, 
religion, song, won't, custard, foreign, hassle, dance, travel, 
airport, lore, trait, built, car, cars, usage, task, ethnic, nothing 
ride: horse (8), car (7), walk (6), bike (4), travel (2), joy (2), 
drive (2), fair,--, trip, train, fun, carnival, amusement park, 
(phrase), bull, rob, rode, fast, bus, ferris wheel, rollercoaster, 
merry-go-round, journey, free, sit 
im:mey: cash (10), spend (4), dollar (2), green (2), none (2), wealth, 
dough, (phrase), rob, exchange, dollars, need, rich, checks, wealthy, 
avarice, sin, people, good, work, a lot, bills, paper, security, tree, 
shop, hungry, power, freedom, pay, bucks, never, wish, broke 
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stupid: smart (18), dumb (12), silly (3), idiot (2), pet tricks, 
stupidity, inane, unintelligent, bright, dull, poor, fool, idiotic, 
unhappy, goofy, handicap, me, L., --
notebook: paper (11), pencil (6), pen (5), notes (5), write (3), 
school (3), pad (3), writing (2 ), class (2), homework (2), spiral, 
memos, papers, cover, study, Hasefer, looseleaf, reading book 
despise: hate (36), love (3), -- (2), Julienne, despondent, despite, 
enemy, deceit, dislike, admire, sad, like 
finger: hand (10), thumb (8), nail (7), point (5), ring (3), toe (2), 
tip, jam, hands, touch, plan, death, punch, 1:x)ne, pull, print, digit, 
middle, -licking, lake, writing 
dear: doe (5), animal (4), love (4), hunter (3), honey (3), sweet 
(3), antelope (2), John (2), antler, antlers, dog, liar, nice, bear, 
sweetheart, darling, fond, hunt, heart, Marie, Mom, endearment, elk, 
shot, none, friend, close, valuable, chain, Bambi, leather, rabbit 
bird: fly (16), sing (4), song (3), cage (2), tweet (2), house (2), 
feathers (2), feather, (visual), flower, horse, parrot, Auntie, in the 
sky, cardinal, wing, of, paradise, jay, fly away, bath, avian, 
sparrow, flight, birdseed, dog 
fall: winter (7), drop (4), hurt (4), down (3), trip (3), water (3), 
foliage (2), spring (2), get up (2), autumn (2), free, Niagara, guy, 
crash, fast, air, cold, cool, pretty, plunge, leaves, (phrase), thump, 
ouch, jump, stand, stand up 
book: read (22), paper (4), cover (3), mark (3), reading (2), end 
(2), open (2), bag, -ish, story, knowledge, pen, magazine, page, 
pages, shelf, worm, learning, candle 
unjust: unfair (16), wrong (4), fair (4), justice (3), just (3), 
cruel (3), -- (2), court (2), evil, jail, corrupt, illegal, jury, 
Angelica, ugly, bad, travesty, liar, law, unequal, loose 
frog: toad (13), leap (8), green (7), pond (5), jump (4), reptile 
(2), tadpole (2), twitch, fraud, croak, ribit, turtle, hop, fantasy, 
genus, fly 
separate: together (9), apart (8), divorce (4), divide (4), part (2), 
equal (2), eggs, severance, despise, care, in between, put together, 
not together, pull, love, combine, rrove, marriage, congeal, split, 
alone, pull apart, broken, depart, sad, departed, take apart 
hl.Dlger: thirst (10), pain (9), food (4), eat (4), starve (3), 
starving (3), pang (2), poor (2), starvation, hungry, stomach, yearn, 
bad, pains, illness, skinny, despair, famished, strike, full 
white: black (33), snow (2), man, trash, glare, apron, pure, bride, 
brown, jealous, sheet, flat, cloud, flag, blue, red, dove 
child: play (6), adult (6), kid (6), baby (5), mother (3), little 
(3), boy (2), love (2), son (2), grown-up (2), joy (2), tot (2), cute, 
-hood, whining, smile, Jamie, me, man, children, body 
pay attenticm: listen (12), ignore (3), -- (2), school (2), strict 
(2), span (2), concentrate, think, daydream, distracted, short 
attention span, acknowledge, alert, yes ma'am, not me, forget, 
thought, teacher, observe, me, stop it, heed, to what, huh, attend, 
never, concentration, fall asleep, learn, fool around, see, hear, 
wander 
pencil: pen (26), paper (10), write (3), lead (2), eraser (2), 
writing, sharpener, neck, notebook, holder, pad 
sad: happy (32), glad (4), cry (3), unhappy (3), face, mad, 
melancholy, cheerful, pensive, blue, sorrow, sorry 
plum: fruit (10), purple (9), peach (7), cherry (3), pudding (3), 
tree (3), apple (2), pear, red, eat, fall, apricot, nectarine, pit, 
grape, sloe, tart, juicy, Jack, granite 
marry: wed (8), divorce (5), dead (2), quite contrary, John, narrate, 
engage, Paul, wife, death, Robin Hood, woman, ring, family, see, 
happiness, unwed, ball and chain, love, with children, church, happy, 
separate, commitment, haste, single, mistake, unhappy, repent, ring, 
bachelor, lover, spouse, join, lamb, divorced, why, no 
house: home (16), live (4), car (2), apartment (2), building, 
(visual), hold, maison, work, brick, rooms, cat, dwelling, lot, cold, 
live in, big, family, buy, barn, shoe, camping, white, rrortgage, 
fence, Police Academy, bills, light, security, shack · 
love: hate (24), cherish (2), marriage (2), heart (2), husband (2), 
care, oh--Lynn, (phrase), lords, bump, goddess, people, person, 
happiness, good, caring, mate, peace, joy, death, yuk, fulfillment, 
romance 
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glass: break (9), window (4), water (4), clear (3), broken (3), drink 
(3), cup (2), bottle (2), house (2), --, figurines, tumbler, tinker, 
shiny, stone, transparent, tree, wine, dish, drinking glass, table, 
ice, sand, mirror, houses, cup, plastic 
quarrel: fight (24), argue (4), angry (4), spat (3), -- (2), argument 
(2), yell, rabbit, disagree, sad, ocean, reef, beautiful, unhappiness, 
make up, water, talk 
fur: coat (15), soft (7), animal (6), mink (2), dog (2), ball (2), 
hair (2), cat, animals, skin, tree, sable, stole, fuzzy, critter, 
wall, -ry, animal killer, smooth, beaver, bunny, brown 
big: small (26), little (17), large (3), monstrous, tall, boat, 
better 
carrot: orange (12), stick (6), rabbit (4), cake (4), vegetable (4), 
Bugs Bunny (3), potato (2), food (2), cucumber, rabbits, the thing, 
red-orange, top, cook, carol, eat, long, peas, bugs, dick, peas 
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paint: brush (13), house (8), thinner (3), red (2), paper (2), picture 
(2), colors (2), wall (2), walls, purple, paintbrush, easel, draw, 
painter, color, never, art, work, weather-beaten, pretty, enamel, 
flower, pictures, marker 
part: separate (8), whole (6), hair (6), piece (3), play (3), car 
(2), --, some, all, section, divide, leave, arm, sever, cut, parking, 
break, time, broken, tear, fraction, combine, transplant, goodbye, 
fix, small, middle, body 
old: new (34), young (11), decrepit, man, older, used, car 
flower: rose (5), petal (4), bloom (4), stem (3), bud (3), pot (2), 
blossom (2), tree (2), pretty (2), daisy (2), seed (2), lovely (2), 
child (2), arrangement, flour, grow, tulip, smell, vase, Mom, bee, 
spring, white, bunny, beauty, sex, cactus, sweet 
beat: red (8), drum (6), hit (6), fight (4), vegetable (2), best, 
heart, dance, tired, egg, juice, whip, wife, sugar, club, win, won, 
carrot, hurt, up, eggs, rhythm, sour, nasty, cane, music, free, loss, 
box: cardboard (9), square (5), car (4), fight (3), present (3), 
carton (3), spar (2), bag (2), (visual), boxer, hold, can, in, round, 
storage, black, store, crate, container, big, package, money, pack, 
brown, string, gift, circle 
wild: tame (15), wooly (3), animal (3), free (3), calm (3), flower 
(2), tiger (2), crazy (2), young, stallions, horse, unruly, self, 
tamed, friendly, thing, streets, play, Trodges, Eric, wire, west, 
flowers, woman, me 
family: love (5), home (5), friends (4), together (3), ties (2), 
close (2), tree (2), parents, small, people, five, brother, unity, us, 
group, three, furnishing, children, clan, good, happy?, friend, loved 
ones, room, many, happiness, crazy, divorce, gathering, household, 
circle, house, unit, cousins 
wash: dry (16), clean (11), clothes (11), rinse (3), dishes (2), 
laundry (2), washer, care, fold, cloth, --
cow: milk (22), moo (6), horse (6), calf (3), pasture (2), Ron, 
cower, cud, big, mule, spotted, me, fat, Holstein, chicken, farm 
strange: odd (14), wierd (11), familiar (3), unusual (3), different 
(2), pickle, potato, friendly, everything, string, sure, fellow, 
unnormal, normal, ex-wife, me, family, you, people, queer, Bobby, 
custom, concern 
happiness: sadness (9), love (3), sad (3), glad (2), joy (2), 
contentment (2), good (2), gladness, teddy bears, hardness, pig, 
vacation, white, rare, elusive, travel, unhappiness, people, smile, 
pleasant, tranquility, nintendo, prosperity, child, wife, warm puppy, 
goodness, unhappy, elate, (phrase), sorrow, laughing, gaiety, wealthy 
lie: truth (10), down (4), untruth (3), steal (3), fib (3), deceit 
(3), deceive (3), deception (2), cheat (2), don't (2), -- (2), lime, 
evil, fabricate, tale, wrong!, still, dishonest, prevaricate, tell, 
treachery, Benedict Arnold, you, see 
conduct: behavior (12), effort (2), action (2), good (2), bad (2), 
exemplary (2), correct (2), lead (2), corrigate, perform, actions, 
order, propriety,--, poor, gross, -ivity, yes, behave, electric, 
lead, demeanor, language, attach, direct, music, orchestra, 
orchestration, manifest, disconduct, teach, grade 
narrow: wide (21), thin (7), small (4), slim (3), margin (3), -minded 
(2), road (2), normal, pass, myopic, lx>rder, shoes, thick, inlet, lx>ne 
brother: sister (40), son (2), -hood (2), mother, friend, little, 
lx>rder, relative, kind 
fear: scared (9), afraid (4), brave (4), anxiety (2), light (2), 
courage, (2), -some, forward, monster, old, death, bravery, no, 
unknown, excitement, fright, agony, horror, frightning, loathing, 
just, egg, ok, sad, shy, timid, fearless, hate, worry, anger, climate, 
no fear, scary 
dog: cat (43), -gone (2), Bandit, Katy, mouse, fur, puppy 
false: true (24), lie (6), untrue (3), truth (2), teeth (2), lies, not 
right, heart, real, -ies, answer, not, furrow, fake, hope, 
perspective, -hood, wrong 
anxiety: attack (13), fear (6), -- (4), nervous (3), stress (2), 
happiness (2), now!, uncomfortable, Arbus, wierd, hope, separation, 
upset, rushing into, worry, anger, caffeine, unrest, daily, tension, 
nerves, sad, pain, stillness, depression, anxiousness 
kiss: hug (12), love (11), lips (5), affection (2), death (2), tell 
(2), smooch (2), peck, goodbye, coarse, good, foreplay, hickey, 
chocolate, make up, yuk, passion, back, 108 FM, hate, --
fire: hot (9), burn (9), water (7), heat (2), house (2), plug (2), 
hose, wire, sun, alarm, smoke, ice, salt, bug, reject, place, hurt, 
starter, calm, unemployed, rain, wild, bacon, man, burning 
pure: white (7), clean (3), unadulterated (3), snow (3), natural (2), 
dirty (2), good (2), water (2), wholesome, essence, -ify, porous, 
rich, salt, juice, virgin, hot, true, love, --, tainted, just, and 
just, coke, gold, new, strange, innocence, rain, soiled, unpure, 
simple, innocent, fake 
door: knob (13), open (12), window (9), close (2), entrance (2), 
nail, drawer, hinge, gate, lock, out, closet, group, house, egress, 
opening, handle 
ch<x>se: pick (15), select (5), choice (2), decide (2), change (2), 
food, shoes, constrain, choices, passage, correctly, pepsi, to, not, 
see, opt,--, guess, family, spits, song, shirt, avoid, options, 
special, socks, one, elect, take 
hay: grass (6), horse (6), horses (4), needle (4), ride (3), straw 
(3), yellow (3), what? (2), stack (2), mow (2), cow (2), market (2), 
farm (2), food, sun, field, barn,--, love, harrow, eat, alfalfa 
quiet: loud (18), noisy (6), peace (3), peaceful (3), solitude (2), 
time (2), calm (2), room, soothing, good, silent, outspoken, -tude, 
quarantine, sad, field, still, noise, soft, storm, short 
ridicu1e: laugh (5), taunt (3), tease (3), -- (3), make fun (3), joke 
(2), stupid, Saturday Evening Post, righteous, ridiculous, funny, 
unjust, unjustly, put down, shame, deception, no, making fun of, make 
a fool of, fool, persecute, scorn, deride, make fun of, compliment, 
degrade, pick on, mistreat, nasty, fun, embarrassed, comnent, sad, 
dislike, insult, love, hate 
sleep: awake (12), tired (6), peace (3), nap (2), night (2), sound 
(2), dream (2), now!, fleas, wild, wake, long, unusual, comfortable, 
good night, pillow, good, wake up, weary, snore, day, deprivation, 
restless, quiet, eight hours, peaceful, up, sigh 
month: year (18), day (8), week (3), teeth (2), days, day/year, 
montage, calendar, May, 30, 30th, years, four weeks, IOC>On, birthday, 
eat, September, January, February, December, August, July, end 
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nice: gcxxl (6), bad (5), sweet (4), easy (3), happy (3), person (2), 
mean (2), pleasant (2), kind (2), false, cat, nights, looking, stars, 
unjust, nice, spice, great, last, pretty, day, loving, weather, yes, 
friendly, ok, kiss, quiet, naughty, lousy 
wcam: man (35), men, -hcxxl, worm, hold, marry, love, child, 
daughters, babe, pretty, good, Mom, flower, fat, complain 
talk: speak (10), loud (4), quiet (4), conversation (3), chatter (3), 
silence (2), chat (2), yell (2), cheap (2), discuss (2), voice, walk, 
speech, yes, slow, openly, listen, say, show, happy talk, work, soft, 
see, torrent, not, laugh 




INTERNAL FAMILY GROUPINGS, VERBAL RESPONSES IN Cct,1MON 
FAMILY 1 
4 Responses in conmen 
sad/happy 
big/small 



























3 Responses in Corrmon 
death/life 
long/short 


















4 Responses in Corrmon 
new/old 
despise/hate 





















































































FAMILY 5 (con't) 



































3 Responses in Corrmon 
19 pairs 
FAMILY 9 






























INTERNAL FAMILY GROUPINGS, CATEGORIAL RESPONSES IN COMMON 
FAMILY 1 FAMILY 4 
5 ResJX)nses in Conmen 8 Res~nses in Common 4 ResJX)nses in Cormnon 
F & 4 children 3 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9 3 1,2,3,5 3 
M & 4 children 1 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 1 4,7,8,9 2 
F,M,ld,ls,2s 1 1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9 1 4,5,6,8 2 
F ,M, 2d, ls, 2s 1 1,2,3,4,5,7,8,9 1 2,3,5,8 2 
1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9 1 1,6,7,9 1 
4 Responses in Common 2,4,5,8 1 
F,2d,ls,2s 7 7 Responses in Common 4,5,6,7 1 
F ,M, 2d, ls 1 1,4,5,6,7,8,9 2 2,7,8,9 1 
F,M,ls,2s 1 1,2,3,4,6,7,9 1 2,5,6,8 1 
M,ld,2d,ls 1 1,2,3,4,5,6,8 1 3,4,7,9 1 
M,2d,ls,2s 1 1,2,3,5,6,8,9 1 2,6,7,9 1 
F, ld, 2d, ls 1 1,2,3,5,6,7,9 1 1,2,8,9 1 
F,M,ld,ls 1 1,2,4,5,7,8,9 1 1,3,5,8 1 
1,3,4,5,7,8,9 1 1,3,4,5 1 
3 Responses in Common 2,3,4,5,6,7,9 1 4,5,8,9 1 
F ,M, ls 8 2,3,4,6,7,8,9 1 2,4,7,9 1 
F,ls,2s 7 2,3,4,5,6,7,8 1 1,3,6,8 1 
2d,ls,2s 5 1,3,8,9 1 
F,ld,ls 4 6 Responses in Common 2,3,7,9 1 
F,2d,2s 3 1,2,4,7,8,9 3 4,6,7,8 1 
M, ld, ls 3 1,2,3,5,6,8 2 4,6,7,9 1 
F, 2d, ls 2 1,3,4,6,7,9 1 1,4,7,8 1 
M, ld, 2d 2 1,4,5,6,8,9 1 1,2,3,8 1 
M, 2d, ls 2 1,2,4,6,7,9 1 
F ,M, ld 2 1,2,3,6,7,8 1 3 Responses in Common 
M,2d,2s 1 1,4,6,7,8,9 1 2,7,9 4 
ld,2d,ls 1 1,2,3,4,5,7 1 1,3,5 3 
F, ld, 2s 1 2,3,6,7,8,9 1 4,7,9 3 
M, ld, 2s 1 2,3,4,5,6,8 1 2 I 4 I 5· 3 
ld,ls,2s 1 4,5,7 3 
F ,M, 2s 1 5 Responses in Common 1,6,9 2 
M,ls,2s 1 1,4,7,8,9 1 1, 8,9 2 
F ,M, 2d 1 1,2,3,5,8 1 3,5,8 2 
1,2,3,7,8 1 3,4,6 2 
FAMILY 2 1,2,3,5,6 1 1,2,3 2 
3 Res~nses in Corrmon 1,2,4,5,6 1 1,5,6 2 
F,M,s 12 1,2,3,5,7 1 1,7,9 2 
F,d,s 7 1,3,5,7,9 1 1,4,5 1 
M,d,s 6 1,2,5,7,9 1 2,3,9 1 
F,M,d 4 1,2,3,5,9 1 2,5,6 1 
1,3,6,7,8 1 1,2,8 1 
FAMILY 3 1,2,4,6,9 1 6,7,8 1 
3 Responses in Cormnon 1,4,6,7,9 1 3,7,8 1 
F ,M, 2s 9 2,3,4,7,9 1 5,7,9 1 
F ,M, ls 8 2,5,7,8,9 1 1,3,9 1 
F, ls, 2s 7 2,3,4,6,7 1 2,7,8 1 
M, ls, 2s 7 2,4,5,6,7 1 4,8,9 1 
3,4,5,6,7 1 2,5,8 1 
3,4,6,7,9 1 1,4,7 1 
4,5,6,7,9 1 2,8,9 1 




















5 Responses in 
F ,M, ld, 3d,4d 
F, ld, 2d, 3d, 4d 
F,M,ld,2d,3d 
F,M,2d,3d,4d 
F ,M, ld, 2d,4d 
4 Responses in 
F,ld,2d,3d 
F ,M, 2d ,4d 
M, 2d, 3d ,4d 
M, ld, 2d, 3d 
F ,M, 2d, 3d 
F,2d,3d,4d 
M,ld,3d,4d 
F ,M, ld, 2d 
F ,M, ld,4d 

























































M, 2d ,3d 1 
FAMILY 11 
3 Responses in Common 
F ,M, 2s 12 
M, 2s,4s 6 
F ,M,4s 4 
F,2s,4s 4 
